

***Observing Nicaragua's Elections, 1989-1990***

The Carter Center

May 1990

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## **Nicaraguan Electoral Process**

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**Hon. Ambler Moss**, Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami; U.S. Ambassador to Panama (1978-1982)

**Hon. Donal (Mike) O'Callaghan**, Former Governor of Nevada

**Hon. Claiborne Pell**, United States Senate (Dem.-Rhode Island); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**Hon. Larry Pressler**, United States Senate (Repub.-S.D.); Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**Hon. Bill Richardson**, U.S. House of Representatives (Dem.-New Mexico); Member, House Select Committee on Intelligence

**Hon. Olympia Snowe**, U.S. House of Representatives (Repub.-Maine); Member, Foreign Affairs Committee

**Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg**, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Democratic House and Senate Council

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- ! Nicaraguan Politics and the Central American Peace Plan
- ! Invitation to the Council to Monitor the Elections
- II. Pre-Election Activities of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government
- III. Election Day Observation
  - ! Voting Process
  - ! Counting Procedure
  - ! The Observers' Independent Vote Counts
  - ! Election Night
- IV. Election Results and Analysis
- V. The Transition
- VI. Inauguration and the Transfer of Power
- 6. List of Tables
  - I. Summary of Voting Sites (JRV's) Observed by Council
  - II. Presidential Vote Results by Party
  - III. Distribution of UNO Seats in the National Assembly
  - IV. Presidential, Legislative, Municipal, and Autonomy Council Results by Region
- 7. Appendices [See list below]
- 8. Press Clippings

14. December Pre-Election Trip Report, led by Jimmy Carter, former President Daniel Oduber, and Gov. Daniel Evans, December 13-16, 1989
  15. Decrees on Campaign Violence of the Supreme Electoral Council of December 16 and 16/18, 1989
  16. January Pre-Election Trip Report, led by Jimmy Carter, former President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, and Senator John Danforth, January 26-28, 1990
  17. Agreement on the Release of Funds to UNO and IPCE, January 28, 1990
  18. February Pre-Election Trip Report, led by Prime Minister George Price, former President Rodrigo Carazo, and Senator Christopher Dodd, February 8-11, 1990
  19. Supreme Electoral Council Decree on Announcement of Election Results, February 19, 1990
  20. Itinerary for Council's Election Visit
  21. Arrival Statements by Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister George Price, February 23, 1990
  22. Joint Statement of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on the Election Campaign, February 24, 1990
  23. Election-Day Observation
    - A. Deployments of Teams to all 9 regions
    - B. Council Observation Form
    - C. Council/OAS Quick Count Form
  24. Statements by President Daniel Ortega, Sra. Violeta de Chamorro, and President George Bush, February 26, 1990
  25. List of Members of the Legislative Assembly
  26. Transcript of Remarks by Jimmy Carter at Department of State, February 28, 1990; Statement by the Department of State on Nicaragua, March 2, 1990
  27. Protocol of Transition Between the Outgoing and Incoming Administrations, March 27, 1990
  28. Letters from Jimmy Carter to Mrs. Chamorro and Daniel Ortega, April 25, 1990
  29. Excerpts from Inaugural address of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, April 25, 1990
- ! Selected Bibliography on Nicaragua, Election Observation Reports, and Democracy



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## **Executive Summary**

1. During the entire electoral process, the political system in Nicaragua

Chamorro, and other key leaders in the country. The group also encouraged leaders from the major parties to understand the need for reconciliation after the election in order to rebuild the country and end the war.

7. Many problems arose throughout the course of the electoral process, but with the help and pressure of international observers, the dedication of the Supreme Electoral Council, and the desire of the political parties, most of these were addressed satisfactorily.
8. Voting procedures were excellent. A secret vote and honest count occurred.
9. The civic education campaign by the Supreme Electoral Council and the Church assured people that their vote was secret.
10. The dedication of the Nicaraguan people to vote for change and reconciliation offered the country the opportunity to heal its divisions and restore its economy within a new consensual framework. President Violeta

Anastasio Somoza Debayle, governed with increasing greed and repression until the latter was overthrown by a national revolution led by the Sandinista Front on July 19, 1979. Instead of being liberated from its tragic past, however, Nicaraguans-both Sandinistas and their adversaries-soon found themselves condemned to repeat it. (So too did the United States). The first Junta lasted less than one year before two moderate members, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, resigned over the direction that the FSLN was taking the country and over the postponement of elections.

In late 1980, the Sandinista government provided arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas, and within one year, the U.S. government began to organize and arm a counter-revolutionary group, subsequently known as the contras, to attack the Sandinistas. In March 1982, the Nicaraguan government declared a state of emergency, making dissent more difficult. The war expanded.

The government moved up the date of elections to November 1984. The opposition initially participated in the election, but after Sandinista harassment of some campaign rallies, several prominent groups withdrew and urged their followers to abstain. Though some international groups judged the election as basically fair, the victory of Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez was marred by the rejection of several prominent opposition groups and by the United States.

In January 1983, the Foreign Ministers of four governments-Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama-met on the Panamanian island of Contadora and launched negotiations designed to reduce external intervention and militarization and bring peace to Central America. Despite many draft treaties, the Contadora Initiative did not succeed.

The war intensified in 1985 and 1986, but so did the efforts by Central Americans to make peace. In Esquipulas, Guatemala in August 1987, the five Presidents signed a plan that had been first proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. As contrasted with the Contadora Plan that sought to end East-West conflict in the area, the Esquipulas Accord aimed to promote democratization and national reconciliation as the way to cut the cord connecting internal strife and international intervention. The Central American peace plan helped create an environment that made possible a dialogue between the Nicaraguan government and its internal and external (the contras) opposition.

At the inauguration of Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez in February 1989, Daniel Ortega discussed with Pérez and Jimmy Carter, among others, his ideas for moving up the scheduled elections in exchange for regional support for the demobilization of the contras. At their summit meeting at Tesoro Beach, El Salvador on February 14, 1989, the Central American presidents approved the plan. Nicaragua agreed to advance the scheduled elections from November 1990 to February 1990 and to reform its electoral law, and Honduras pledged to work with the UN and the OAS to demobilize and repatriate the contras.

One month later, on March 24, Secretary of State James Baker and the U.S. Congress completed the Bipartisan Accord which declared strong support for the Central American peace plan, denied further military aid to the contras, but allowed humanitarian aid until the elections.

In April 1989 the Sandinistadominated National Assembly approved a new electoral law, though the opposition was dissatisfied with it. In June, 14 political parties united to form the National Opposition Union (UNO) to contest the elections against the FSLN. Later in the month, the five members of the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) and their alternates were chosen by the National Assembly from lists provided by the political parties through President Ortega. UNO protested that the composition of the SEC favored the FSLN and only allowed for one of its members. The FSLN responded that there were two members from the FSLN, two from the opposition (one from UNO and the other from PCD), and one independent.

### **The Invitation to the Council**

In the Central American Accord signed in El Salvador on February 15, 1989, the five Presidents described the outlines of a free electoral process in Nicaragua, and President Ortega agreed to invite international observers, including the Secretaries General of the United Nations and the Organization of American State. Though the invitations were unprecedented, both international organizations accepted.

On March 30, 1989, several leaders of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, including Presidents Carter and Ford, President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela, Prime Ministers Michael Manley of Jamaica and George Price of Belize, former Presidents Rafael Caldera of Venezuela and Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica, met at The Carter Center with U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III (See appendix 1 for background on the Council and its composition). They discussed the entire Hemispheric Agenda, and agreed on the need for multilateral approaches to make peace in Central America and monitor elections.

At the meeting, the Council reviewed a preliminary report about the elections in Panama scheduled for May 7, 1989 and decided to monitor the election if the government permitted it. On April 24, President Carter sent Dr. Robert Pastor to Panama to meet with General Manuel Antonio Noriega and leaders of the opposition to discuss the prospects for monitoring the election. The opposition encouraged the Council to observe the elections, and General Noriega reluctantly accepted it.

Under the auspices of the Council Presidents Carter and Ford led an international and bipartisan delegation, sponsored by the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs, to observe the election. The Council found that the electoral process had not been fair, but Panamanians still turned out in large numbers to vote for change. A "quick count" organized by the Church suggested that Noriega's candidates lost by a margin of 3 to 1. When the proper vote counts were substituted by counterfeit ones, President Carter denounced this and urged the OAS to condemn Noriega and declare its support for the opposition coalition led by Guillermo Endara (See appendix 2 for Carter's letter to the OAS).

In June, President Daniel Ortega invited President Carter and Dr. Pastor to attend a symposium in Managua, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the revolution. President Carter sent a letter with Dr. Pastor that expressed his hope

that free and fair elections would end the conflict in Nicaragua and improve relations with the United States (See appendix 3 for President Carter's letter to Ortega). In late July, Dr. Pastor met with President Ortega, Vice President Ramirez, the President of the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC), and opposition leaders and described the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government and its various activities, including the observation of the elections in Panama. In August, President Ortega, the SEC, and UNO each sent letters to former President Carter, as Chair of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, inviting him to form a delegation to observe the electoral process (See appendix 4 for the invitations and President Carter's response). Given President Carter's record of denouncing the fraud in Panama, the decision to invite his group to Nicaragua was a sign of the seriousness of the parties to have a free and fair election in Nicaragua. The letters promised the Council unrestricted access to the entire electoral process and the vote count on election day. President Carter accepted the invitation and after consulting with members of the Council, assembled an international and bipartisan delegation of 34 people.

At the same time as President Ortega was inviting the Council, he responded to the request by the opposition parties for a National Dialogue to discuss their concerns about the electoral process. Further reforms were made to the electoral law to provide the most important guarantees desired by the opposition. All of the Nicaraguan parties that participated in the Dialogue also expressed their support for the demobilization of the contras (See appendix 5 for the political accord). Immediately after, the Tela summit meeting of the Central American presidents reaffirmed these points and established a combined OAS-UN mechanism for disarming and repatriating the contras.

By September 1989, ten parties and alliances had registered presidential and vice presidential candidates for the elections (See appendices 6 and 7).

## **II. Pre-Election Activities of The Council**

Former presidents Jimmy Carter and Raúl Alfonsín initiated the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government election-monitoring project with a visit to Nicaragua on September 16-19, 1989. They were accompanied by Senator David Morales Bello and Deputy Minister of the Presidency Beatrice Rangel of Venezuela, Raúl Alconada of Argentina, and Drs. Robert Pastor and Jennie Lincoln of The Carter Center (See appendix 8 for trip report).

The group met with government and opposition leaders and with the Supreme Electoral Council, who gave assurances that the Council's observer delegation would have complete access, along with the observer missions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, to the voting *and the counting*. The three observer groups would also receive copies of the certified final actas (vote tallies) so that they could undertake an independent tabulation of the vote. The group concluded at that time that although significant differences remained between the Nicaraguan government and the opposition on issues regarding media access, and the composition and balance of the Supreme Electoral Council, a commitment by both sides to participate in the elections was evident,

demonstrated especially by the August 4 Political Accord among the Nicaraguan political parties.

Former President Carter also travelled to the Atlantic Coast to meet with Minister of Interior Tomas Borge and to assess the conditions for the participation of the Miskito Indians in the political process. President Carter mediated an agreement whereby the government modified its previous conditions for the reentry of Miskito Indian leaders, and Brooklyn Rivera and other leaders agreed to return to Nicaragua to participate peacefully in the electoral process (See appendix 9). During the visit, President Carter also met with the observer missions of the UN and the OAS, and subsequently with OAS Secretary-General Joao Baena Soares and UN Special Representative Elliot Richardson in Washington, D.C. During these meetings, the three groups agreed to coordinate their missions to minimize duplication and improve their collective capacity to observe the elections.

Based on the September trip, President Carter and the Council staff developed the monitoring role and activities of the Council observer delegation, with the goals of observing the electoral process in an impartial and neutral manner and contributing to the task of national reconciliation in Nicaragua. A permanent office for the Council was established in Managua and Dr. Jennifer McCoy of Georgia State University was appointed to direct the office and represent the Council in Managua.

The monitoring activities of the Council were organized around the phases of the electoral process, beginning with the October voter registration drive, and continuing through the onset of the campaign in December, the growing intensity of the campaign's latter stages, the vote, the count, and the transition. Most members of the delegation visited Nicaragua at least once before the February elections to monitor the campaign period and to become acquainted with the process and the participants.

### **Voter Registration**

During four Sundays in October, a total of 1,752,088 Nicaraguans registered to vote, representing 89 percent of an estimated population of 1.9 million people. Former Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera and former Governor Bruce Babbitt led the second Council delegation on October 20-23, 1989, accompanied by former Governor Donal (Mike) O'Callaghan, Elizabeth Frawley-Bagley, and Harriet Babbitt (See appendix 10 for a list of members and a full report). The delegation observed the last Sunday of registration, during which it visited a total of 59 Juntas de Receptoras de Votos (JRV's or registration/voting sites) in three regions of the country-Leon, Granada and Managua-and found no significant irregularities. Based on discussions with party leaders and election officials, however, the group expressed its concern over several issues, including the need to extend registration in those regions in which not all JRV's were opened (especially Regions VI and VII), the need to open additional JRV's on election day to accommodate voters in those sites with more than 400 registrants, and the need to improve the inequity in access to television and radio for campaign purposes.

While technical and administrative difficulties slowed registration in the first two Sundays, and security reasons forced the closing of 63 JRV's, the international observers, the opposition and the Supreme Electoral Council concluded that for the most part, the registration effort was carried out smoothly and that the large numbers of registrants attested to a successful operation. (See appendix 11 for registration statistics by date and region. Due to security reasons, some registration sites were not opened in October; five sites were reopened on November 12 and twelve additional sites were reopened on February 11. The total registrants includes these late registrations as well as contras who returned and registered under the amnesty before February 5). The Supreme Electoral Council and UNO subsequently verified the voter registration lists, and *La Prensa* praised the registration process.

**Pre-Campaign Period**

**November 1 - December 3)**

With the close of the voter registration period in October, a pre-campaign period of party rallies began in earnest in November. Dr. McCoy monitored this period, travelling around the country to observe campaign rallies and reporting to delegation members on the developm Tc0. o

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## **Official Campaign Period (December 4 - February 21)**

Former Presidents Carter and Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica, with co-leader Daniel Evans of the United States, led a third delegation visit on December 13-16 to observe the beginning of the official campaign period (See appendix 14 for full report). In the wake of the campaign violence in the first part of December, Vice President Sergio Ramirez told President Carter that the government intended to issue a decree to end such violence. President Carter suggested as an alternative that the Supreme Electoral Council take the lead in negotiating a set of guidelines with the other parties; Ramirez agreed and also asked President Carter and his delegation to assist in drafting the points of such an agreement. The delegation travelled to Region VI (Matagalpa) and Region I (Esteli), the regions with the highest numbers of complaints of violence and intimidation, to meet with political leaders and to begin to draft a document with specific steps to prevent campaign violence. The group was encouraged that party leaders from all sides wanted to end the electoral violence. Party leaders in Regions I and VI had already been working with the OAS and UN observers and regional election officials to reach a consensus on ending campaign violence.

The Council delegation consulted with regional and national party and election officials and with OAS and UN observers to develop specific national guidelines to minimize the chances of violence at political rallies in all regions. One of the most contentious issues had been the proper role of the police. UNO leaders felt that a visible police presence had intimidated their supporters from attending rallies. Yet the lack of an active police role at Masatepe contributed to the violence and death on December 10.

The Council helped draft guidelines that included provisions to prohibit weapons of all kinds at rallies, to ban the sale of alcohol during the time of the rally, to regulate the location and activity of police at rallies, and to moderate the political rhetoric. The draft also encouraged party leaders publicly to accept the results of the February election and work for reconciliation regardless of who might win. The SEC also solicited proposals from the political parties on how to end the campaign violence. After much discussion over various proposals, a very general statement was signed by eight political parties, but UNO chose not to sign because it included a provision that they viewed as deliberately provocative. President Carter then submitted the Council's draft guidelines to President Ortega, Mrs. Chamorro, and Dr. Fiallos. All endorsed the draft, and the Supreme Electoral Council then issued a second decree based on these guidelines, with some modifications. The major political parties then publicly endorsed them (See appendix 15 for the two decrees).

At a rally held soon after the decree was issued, Antonio Lacayo, UNO Campaign Manager, approached Rene Vivas, Vice Minister of the Interior, to compliment him on the constructive way the police were behaving. Vivas indicated that the new instructions for the police and the cooperation of UNO would likely be able to prevent any further incidents.

During the delegation's December visit, the U.S. Embassy hosted a dinner for the group, representatives of all the major parties, and the Ambassadors of potential





mid-January, however, both of the major parties stepped up the campaign, holding daily rallies throughout the country.

### **January Delegation Visits**

Council delegation member Senator Christopher Dodd visited Nicaragua on January 5-6 to meet with party leaders and attend campaign rallies. President Carter and former President Alfonso López Michelsen of Colombia then led another delegation visit to Nicaragua on January 26-29, accompanied by Rosalynn Carter, Senator John Danforth, Congressmen Douglas Bereuter and Bill Richardson, and Dr. Robert Pastor (See appendix 16). Along with members of the OAS and UN observer missions, the delegation witnessed a simulation of the procedures to be followed in the voting sites on election day.

The delegation concluded that excellent technical preparations had been made for the voting. The delegation also attended campaign rallies of presidential candidates Daniel Ortega in Rivas and Violeta Chamorro in Jinotepe (both in Region IV) and confirmed that the December guidelines were in fact being followed, producing well-attended and peaceful rallies.

The principal concerns raised during this visit related to charges of intimidation and harassment of opposition party candidates and poll-watchers (fiscales), inaccessibility of the funds provided by the U.S. Congress to the opposition, and continued complaints about imbalance in media campaign coverage and access and the use of government facilities and vehicles by the FSLN for campaign purposes.

In discussions with party and government leaders and in the concluding press statement, Senator Danforth made clear the delegation's view that it was in the interests of both the Sandinistas and the opposition that opposition poll-watchers be present at all polling sites on election day. If this did not occur, President Carter told President Ortega, then the delegation would have difficulty verifying the integrity of the election. President Ortega pledged to give public and private instructions to FSLN supporters and government workers that intimidation of opposition members would not be tolerated.

The delegation also worked to overcome the impasse over the delivery of funds appropriated by the U.S. Congress to UNO, the Institute for Electoral Promotion and Training (IPCE) and the Supreme Electoral Council. The funds had been held up since their approval in October by, first, delays from the U.S. side in setting up the mechanisms and procedures for delivery, and then, Christmas holidays and bureaucratic delays in Nicaragua. Senator Danforth and Congressmen Bereuter and Richardson expressed the strong feelings of Congress that any further delays would adversely affect the perception in the United States of the entire electoral process. Congressman Richardson met with Minister of External Cooperation Henry Ruiz and officials from the Central Bank and the Finance Ministries to try to facilitate the release of funds.

After this meeting and then subsequent discussions between the delegation and President Ortega, President Carter then drafted an agreement between the Nicaraguan government and Central Bank officials whereby funds would be delivered without further delay to UNO, IPCE, and the SEC. It was agreed that IPCE and the SEC would work in harmony to assure that activities and



On February 25, 1990, Nicaraguans cast their ballots for President and Vice-President, representatives to the National Assembly, members of Municipal Councils in 131 municipalities and members of Regional Autonomous Councils in the Atlantic Coast regions. One and one-half million people-or 86 percent of those registered-voted throughout the country.

The Council delegation of 34 members arrived in Managua on February 23 for briefings on the campaign and the voting and counting process. The delegation met with Violeta de Chamorro, Sergio Ramirez and Bayardo Arce, Mariano Fiallos, and the heads of the OAS and UN observer missions. On behalf of the delegation, Prime Minister Price gave an arrival statement, explaining the international and bipartisan character of the group and its previous activities. President Carter gave a briefer arrival statement in Spanish and urged Nicaraguans to vote "and be confident that your vote will be secret and that your vote will count. We are here to make sure of that." He also explained how the Council, the OAS, and UN observers would be working together and monitoring "every step of the process and do parallel tabulations of the vote to guarantee that the final results reflect the will of the people" (See appendices 20 and 21 for the list of delegation members, the itinerary, and the arrival statements).

The delegation asked the principal candidates if they had adequate opportunities to convey their positions to the electorate, whether they felt the vote would be free and fair, and whether they would respect the vote. All the candidates answered affirmatively, though Mrs. Chamorro complained that the FSLN had made it difficult for UNO to import a loud-speaker system from Costa Rica for their final campaign rally. On February 24, the delegation held a joint press conference with OAS Secretary-General Joao Baena Soares and UN Special Representative Elliot Richardson in which all three missions urged Nicaraguans to vote, confident that it would be secret. The three concluded that despite difficulties and moments of tension in the campaign, "conditions exist in Nicaragua in which the people may freely express their choices on the day of the election" (See appendix 22).

The Council's delegation divided into 14 teams to be present in all nine regions when the polls opened on election day (See appendix 23A for team deployments). The teams travelled on Saturday, February 24, to the regions to meet with regional election officials and party workers prior to the voting. The polling places observed were selected in coordination with the OAS to ensure maximum coverage by the international observers (See Table I).

Beginning with the opening of the polls at 6 a.m. on Sunday morning, February 25th, the delegation's teams visited 205 JRVs throughout the day. Some of the teams were accompanied at various times by OAS observers. In all regions, contacts were made during the day with OAS and UN observers. Delegates visited a broad mixture of sites that ranged from the most populated JRV in Managua, with 2,223 voters to a small polling site reached by helicopter at Waspam on the Rio Coco in Region VII (North Atlantic Coast Region). OAS observers covered 3,064 JRVs (70%) throughout the day and the UN accounted for 2,155 JRVs (49%). Thus, most of the JRV's were observed by the three main observer groups during the day.

**TABLE I: SUMMARY OF VOTING SITES (JRVs) OBSERVED BY DELEGATION OF COUNCIL OF FREELY-ELECTED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

REGION	# of Observers/Staff	# JRVs Visited
I - Esteli	5	29
II - Leon/Chinandega	5	24
III - Managua	5	32
IV - San Carlos	5	18
V - Chontales/Ucigalpa	6	12
VI - Jinotega	8	10
VII - North Atlantic Coast	3	3
VIII - South Atlantic Coast	5	6
IX - San Carlos	(2) (from Reg. V team)	0
205	TOTAL	46

Delegates completed an evaluation form for each JRV observed (See appendix 23B for Council JRV Evaluation form) that would provide the basis for an aggregate assessment of the observations of the group. At the end of the day, delegates were stationed at particular voting sites to observe the count and to report the results to the OAS as part of the independent and quick count efforts (See appendix 23C for Council/OAS Count Report Form). Delegates also observed the collection of ballots and the recount at the regional electoral headquarters. Other delegates monitored the arrival of the telexes and the computation of results at the national vote count center.

The following, very minor irregularities were reported at 10 of the 205 JRVs (5 percent) observed by Council delegates: (1) election materials missing or insufficient for number of registered voters; (2) the absence of JRV officials other than poll-watchers; and (3) the indelible ink was defective.

Similar observations were noted by both the OAS and UN observer groups, and all agreed that these problems were not significant enough to affect the process or the results.

### **Voting Process**

Voting was held at 4,383 sites (JRVs) throughout the nine electoral regions of Nicaragua. (Nine polling places did not open in Regions VI and VII due to security reasons.) According to the electoral law citizens would vote in the same location where they had registered, though no more than 400 would vote at a single location. At the request of UNO, the SEC added voting facilities at existing sites to accommodate those with more than 250 registered voters.

A local electoral tribunal of a President and two additional members oversaw the process at each JRV. The President and First Members generally were members of the FSLN. The Second Member was chosen by the other political parties and was usually an UNO representative. While disputes would be resolved by a majority of the tribunal, the presence of a Second Member and opposition pollwatchers was supposed to provide a safeguard from partisan decision-making.

Prior to the election, there had been a concern that the absence of UNO poll watchers and UNO Second Members of the Electoral Tribunals might call into

question the legitimacy of the election. Council delegates observed the presence of UNO poll-watchers at 96.5 percent, other opposition pollwatchers at 55 percent and FSLN pollwatchers at 100 percent of the 205 JRVs visited. No problems were identified attributable to the absence of opposition pollwatchers. These results were similar to the observations of the UN mission, which observed UNO pollwatchers at 97 percent of the sites and other opposition poll-watchers at 51 percent of the JRV's visited.

The President of the local tribunal held a significant amount of authority, for example, to decide if electoral police should be present inside the voting site and whether or not the police should be armed. This was particularly significant in conflict zones. Unarmed electoral police were observed by the Council, the UN, and the OAS at nearly every polling site. Armed police were observed by Council delegates at polling sites in Regions V (Chontales) and IX (San Carlos).

Upon entering the polling place, the voter presented a voter registration card, which was checked against a registration catalog. After the registration card was verified, the voter was given three ballots and instructed to mark the ballots in private behind a cardboard booth and to deposit each in a separate box marked for a) President and Vice President, b) Legislative Assembly, and c) municipal candidates (or Regional Autonomous Councils in Regions VII and VIII). The voter's thumb was then dipped in solvent to clean it and then into indelible ink. The voter's registration card was marked to indicate completion of voting.

In large part, the process moved smoothly with the exception of delays in the opening of many JRVs. Election officials began setting up at 6 a.m., and polls were supposed to open at 7 a.m. However, the meticulous approach with which the election officials counted the materials and organized the polling places delayed the opening of many JRVs. Voters grew restless as long lines formed, and the Council's observers in Granada heard some voters express fears of manipulation of the process. This concern diminished when voters began to file into the polling places to vote. Once inside, voting took an average of less than two minutes per voter at JRVs observed in Managua, and voting proceeded with few complaints at the JRVs observed. Revisits to sites where lines had been particularly long in the morning confirmed that voting proceeded normally once the JRV was operating, and no evidence was found that voters were excluded for lack of time.

At 11:30 a.m., a Venezuelan observer working with the OAS reported to Dr. Pastor that the indelible ink in which the voters' thumbs were dipped after voting could be washed off with chlorox. A Nicaraguan witness provided evidence, and a simple test with chlorox confirmed the problem. Given the concern for any possibility of multiple voting, President Carter conferred immediately with SEC President Fiallos, and together they consulted the OAS and UN observer mission chiefs and the campaign managers of both the FSLN and UNO. After a lengthy discussion, both campaign managers agreed that if no additional problems that might indicate multiple voting were witnessed by the pollwatchers or observers during the course of the vote count, each would respect the outcome of the election.

### **Counting Procedure**



emphasized by the OAS. The methods of the two organizations complemented each other and provided for a comprehensive monitoring and verification of the entire process.

The Council delegation actively participated in the independent count of the OAS, recording presidential counts at assigned polling places and delivering those results to the regional OAS headquarters for tabulation. Secretary-General Baena Soares and UN Special Representative Richardson had previously agreed to provide the results of their projections to President Carter as soon as they were available. Their projections proved to be highly accurate as subsequently confirmed by results reported by the SEC.

There was a consensus among the Council's observers that the voting and counting procedures were technically correct and that the results accurately reflected the choices of a record number of voters.

### **Early Election Returns**

After observing vote counts at several polling sites, President and Mrs. Carter and Dr. Pastor visited the UN observer mission at 10:00 p.m. and were informed that the first projections based on slightly more than one-third of the sample vote gave UNO about 56 percent and the FSLN 40 percent. They then went to the national vote count center at the CAS where SEC President Mariano Fiallos reported that less than 5 percent of the vote had been received, and that was not sufficient to release the results. The early returns, he reported, indicated that UNO had a slight lead.

The SEC had previously agreed to announce the first results that arrived and then to announce returns only after 15 percent of the votes had been tabulated. Regular reporting would follow as more returns were received. The SEC had expected to begin announcing returns as early as 8:00 p.m. on election night, but by 10 p.m., very few results-only 4 Juntas-were reported.

By 11:30 p.m., no further results had been announced. At that time, President Ortega called and requested that President Carter, Mr. Richardson and Secretary-General Baena Soares and their senior aides, Pastor, Riza, and Gonzalez meet with him, Vice-President Sergio Ramirez, Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, campaign manager Bayardo Arce, and their lawyer Paul Reichler. The meeting took place at the FSLN headquarters from 12:20-1:10 a.m.

The FSLN leaders acknowledged that the trends favored UNO, but believed that they could still win. President Carter and Elliot Richardson indicated that their numbers were very accurate and stable, showing a wide and consistent lead in favor of UNO. President Ortega asked for advice on how to handle the situation; he was fearful that with UNO and FSLN militants in the streets already, a premature release of results or declaration of victory by UNO could lead to dangerous clashes and terrible violence. It was agreed that the SEC should announce preliminary results, even if 15 percent of the returns had not been received. President Ortega asked whether Mrs. Chamorro's announcement could follow and note the SEC's results and whether it might be possible for her to urge her supporters to be calm and to wait until more results were released. President Carter urged President Ortega to make a statement before the morning news programs and to take credit for the democratic election and the achievements of



the revolution, while also acknowledging that he was losing and reaffirming his respect for the results. President Ortega asked the three leaders to remain in Nicaragua and serve as guarantors of the transition process just as they had done during the campaign and the election.

The three observer teams then went to see Mrs. Chamorro, who said she wanted a calm and deliberate approach to the results and agreed with the main points outlined by President Ortega. Mrs. Chamorro also asked the three leaders to remain in Nicaragua and work with them to ensure that the transition would be orderly and smooth. All three agreed to help in appropriate ways.

The group then informed President Ortega and returned to the national vote counting center. At about 1:45 a.m., the SEC released about 5 percent of the results, insisting that "technical difficulties" prevented a fuller counting at that time. In the next hour, however, they released 30 percent of the votes, and UNO was leading with 54 percent, to 42 percent for the FSLN.

At 3:15 a.m., President Carter and Gov. Evans phoned Secretary of State James A. Baker. They informed Secretary Baker that UNO had won a large victory and briefed him on the evening's meetings. They said that they expected both sides to work for a peaceful and orderly transition, and they urged the Secretary and

percent of registered voters participated. Eighty-nine percent of an estimated population of 1.9 million eligible voters had registered in October, representing an impressive total participation rate of 76.7 percent. Of the total votes cast, 5.97 percent were null votes (mismarked or blank votes), giving a total of 1,420,544 valid votes.

In the presidential elections, the ticket of the National Opposition Union (UNO)-Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Virgilio Godoy, won with 54.7 percent of the votes, followed by the governing FSLN ticket-Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez, with 40.8 percent of the votes. Third place went to the Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) with 1.1 percent.


In legislative elections, UNO won an absolute majority with 51 of 92 total seats, while the FSLN won 39 seats, a Yatama candidate running on the ticket of the Social Christian Party (PSC) won one seat, and the MUR won one seat (See appendix 25 for the list of National Assembly members). Although the legislature is constitutionally composed of 90 seats, presidential candidates winning the equivalent of the average votes needed to elect a legislative member (12,960 votes in the 1990 elections) have the right to take a seat in the legislature. In the 1990 elections, only the FSLN and the MUR met this requirement (See Table II below).

UNO also

Total # JRV's

4,392

Total # JRV's	Total # Voters
1,510,838	2,251,900



Of the ten parties/alliances that participated in the election, only two gained significant support: together, the FSLN and UNO captured nearly 96 percent of the presidential votes and 90 of 92 seats in the Assembly. Although these results reflect a polarization of the electorate between UNO and the FSLN, Nicaragua does not, of course, have a two-party system. The UNO alliance of 14 parties reflects a range of ideological tendencies from the Socialist and Communist to Social Democratic and Social Christian to small factions that have broken from the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties (See Table III). During the

Table III. Distribution of UNO Seats in the National Assembly

Party	Seats
Independent Liberal Party (PLI)	5
Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC)	4
Nicaraguan Party (PUN)	5
National Conservative Party (PNC)	5
Conservative Popular Alliance (APC)	5
National Conservative Alliance (ANC)	2
Social Democratic Party (PSD)	6
Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN)	3
Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC)	2
Nicaraguan Democratic Christian Party (PDC)	1
National Action Party (PAN)	3
Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCEN)	3

This election represents the first time that Nicaraguans have chosen their leaders at the local level. UNO received a majority in an overwhelming number of municipalities, and this gives it significant control over decision-making and the provision of services at the local level. UNO's success in maintaining that control will depend on the degree of cohesion it retains over the next six years. Both the presidential and legislative votes followed similar patterns with regard to the proportion of votes going to the FSLN and the UNO in each region. UNO won substantial victories in Regions II, III and IV and by large margins in Regions V, VI, and VIII. There was a very close vote in Region I, and in VII, UNO won the Presidential vote. The FSLN won handily in Region IX (See Table IV next page). Region V (Boaco/Chontales), a ranching area with a high degree of conflict and contra activity, was expected to heavily favor the opposition. UNO won 70.5 percent of the presidential votes, four-fifths of the legislative seats, and a majority in all of the municipal councils. Region VI (Matagalpa), the largest coffee producing region in the country and bordering on Honduras, has also experienced a large number of military-contra clashes and has produced many contra recruits in the past decade. UNO won in this region with 57.8 percent of the presidential votes, nearly two-thirds of the legislative seats, and a majority in 18 of 21 municipal councils. In Region III (Managua), UNO won 53.4 percent of the presidential votes and more than half of the legislative seats, and controls 5 of 7 municipalities. With one quarter of total registered voters, the Managua region represents the largest bloc of voters in the country.

Region IV (Granada), the third largest region with 17 percent of total registered voters, experienced a high degree of political conflict during the campaign. An area of fierce fighting during the 1979 revolution, the region includes the strongly opposition Granada-historically the seat of the Conservative party and home to many of the Chamorro family, Masaya-the arts and crafts capital, Nandaime, and Masatepe-site of the worst campaign violence. UNO won in this region with 52.7 percent of the presidential vote, eight of 14 legislative seats, and control of 24 of 31 municipalities, including the largest cities of Granada and Masaya.

**Table IV. Presidential, Legislative, Municipal, and Autonomy Council Results by Region**

Region	President # of votes (%)		Legislature # of seats (% of voters)			Municipal # of councils w/majority	
	UNO	FSLN	UNO	FSLN	Other	UNO	FSLN
I. Esteli	66,661 (48.0%)	66,960 (48.2%)	4 (47.7%)	5 (48.3%)	0 (4.4%)	18	8
II. Leon	126,386 (51.8%)	105,176 (43.1%)	8 (52.9%)	7 (44.3%)	0 (4.3%)	17	6
III. Managua	209,572 (53.4%)	168,071 (42.9%)	14 (54.4%)	11 (43.3%)	0 (4.4%)	5	2
IV. Granada	135,117 (52.7%)	110,090 (42.9%)	8 (52.2%)	6 (43.3%)	0 (3.5%)	24	7
V. Boaco	97,911 (70.5%)	35,081 (25.2%)	8 (70.5%)	2 (25.2%)	0 (4.5%)	19	0
VI. Matagalpa	105,020 (57.8%)	65,499 (36.0%)	7 (57.6%)	4 (36.1%)	0 (6.1%)	18	3
IX. San Carlos	4,637 (39.0%)	6,709 (56.4%)	0 (39.3%)	1 (58.0%)	0 (2.8%)	1	3
Autonomous Council							
			UNO	FSLN	Yatama	# of seats	
X. N. Atlántico	19,253 (48.1%)	15,044 (37.6%)	1 (24.8%)	1 (37.8%)	2 (33.0%)	21	22
XI. Jinotega	27,804 (66.7%)	13,256 (31.3%)	1 (68.7%)	1 (34.3%)	0 (0.0%)	23	5
XII. Chinandega	10,881 (46.7%)	12,281 (50.9%)	1 (46.7%)	1 (50.9%)	0 (0.0%)	10	10

Region I (Esteli) has been traditionally supportive of the FSLN and is one of only two regions in which the FSLN won, though by only .2 percent of the presidential votes and with five of nine legislative seats. The FSLN also retained control of the capital city of Esteli. UNO, on the other hand, won control of 18 of 26 municipal councils in the region.

Region II (Leon) is the second largest region in the country, with 17 percent of total registered voters, and includes the city of Leon with the national university and historically the seat of the Liberal party, as well as the cotton producing center of the country. UNO won by 8 percent of the presidential vote, eight of 15 legislative seats, and control of 17 of 23 municipalities, though the FSLN retained control of the capital city of Leon.

Region IX (San Carlos), bordering on Costa Rica, is the least populated and most isolated region of the country. The FSLN won 56.4 percent of the presidential vote, the only legislative seat, and three of four municipalities.

The Atlantic Coast voted for regional autonomous councils, in addition to the presidency and national assembly. Municipal elections will be scheduled later. With large numbers of Miskito Indians in Region VII (Puerto Cabezas) and blacks in Region VIII (Bluefields), the Atlantic Coast represents an area that is quite different ethnically and linguistically from the rest of the country. Traditionally



Humberto Ortega to transfer power, and the willingness of UNO and FSLN to work together to achieve a peaceful and rapid demobilization of the contras. Several days later, the Department of State announced that it was "convinced that immediate steps should be taken to encourage demobilization and repatriation of the Resistance Forces" and that it was willing to assist in this process by supporting the UN-OAS International Commission for Support and



Governor O'Callaghan ensured that the Yatama representatives were included in the negotiating process and that they were able to reach a separate signed accord detailing the demobilization of their troops and the designated security zones.

#### **Protocol for the Transfer of Power**

On March 27, transition leaders Humberto Ortega and Antonio Lacayo signed a Protocol of Procedure for the Transfer of Executive Power which reaffirmed the points agreed to in the initial meeting hosted by President Carter on February 27 (See appendix 27). The Protocol also called for depoliticization of the armed forces, employment for public servants, and transition commissions to facilitate the transfer of the Ministries to the new government.

#### **Legislation**

During the interim period, the Sandinista-dominated National Assembly passed a series of laws; some were negotiated and accepted by UNO, others were not. The most important included a law granting a general amnesty to all Nicaraguans (including contras and military troops) who committed crimes against the public order since July 19, 1979; a law of immunity for the highest officials of the

the National Assembly on April 24, however, the FSLN suggested the need for a more representative slate. After lengthy negotiations, the Assembly voted and elected Miriam Arguello as President and four UNO and two FSLN members to fill the remaining leadership posts.

The divisions within UNO, the struggles between UNO and the FSLN, the economic crisis, and the immediate problems stemming from the transfer of power between such different political movements-these developments have caught the attention of the world community, but they should not obscure two more compelling facts. For the first time in the history of Nicaragua, power was transferred peacefully from an incumbent government to its rival as a result of an election that was judged by all Nicaraguans as free and fair. For the first time in the history of the world, a revolutionary government that had come to power as a result of a 20-year armed struggle voluntarily gave up the reins of power to its adversary. These two facts make the Nicaraguan election a unique event.

The role of international observers in the campaign, the election, and the transition was also unique. This was the first time in which a sov

Center in March 1989 that brought together government and business leaders of Latin America with U.S. government officials, including Secretary of State James A. Baker.

*Membership.* The original members of the Council are Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina, Errol Barrow of Barbados, Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, Nicolas Ardito Barletta of Panama, Fernando Belaunde of Peru, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela, Osvaldo Hurtado of Ecuador, Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica, George Price of Belize, and Pierre Trudeau of Canada.

Subsequently, Michael Manley of Jamaica, Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela, Erskine Sandiford of Barbados, Oscar Arias Sanchez and Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Colombia, and Edward Seaga of Jamaica have joined the Council. An Executive Committee of Jimmy Carter (Chairman), Rafael Caldera, Daniel Oduber, and George Price, was designated to explore a number of ideas and possible future activities. The headquarters of the Council is at the Carter Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program. Dr.

MAY 17, 1990

To the President of the XXI Meeting of the Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States

The meeting that you are chairing today is of the greatest significance to the inter-American system and to all democrats in the Americas. I am writing to you for two reasons and ask that you submit this letter and the accompanying material to all members in attendance in this special session of the O.A.S. First, I want to convey my conclusions and those of my delegation from having observed Panama's elections on May 7. Secondly, I have great hopes that the governments of the Americas will rise to the occasion and recognize that the case of democracy in Panama is a test of the entire hemisphere's resolve in creating a collective mechanism for reinforcing democracy everywhere in the hemisphere.

Representing the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, I went to Panama with President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister George Price of Belize. We are associated with a group representing the National Democratic and Republican Institutes, including experts representing eight nations who had previously monitored elections in the Philippines, Pakistan, Paraguay, and the plebiscite in Chile.

Throughout election day on May 7, we were all given free access to voting places (mesas) throughout the country. This was an exciting, even emotional experience. Despite widespread reports that General Noriega would ultimately commit fraud if necessary to prevail, the Panamanian people voted in huge numbers to select their own leaders. In addition to more than 800,000 voters, 50,000



responsibility to do anything other than report the false tabulations they had received.

Subsequently I was denied entrance to the election center and even to the center where the news media were assembled. I and other members of our delegation made our findings known to the public through reporters who came to the lobby of our hotel. All Panamanian news broadcasts were forbidden until the following morning, May 9, when Noriega's candidate, Don Carlos Duque, was unofficially declared to be the winner.

In obvious attempts to intimidate the people, many citizens were arrested and othero the l oattem5ts t6ryud1(erepo8(heN (o the l)3[6]05ttem5tany w)16.1(ng en .w15((on maiur)6.9( del)6')57(lsa)6t(on maa6.1(5(e l)65(a6.1(5(our)6.col)6.12i)6.1(.0016

June 30, 1989

To President Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Thank you for your invitation to participate in the International Symposium to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Nicaraguan revolution. It is an appropriate time to assess your nation's accomplishments and problems and consider new ideas, and you have invited a distinguished group to assist in your evaluation. I deeply regret that I cannot attend.

I understand, however, that you have also invited Dr. Robert Pastor, the Director of the Carter Center's Latin American Program and the Executive Secretary of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, which I chair. I have asked Dr. Pastor to attend the Symposium and convey a personal message from me to you. Because of my interest in the Symposium and Nicaragua's future, I have also asked him to brief me on the event's discussions when he returns to Atlanta.

The elections that Nicaragua will hold in February 1990 are of the greatest importance, and I would welcome your views of them. They offer Nicaraguans the opportunity to express their legitimate human right of self-determination. It is my hope that free and fair elections can also end definitively the conflict and divisions within Nicaragua and lead to improved relations between your country and the United States. You can be assured that I will use my influence to ensure that the results of a free and fair election in Nicaragua will be respected by the United States regardless of who wins or loses.

I recall vividly and with gratitude the courtesy and generosity you and your colleagues extended to Rosalynn and me during our previous visit to Nicaragua in February 1986. We hope to be able to visit Nicaragua again in the future. I remain deeply interested in developments in Nicaragua and am committed to trying to improve the relationship between our two countries.

Sincerely,

Hon. Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Presidente de la Republica

Managua, Nicaragua

## Appendix 4: Invitations to President Carter to observe Nicaraguan elections

Translation

Original In Spanish/signed

August 3, 1989

His Excellency

James Carter

Chairman

Council of Freely Elected Heads of State

Atlanta, Georgia

Dear President Carter:

On February 25, 1990, the Nicaraguan people will elect their President, Vice-President and representatives to the National Assembly, as well as municipal authorities and members to the Regional Councils in the Atlantic Coast Autonomous Regions.

These elections will be free, fair and democratic, as mandated by Nicaragua's Constitution, and by the Esquipulas II Accords of August 7, 1987 and the Joint Declaration of the five Central American Presidents of February 14, 1989.

In compliance with the Joint Declaration, Nicaragua has invited, as official international observers of the entire electoral process, the Secretaries General of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Both have accepted our invitation and are already sending teams of observers for the entire electoral process.

On behalf of my Government, I would like to take this opportunity to invite you, as President of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State, to serve as an official Invited Observer of the electoral process in Nicaragua. We would be honored to have you and your colleagues in the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State observe our electoral process from beginning to end.

Indeed, we encourage you to come to Nicaragua as many times as you can during the electoral process, to observe all aspects of the



process, and to meet with the members of the Supreme Electoral Council, the Political Parties and the Government. You will have unrestricted access to all aspects of the process.

I hope that you will accept this invitation and we will have the pleasure of welcoming you again to Nicaragua.

My best personal regards to you and Rosalynn.

Sincerely,

[signed]

Daniel Ortega Saavedra

President of Nicaragua

Translation

Original in Spanish/signed

Managua, 4 August 1989

Honorable

Jimmy Carter,

President of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Supreme Electoral Council of the Republic of Nicaragua, I have the honor of inviting you and the other members of the Council over which you preside, to participate as official observers in the electoral process that is underway in Nicaragua and will culminate on the 25th of February 1990.

Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren

President

Supreme Electoral Council

Translation

Original in Spanish/signed

Managua, August 4, 1989

Mr. Jimmy Carter

Chairman of the Freely-Elected Heads of Government

Atlanta, Georgia

U.S.A.

Mr. Carter:

The National Opposition Union (UNO) invites you, as an international observer, to participate in the electoral process to take place the 25th of February 1990.

If you accept, we would like to know who will be the members of the delegation.

Please accept these gestures of our regards.

Sincerely,

[signed]

Dr. Gustavo Tablada Zelaya

Coordinator, International Relations Commission

National Opposition Union (UNO) of Nicaragua

JIMMY CARTER

August 8, 1989

To President Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Thank you for your letter of August 3rd. I was pleased to receive your invitation for me to lead a delegation under the auspices of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government to observe Nicaragua's elections on February 25, 1990. I have also received letters from the Supreme Electoral Council and the National Opposition Union (U.N.O.). Together these invitations represent a consensus among Nicaraguans that the world has a legitimate role to play in observing the elections.

Your invitation to observe the electoral process from beginning to end with unrestricted access is a clear signal of the seriousness with which you view the elections. The political agreement that was the result of the dialogue is another very positive and sincere effort by your government and the opposition to ensure that the people of Nicaragua will have an historic opportunity to express their will in

Presidente de la Republica

Managua, Nicaragua

## **Appendix 5: The Political Accord of August, 1990**

Translation  
Original in Spanish

### **EXCERPTS FROM POLITICAL ACCORD**

On *August 3 and 4, 1989* the President of the Republic of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega Saavedra, and representatives of legally constituted political parties gathered in the Olof Palme Convention Center in Managua and concluded a



- V. The President of the Republic and the political party signatories of this Accord agree that the President and Vice-President of the Republic to be elected by popular vote in the February 25, 1990 elections will assume office on April 25 of the same year, following the procedures stipulated in Article 149 of the Constitution.... <sup>1</sup>
- VI. The political party signatories to this Accord, with the support of the President of the Republic, propose to the Supreme Electoral Council, the following:
  - 1. To submit the catalogue with the lists of registered voters to each party or alliance participating in the electoral process no later than



30. The Supreme Electoral Council will establish a Consultative Body made up of seven members chosen on a pluralist basis in accordance with Article 201 of the Electoral Law.

The Conservative Democratic Party registers its disagreement with the second paragraph of point V relating to the assuming of office of the elected representatives of the National Assembly.

Managua, August 4, 1989

Daniel Ortega Saavedra

President of the Republic of Nicaragua

***LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES***

Sandinista National Liberation Front Conservative Popular Alliance Party

Social Christian Party Social Democratic Party

National Conservative Party Neo-Liberal Party (PALI)

National Action Party Nicaraguan Democratic Movement

Independent Liberal Party Liberal Constitutionalist Party

Communist Party of Nicaragua Liberal National Unity Party

Nicaraguan Socialist Party Central American Unionist Party

National Confidence Democratic Party Social Conservative Party

Popular Social Christian Party Conservative Democratic Party

**Appendix 6: Candidates for President and Vice President  
NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS 1990**

**Candidates for President and Vice-President**

1. Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

President: Cmdte. Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Vice President: Dr. Sergio Ramirez Mercado

2. National Opposition Union (UNO)

President: Sra. Violeta Barrios de Chamorro

Vice President: Dr. Virgilio Godoy Reyes

3. Revolutionary Unity Movement Party (MUR)

President: Dr. Moises Hassan Morales

Vice President: Lic. Francisco Samper Blanco

4. Social Christian Party (PSC)

President: Lic. Erick Ramirez Benavente



Vice President: Dra. Rina María Córdova de Taboada

5. Social Conservative Party (PSOC)

President: Dr. Fernando Agüero Rocha





Leaders of the opposition voiced concerns about the electoral climate and certain procedures that were in effect. These concerns included: a) the interpretation of the August 4 political accord that allowed conscription to military reserves, as opposed to the interpretation that all conscription should cease; b) unequal access to the media, in part due to the state monopoly of media resources; c) the concern for political prisoners being held in violation of their human rights; d) the unfair expropriation of property; and e) the application of a different set of conditions under which the Miskito Indians might return to participate in the electoral process.

President Carter encouraged the opposition to document their complaints about the election process and to submit them directly to the Supreme Electoral Council with appropriate copies to the observer groups of the U.N., O.A.S. and the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government.

The delegation traveled to Puerto Cabezas to meet with church leaders and Miskito Indian representatives to discuss the current electoral climate. In a meeting with Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge it was agreed that the conditions under which the Indian leaders might return to Nicaragua would be the same as those being applied to other members of the armed opposition who had agreed to abandon their armed struggle and return to Nicaragua. President Carter communicated this agreement directly to Miskito Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera and to the press at a news conference before his departure from Nicaragua.

### **III. Conclusions and Follow-up**

Based on the meetings held during this pre-election visit the delegation concluded that despite differences between the Nicaraguan government and the opposition parties, the climate could be characterized as propitious. The differences regarding media access, the balance of the Supreme Electoral Council, conscription, expropriation of property, and political prisoners are significant, but the delegation viewed as more important the Tela Agreement and the Political Accord of August 4, which demonstrate a commitment by both sides to participate in the elections. The delegation left Nicaragua with a feeling of optimism about the potential for the opportunity of the Nicaraguan people to express their will in free and fair elections.

Following the delegation's visit, at President Ortega's request, President Carter wrote to Cardinal Obando y Bravo and urged him to use the National Reconciliation Commission to encourage both sides to moderate the campaign rhetoric and begin the healing process that will be so critical to the future of Nicaragua regardless of who wins the election.

During the visit President Ortega had expressed his government's interest in normalizing relations with the United States. President Carter responded that he thought this would occur if the elections were free and fair. Upon his return to the U.S. President Carter had extensive consultations with President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and other senior officials in the Administration, as well as with Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and Senate. Following those meetings President Carter expressed his belief that there is

much U.S. interest in the Nicaraguan elections and a genuine intention to improve relations if the elections are free.

President Carter also met in Washington with Secretary-General of the O.A.S. Joao Baena Soares and Elliot Richardson, the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, to discuss coordination among the observer groups.

Delegations representing the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government will travel approximately once a month between September and February and will be present in Nicaragua to observe the elections in all nine regions in February 1990.

## **ITINERARY**

### ***Saturday, September 16, 1989***

9:30 a.m. arrival in Managua

Arrival Statement by the Hon. Jimmy Carter

Meeting at airport with President Daniel Ortega, Vice-President Sergio Ramirez, Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry Alejandro Bendaña, and former President of Argentina Raúl Alfonsín

Meeting at the Supreme Electoral Council

Meeting and Lunch with Violeta Chamorro and Virgilio Godoy and advisors Antonio Lacayo and Jaime Bonilla

Meeting at UNO party headquarters with representatives of parties in the UNO coalition

Dinner with President Ortega, Vice-President Ramirez(er)6.ua

Return to Managua for Press Conference  
Return to the U.S.

**ARRIVAL STATEMENT BY FORMER PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER**

**Managua, Nicaragua**

**September 16, 1989**

I have come to Nicaragua today as the Chairman of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government. We are a group of fifteen former and current Presidents and Prime Ministers of western hemisphere nations who are dedicated to reinforcing democracy. I am delighted to be joined by my good friend and fellow

September 22, 1989

To President Daniel Ortega

Brooklyn Rivera and the Indian Leaders of Nicaragua

The following is the understanding between myself and Minister Tomas Borge concerning the return of the Miskito Indian leaders, as modified after subsequent discussions today:

The leaders will:

1. Renounce the armed struggle;
2. Declare not to be involved in illegal activities;
3. Declare readiness to incorporate themselves in political activities of Nicaragua;
4. Will make honest efforts as soon as possible after return to Nicaragua to achieve the demobilization, disarmament, and return to political life of the country of troops under their control.

that visited 59 juntas receptors (JRVs or registration sites) that accounted for over 19,000 registrants. At the end of the visit, former President Rafael Caldera (Venezuela) presented a statement to the press on behalf of the delegation.

## **II. Direct Observation of Registration - October 22, 1989**

The delegation and accompanying staff persons divided into six teams and covered 59 mesas in Regions II, III, and IV that represent approximately 19,100 voters.



Based on interviews of electoral officials at the JRV's and individuals who were present to register our delegation observed the following at the above identified JRV's in Regions II, III, and IV:

1. Adequate or extra registration materials were encountered at every site.
2. Polls opened on time. Few long lines were observed at the time of the visits, and some sites were without registrants. Most of the sites visited expected to complete easily the registration of all eligible voters by the end of the day, the fourth Sunday of registration. There was an uneven number of people registered at each site ranging from 185 to 602. By law no more than 400 may vote at any single JRV.
3. Each JRV should have three election officials present to register voters. Three substitutes were also designated for each JRV, but were not required to be present for registration. Of the sites we visited 81% had all three present. The remaining 19% were each missing the 2nd member which according to the political accord should be from the opposition, since opposition parties collectively are to determine who holds that slot.
4. No political propoganda was found at any of the registration sites.
5. Electoral police (PE) were present at every JRV, although none were armed. The President of the Supreme Electoral Council explained to the delegation that the local President of the JRV has the authority to ask the Electoral Police (PE) to carry weapons and may ask the armed PE to enter the JRV if he determines that there is a security concern.
6. Some voters-as many as half at some sites-registered by having two witnesses instead of documentation.
7. Identification documents accepted for registration varied from JRV to JRV, but always included as acceptable: passports, birth certificates, commercial licenses, and drivers licenses. Some sites accepted other documentation, such as baptismal certificates, while others did not.
8. The observer credential given to each delegation member by the Supreme Electoral Council was requested for identification by the Electoral Police before the observer was allowed to enter the JRV. Delegation members who were accompanied by OAS observers with visible credentials (OAS badge and/or OAS T-shirt) were not asked for identification.



9. The only complaint received by the delegation about the registration process was a dispute about the verification of the age of two registrants at one JRV. Registration was denied in some cases due to lack of proper credentials or witnesses or mistaken location for registration of the individual.

### **III. Reports Made by Individuals or Groups to the Delegation (Secondary Sources)**

1. Local JRV Presidents have been given significant authority. In any case of controversy, the UNO expressed concern that a decision would favor the FSLN that usually dominates the official electoral councils. This is especially true in the absence of the 2nd members. UNO is considering

- Council is to meet on this issue October 30. (Note: Subsequent to this report an extension of registration was announced for November 5, 1989).
2. The impressive number of voters registering means that new voting sites will have to be made available to comply with the electoral law that mandates no more than 400 voters per JRV. It is important that additional JRV's be located in the same or very near the original JRV to reduce the possibility of confusion on election day.
  3. The delegation concluded that the issue of access to the media needs to be more fair and equal. Despite government and Electoral Council declarations that this is the case, access to a television and radio signals that may be received in every area of the country are available to the opposition parties in a very limited manner. Programming on Channel 6 (Government controlled) includes informal programming of a very campaign-oriented nature, such as a youth program of music with an interview of a young candidate for the legislative assembly.

Channel 2 does not reach all parts of Managua, much less the whole of Nicaragua. Programming on local radio is similar in discrepancy between coverage and programming of the opposition.

The delegation concluded that this must be addressed by the parties and the Electoral Council in order to assure the opportunity for all sides to campaign fairly.

Revised 11/6/89

## **DELEGATION SCHEDULE**

### ***Saturday, October 21, 1989***

Supreme Electoral Council

Supreme Electoral Council Mariano Fiallos

Supreme Electoral Council Leonel Arguello

Supreme Electoral Council Aman Sandino

Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo and Mons. Bosco Vivas

U.N. Observer Mission (ONUVEN)

U.N. Observer Mission (ONUVEN) Igbal Riza, Director

O.A.S. Observer Mission

O.A.S. Observer Mission Mario Gonzalez, Director

Superior Council of Private Enterprise (C.O.S.E.P)

Superior Council of Private Enterprise (C.O.S.E.P) Gilberto Cuadra

Superior Council of Private Enterprise (C.O.S.E.P) Jaime Bengoechea

Superior Council of Private Enterprise (C.O.S.E.P) Juan López

Rafael Solís, Member of Legislative Assembly and FSLN Candidate for Legislative Assembly

### ***Sunday, October 22, 1989***

Observer Missions deployed to Region II (Leon)

Observer Missions deployed to Region III (Managua)

Observer Missions deployed to Region IV (Granada)

Meetings with OAS officials and Nicaraguan Electoral officials in each location

### ***Monday, October 23, 1989***

Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, Presidential Candidate for UNO  
Virgilio Godoy, Vice-Presidential Candidate for UNO  
National Opposition Union (UNO) Directors  
Sergio Ramirez, Vice-President and FSLN Vice-Presidential Candidate

**STATEMENT BY FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL CALDERA**

**Managua, Nicaragua**

**October 23, 1989**

We are finishing our three day visit to Nicaragua under the auspices of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government.

The Council is a group of fifteen former and current Presidents and Prime Ministers from this Hemisphere, which has its seat at the Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, Georgia. This group is dedicated to take advantage of the experiences of its members to support the struggle for democracy in the region. Our group has been invited by the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), by President Ortega, and by leaders of UNO to observe the electoral process in Nicaragua. In September, former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Raúl Alfonsín were here with the purpose of observing the beginning of the electoral process. During this visit, the group consisted of Dr. Rafael Caldera, former President of Venezuela, Mr. Bruce Babbitt, former Governor of the State of Arizona, U.S., Mr. Donal (Mike) O'Callaghan, former Governor of the State of Nevada, U.S., and



**Appendix 12: Symposium on the Nicaraguan Elections, November  
1989**

Presents a Symposium on  
**"The Nicaraguan Elections: A Turning Point?"**  
Tuesday, November 14  
1-5 P.M.

Alfredo Cesar, member of the Campaign Committee, UNO, and Secretary  
General, Social Democratic Party  
Moises Hassan, Presidential Candidate and Member of Executive Committee,

*Alejandro Bendaña:* "If the FSLN wins, then UNO and the rest of the opposition should from this very moment say that they will work constructively, [and] peacefully with the government in order to try to achieve economic reconstruction that our country so desperately needs. But [it is necessary to say it] the other way around too, and the FSLN is not ashamed to say it: if UNO were to win, which we of course don't think is going to happen, but if that were to happen, we, too, would be prepared to work constructively as an opposition force in trying to move the country forward."

*Alfredo César:* "...we have said many times and I repeat it today, that if the elections are free and fair we will accept whatever result the Nicaraguan people decide, including the possibility of Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista Front winning the elections."

"...no matter who wins, the game is over in Nicaragua for one player. From now on, it will take two to tango in Nicaragua... Is the government ready for that? *I consider that the electoral process is the only solution for the conflict of Nicaragua and no armed activity, attack, or whatever should take place because it only hurts the electoral process.*"

*Moisés Hassan:* "I am one of those who has serious doubts whether the Sandinista Front will release power or not. I think the Sandinista front is in a very difficult position.... Faced with the prospect of continued government, that has been very unsatisfactory for many reasons to most of the population, I believe that the "undecideds" have been dragged and pulled more toward UNO than to the FSLN."

***FSLN Strategy: Tie UNO to Contras/A Forged Letter***

*Alfredo César:* "For a few days, right after the decision to lift the cease-fire, full-page ads tying UNO and its candidate to the war started reappearing in the official press."

"On Saturday, a supposed letter that I had sent to Enrique Bermudez appeared in a Honduran newspaper... I issued a denial on Sunday [November 12]. Yesterday, Monday, *La Prensa* reprinted the denial... This morning, the official newspaper *Barricada* in a news piece and in an editorial, which is the official newspaper of the Sandinista party, editorializes based on that false letter, saying that this is the best proof that UNO and the [contra] assassinations that have been taking place in Nicaragua are fully connected."

"All of sudden, by coincidence, when President Ortega decides not to renew the cease-fire, these things start happening ayef-8.6(f-aand puthe6( of)43way)13.2ence1hre, (e)-08Tf-

government has had its share. It has continued on the tradition of all past governments of trying to perpetrate themselves in power, [and] of abuse of state property... They have continued this type of tradition and therefore, from our point of view they are no longer entitled to be called 'revolutionary'...."

### ***The UNO Platform***

*Alfredo César:* "The UNO platform is basically the platform presented by the broad coalition [in 1979] that brought Somoza down. It ... respects all the social advances of the revolution, [and calls for] a deepening of the land reform. ... We call for a respect for private initiative for the small, medium, and large producer in Nicaragua. We [will] change the situation with the appropriate economic policies, like not spending ... 60% of the budget on defense..."

### ***The Contras and Demobilization***

*Bendaña:* "I did not hear Mr. César explicitly condemn the murders of innocent victims by the contras as has been documented in the press. I did not hear him call, nor have we had anyone in UNO call for the explicit demobilization of the contras."

*Alfredo César:* "The official position of UNO is in the agreement signed between President Ortega and all the opposition parties, including UNO, on the 4th of August, in which there is a specific paragraph [calling for] the demobilization [of the contras] in accordance and in support of the Central American Peace Agreements. [UNO also has issued] ... an official communique condemning the violence and asking for the demobilization process to continue."

### ***Role of International Observers***

*Jimmy Carter:* "When I was in Nicaragua in September, we had a long list of complaints from UNO and from the other smaller parties concerning access to media, the confiscation of land, conscription of people to punish political opponents, the threat from the FSLN that the United States was going to channel major covert financing into the country, plus many others. We took up some of these complaints with the Supreme Electoral Council and got their assurance that they would monitor these problems. Also, there was a commitment by the Sandinista leadership that beginning as early as possible, media access would be made available, for instance, on the broad-ranging channel, Channel 6 on television and not just on Channel 2. That's been done.

"One other issue that we undertook to correct, which would have been very serious, is a prohibition, in effect, against the Miskito Indian leadership returning to the Atlantic Coast. The Sandinistas put restraints on them that far exceeded



"I hope that as the time approaches, that we can get strong commitments, private if necessary, public preferably, from the U.S. administration that it will lift the embargo immediately after the election if it is certified to be honest with full diplomatic relations ... regardless of who the victor or the victors might be. Though outside my duty as observer, I feel something of a responsibility to try to marshal international financial or economic support to help in the rebuilding of Nicaragua if the elections are honest."

***Nicaragua and Arms Supplies for FMLN***

*Question:* The *New York Times* reported that on October 18th, Honduras intercepted a truck of arms going from Nicaragua to El Salvador, and the driver said he had been making such deliveries since August. How can you justify your condemnation of U.S. overt, non-lethal aid to the contras and to UNO and yet justify the Nicaraguan government's aid to the FMLN in El Salvador?"

*Alejandro Bendaña:* "We can't justify anything that hasn't taken place. Didn't the Hondurans say that the weapons were wrapped in Nicaraguan newspapers? If we were stupid enough to send that, would we wrap them up in Nicaraguan newspapers?"

**Appendix 14: December Pre-Election Trip Report**

Report on Pre-Election Trip to Nicaragua

Observer Delegation

Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government

December 13-16, 1989

Honorable Jimmy Carter

Mrs. Rosalynn Carter

Honorable Daniel Oduber

election, particularly since the incident further polarized politics and little had been done to prevent its recurrence. We were also concerned about the effect of the November 1 suspension of the cease-fire and continued military activity on the election process itself, especially in light of the failure of the talks between the Nicaraguan government and the Resistance on the demobilization of the contras. The delegation travelled to Matagalpa, Esteli, and Managua, and met with regional and national party leaders and election officials, government leaders, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and members of the press (see the enclosed schedule). We also worked closely with the UN and OAS observer missions, receiving their generous cooperation in coordinating the visit.

## **II. Activities and Discussions**

Vice President Sergio Ramirez met the delegation on its arrival. In response to President Carter's statement about Masatepe, he said that the government was also concerned about the violence there and was considering issuing a decree that could prevent future recurrences. President Carter said that it would be preferable for the Electoral Council to take the lead in getting all of the political parties to work out procedures to eliminate campaign violence. Vice President Ramirez asked if Carter could help put together such a document.

The delegation then travelled to Matagalpa (Region VI) with Antonio Lacayo, campaign manager of UNO and with Alfredo Cesar, a leader of the Social Democratic Party and principal adviser to UNO Presidential Candidate, Violeta de Chamorro. In the group's discussions with these leaders and others from Matagalpa and Esteli (Region I), the group was able to develop a specific document on steps to prevent violence at campaign rallies.

Regions I and VI were reported by the United Nations Observer Mission to have experienced the most complaints of violence and intimidation in the electoral process. The electoral process in these regions is complicated by the presence of armed Resistance and Sandinista military forces, as well as by the return of former contras and refugees who have asked to participate in the electoral process with guarantees of safety.

### ***Matagalpa***

The region produces roughly 2/3 of the country's coffee, has strong opposition support, and is experiencing security risks in the rising numbers of reported clashes and attacks by contra or EPS forces. International observers, the regional electoral council, and the opposition leaders expressed concern that the high levels of tension in the region are giving rise to threats and violence, especially at opposition campaign rallies. The regional electoral council has worked with the parties to produce an agreement to respect the electoral ethics law, but most felt that this agreement has been violated repeatedly since its signing in later November. The complaints center on destruction of campaign propaganda, harassment (including stoning) at UNO campaign rallies, and intimidation of party supporters by both contra activities and Sandinista military and police. The electoral council agreed that more specific measures were needed to preclude campaign violence.

Another concern raised by nearly all the participants was the problem of registration in the northern part of the region, in which as 20,000 people were

perhaps not able to register due to security reasons, long lines, and lack of sufficient registration materials. The regional electoral council has asked for a 5th Sunday of registration for 26 registration sites (JRV's) that were either partially or totally closed, but had not yet received an answer from the Supreme Electoral Council. Of these 26, the electoral council reported that nine sites had security risks due to military or contra activity.

In addition to the above concerns, UNO raised the following issues: 1) inequitable access to the media (government has 33 radio stations nationally, compared to 7 independent stations); 2) concern about military personnel registering and voting more than once, and difficulty in verifying this; 3) threats to fiscales (poll-watchers) to prevent their functioning on election day (in Jinotega Dept, 45% of JRV's have no UNO fiscales, and in Matagalpa Dept. 35% are missing); 4) continued recruitment of party candidates and election officials into the military reserves, contrary to August agreement; and 5) plans for a major mobilization of 30,000 reservists in mid-December.

The FSLN representatives and regional military and police commanders responded that they wanted military personnel to register and vote in the same locale, near their barracks, to avoid problems. Since July they have reduced mobilization of reserves by 50%, had one large mobilization in October and another planned after the election, and had none planned for December. They estimate 3,500-4,000 contras inside Nicaragua, another 4,500 in Honduras, and nearly 600 amnestied in Region VI. They expect that the contras will continue their struggle after the election if the FSLN wins because the contras believe that the FSLN could only win by fraud, and so they will be justified in continuing the fight. About a third of the population lives in municipalities affected by contra activity.

### ***Estelí***

Historically a strategic region in Nicaraguan civil conflicts and Honduran border smuggling, Region I is characterized by strong FSLN support and organization, continued contra presence, and serious complaints of intimidation and threats to opposition political leaders and, secondarily, harassment at campaign rallies. Nevertheless, the electoral council and party leaders have met regularly and made some progress, recently signing a specific accord aimed at delineating the role of the police and controlling electoral violence. While there have been no major complaints about campaign rallies since the opening of the official campaign on December 4 (in contrast to incidents at Jalapa, La Trinidad, and other towns during the pre-campaign period in November), it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of the accord.

The issue of police protection is a central one in the region as well as nationally. The accord now provides for police presence at rallies with careful limitations and also for police protection of individuals upon request. The delegation addressed the case of Arnulfo Barrantes, the UNO legal representative who resigned temporarily from his position after receiving anonymous threats to himself and his family, and having his car stolen and burned. President Carter raised the case with President Ortega and with Vice Minister of Interior René Vivas, who promised to provide police protection to Barrantes. Other UNO leaders have also

reported intimidation and harassment to themselves, claiming it comes from state security forces.

The FSLN representatives reported the continued problem of contra activity and its impact on the electoral process, and cited a case in early December of an attack in which seven people were killed in La Trinidad. Other party leaders (PLIUN, PSC) complained about lack of access to either government or UNO - supported media, and that they are caught in the middle of the tensions and conflict between UNO and FSLN. The UNO representative, Dr. Braulio Lanciga, made an explicit statement that the UNO is not tied to the contras and that they condemn the contra violence.

The registration process appeared quite successful in Region I, with high numbers registering (compared to 1984) and none of the registration sites being forced to close (although some opened late or were given military protection.)

### ***Ending the Electoral Violence***

Based on our discussions with regional leaders in Matagalpa and Esteli, and national political and government leaders in Managua, we were encouraged that leaders from all sides wanted to end the electoral violence, and by the efforts in Regions I and VI to reach a consensus among the parties to that end. We worked with national party and election officials to develop specific guidelines to minimize the chances of violence at political rallies in all regions by prohibiting the presence of weapons of all kinds at rallies, barring the sale of alcohol during the time of the rally, regulating the use of the police, and urging the moderation of political rhetoric. We also encouraged party leaders publicly to accept the results of the February election and work for reconciliation regardless of who might win. We urged the Supreme Electoral Council to take the lead in developing a consensus around such guidelines. During our visit, the Electoral Council solicited proposals from the political parties and convened a meeting to try to reach agreement on an accord. The effort failed to gain the signatures of all the parties, however. We continued our efforts to devise a set of guidelines that would be acceptable to all parties and, after consulting with the SEC, we gained approval of FSLN and UNO leaders of the proposed guidelines. SEC President Mariano Fiallos authorized President Carter to announce in his press conference that the Supreme Electoral Council would promulgate a decree setting out the guidelines and that the Ministry of Interior would implement it. Carter called on all political parties to publicly endorse the measures.

### ***Contras and the elections***

The delegation also discussed the negative effect on the electoral process of the presence of the Nicaraguan Resistance (contras) inside Nicaragua, the continued military activity, and the use of the contras in political campaign rhetoric. The tying of UNO to the contra and the Guardia Nacional in the press and in campaign rhetoric is damaging to the climate of the campaign and prospects for national reconciliation. In discussions with the UNO leadership, the delegation urged them to state clearly that there is no relationship between UNO and the contras and to condemn the contra violence. The previous UNO position was to condemn all the violence in the country by both sides and to support the Central American Accords, which call for demobilization of the contras.



### **III. Conclusions and Follow-up**

After leaving Managua, the delegation spent four hours in San José with Presidents Oscar Arias and Carlos Andrés Pérez briefing them on the Nicaraguan electoral process and discussing the Central American peace process. Both Presidents Arias and Pérez believe that if the peace process is to be invigorated, the conflicts in both El Salvador and Nicaragua must be addressed. Success in one cannot occur without progress in the other. If the issue of contra demobilization is not advanced, then the Salvadoran war could worsen, and the Nicaraguan electoral process could be harmed.

On December 20, President Carter and Dr. Pastor visited Washington to brief senior Administration officials on the trip and to discuss the prospects for improving the Nicaraguan electoral climate by renewing the ceasefire and implementing the Central American Accords on demobilization. They also discussed the issues of cessation of support for insurgencies and the normalization of external relations.

Two days after the delegation's departure on December 16, the Supreme Electoral Council issued its directive containing the guidelines to prevent further electoral violence. The directive was publicly endorsed by the FLSN and UNO. To date, the ensuing campaign rallies have been peaceful. Senior campaign officials of UNO confirmed that they felt a turning point had been reached, and they hoped that the violence that had been escalating before our visit would recede permanently into the past.

### **ITINERARY**

#### ***Wednesday, December 13, 1989***

9:30 am-Arrive Managua

Meeting with Vice President Sergio Ramirez

Depart to Matagalpa (with UNO campaign advisors Antonio Lacayo, Alfredo César)

Visit to market

#### **Matagalpa meetings:**

OAS and ONUVEN observers

OAS and ONUVEN observers Yamandu Rios, OAS

OAS and ONUVEN observers Mirta Teitelbaum, ONUVEN

Regional Electoral Council

Regional Electoral Council Sadrach Zeledón, President

UNO leaders

UNO leaders Santiago Rivas Lecler, Legal Representative

UNO leaders Jaime Cuadra, Region VI campaign chief

UNO leaders Francisco Castillo, Department campaign chief

UNO leaders Frank Lanza, Candidate for mayor

UNO leaders Orlanda Rodriguez, Electoral control, Region VI

FSLN and government leaders

FSLN and government leaders Carlos Zamora, Minister Delegate of the President and Region VI FSLN coordinator

FSLN and government leaders Com. Luís Chavez, Region VI Commander, Ministry of Interior

FSLN and government leaders Cor. Manuel Salvatierra, Region VI Chief of  
Military  
***Thursday, December 14, 1989***

Meeting with Brooklyn Rivera, Yatama, and Gustavo Parajón, National Reconciliation Commission  
Tour FSLN campaign headquarter and meet campaign leaders  
Tour FSLN campaign headquarter and meet campaign leaders Bayardo Arce, Legal Representative  
Tour FSLN campaign headquarter and meet campaign leaders Dionisio Marengo, campaign manager  
Dinner with Ambassadors and political leaders at U.S. Ambassador's residence  
Meeting with Supreme Electoral Council

***Saturday, December 16***

Breakfast with President Daniel Ortega and Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto  
Meeting with Moisés Hassan, candidate of MUR  
Meeting with Violeta Chamorro, Antonio Lacayo, Alfredo César, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Barrios  
Press conference

**San José, Costa Rica**

Meeting with Presidents Oscar Arias and José María Figueres



and for two hours after the rallies are concluded; a prohibition against any weapons to be in the vicinity of a rally; inspection of the rally site by the police before the rally commences and then the police would maintain a prudent distance [Editor: The directive indicated no less than 100 meters] from the rally while it was underway to detect violence and take immediate action if violence should erupt.

This directive by President Fiallos will be given to the Ministry of Interior to implement, and my hope and expectation is that all the political parties will endorse publicly this directive so that each parties' militants will be restrained. [Editor: During the weekend, Fiallos gained the consent of the entire five-person Electoral Council rather than issue it himself. The Council then issued a modified decree on December 18, and both major parties endorsed it.]

Another problem that we have observed that creates violence is the tying of UNO to the contras and to the National Guard. Violeta Chamorro and the political campaign managers of UNO have made it very clear to us that there is no relationship between UNO and the contras, that the military actions of the Resistance are condemned by the UNO leaders, and that the UNO leaders and the UNO party fully support the accords that have been reached by the Presidents in Central America, including the accord that was reached last week in Costa Rica that calls for the demobilization of the contra forces. With this clear statement by UNO, it is not proper anymore for the newspapers or others to tie UNO with the contras.

Last night we had a meeting at the American Embassy residence with diplomats in Managua. There were representatives of about fifteen foreign nations and we called upon them not only to support the election but also to begin to pledge financial support for Nicaragua, so that if and when the election is determined to be fair and free in February, that major financial and economic support will be given to this country by international organizations and by other governments to rebuild Nicaragua and give the people of this country not only peace but economic prosperity.

*Daniel Evans*, Co-leader of the U.S. delegation members:

I believe this has been a rewarding and worthwhile trip of the delegation to Nicaragua. I have been impressed with President Carter's determination to bring the different sides together and to help reduce some of the rhetoric that always seems to surround elections not only here but elsewhere. I agree with President Carter that the registration and the preparations for the election, the mechanical

In 1977 President Carter and I and another group of leaders from Latin America met, and we started to fight for human rights in this region. The greatest test that we had was the negotiation for the Canal Treaty in Panama. We insisted with many governments, including the one with Somoza who was still installed here, that there should be a clear and honest democracy that would give this people the opportunity to choose their leaders freely.

Demand the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and the immediate cessation of all types of action against the population and the electoral process in order that the elections may take place under conditions of peace and civility. The Social Christian Party and the Conservative Democratic Party express reservations regarding the point referring to the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance because this should take place in the framework of the accords of the Presidents of Central America.

Jose Maria Zabala PSOC  
Bonifacio Miranda Bengoechea PRT  
Bayardo Arce Casiano FSLN  
Isidro Tellez Toruno MAP-ML  
Filiberto Sarria P. PSC  
Giovanni D'Ciofalo Vera PUCA  
Eduardo Molina Palacios PCDN  
Francisco Samper Blanco MUR

Second Decree December 16/18, 1990

**DECREE ON CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE**

**SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL-Managua, Nicaragua-(signed by five members)**

THE SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL, with the purpose of contributing to the creation of appropriate conditions that may allow the development of an electoral campaign within the framework of peace and civility that will lead to the celebration of just, honest, free and democratic elections on the 25th of February 1990, makes known through this communication to the Political Parties, Alliances and Popular Organizations, and to the citizens of Nicaragua, to urge the strict adherence to the regulations of the Political Constitution of the Republic, to the Electoral Law, to the Electoral Code of Ethics and the diverse resolutions and dispositions of the Supreme Electoral Council and the Regional Electoral

Councils, aorao]TJTJTtorapliao]TJTJorr,7(he f)-cldohe fadherau thecuons ofual thens ofuliguatitizp

- from the beginning of the rally, at a prudent distance, not less than 100 meters, and to intervene if there is violence, to prevent violence, or if intervention is requested by the electoral authorities or the organizers of the rally.
5. To reiterate the prohibition of the sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages before and during the celebration of rallies in the community where the rallies take place.
  6. To demand that the coordinators and the speakers at these rallies make it known to the public that the role of the police is to maintain order and as such should be respected.
  7. To indicate to the directors of the media and journalists from television and the print media, that they should strictly comply with the Rules and Electoral Laws dictated by the Council, refraining from using insulting and injurious language, and that they remember that the Supreme Electoral Council, as the responsible entity for the administration of the law governing the Media and Social Communication, will rigorously and objectively apply this law.
  8. To ask that the candidates and supporters of the Parties, Alliances, and Associations publicly respect this communication.

Appendix 16: January Pre-Election Trip Report  
Report on Pre-Election Trip to Nicaragua  
Observer Delegation  
Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government  
January 26-28, 1990  
Honorable Jimmy Carter  
Mrs. Rosalynn Carter  
Honorable Alfonso López Michelson  
Senator John Danforth  
Representative Bill Richardson  
Representative Douglas Bereuter  
Dr. Robert Pastor  
Dr. Jennifer McCoy

**SUMMARY REPORT OF FOURTH PRE-ELECTION VISIT TO  
NICARAGUA**

January 26-28, 1990

**I. Introduction**

Seven members of the Observer Delegation of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government travelled to Nicaragua between January 26-29, 1990: former President Jimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, former Colombian President Alfonso López Michelson, Senator John Danforth, Congressman Douglas Bereuter, Congressman Bill Richardson, and Dr. Robert Pastor. This was the fifth visit by members of the delegation, following a trip earlier in the month by Senator Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dr. Jennifer

McCoy, the Director of the Managua Office, helped organize the visit and accompanied the delegation.

Since President Carter's visit in December, U.S. military forces had invaded Panama and intruded in the Nicaraguan Embassy residence in Panama. The latter event evoked a strong reaction by the Nicaraguan government, which included the expulsion of U.S. diplomats in Nicaragua. On this occasion, the principal opposition leader, Violeta de Chamorro, joined in criticizing the U.S. action and applauded the reaction by the Nicaraguan President. What was most interesting on this delegation's visit, however, was that no Nicaraguan raised Panama; the issue seems to have already receded.

The technical provisions of the election are progressing well, but the members of the delegation heard of serious problems and complaints related to the campaign. The principal concern related to charges of intimidation and harassment of opposition party candidates and poll-watchers (fiscales). Other problems included the imbalance in access to the media and the use of government facilities and vehicles by the Sandinista party. The opposition also complained that its access to funds provided by the U.S. Congress was being impeded, and the U.S. government also complained that its official delegation was not permitted to observe the elections.

With the return in mid-January of Sra. Violeta de Chamorro after a knee injury and of Vice Presidential Candidate Virgilio Godoy, the UNO campaign has moved into high gear. The candidates of the Sandinista Party and the other parties are campaigning intensely. With the election just one month away, and each of the two principal parties still confident of victory, the race is simply too close to call.

## **II. Activities**

As before, the delegation met with leaders in the major opposition party (UNO), the Sandinista party (FSLN), minor opposition parties, the United Nations and Organization of American States observer teams, the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC), and Cardinal Obando y Bravo. (See the appendix for a full itinerary.) Along with observers from the OAS and the UN, and accompanied by many members of the press, the delegation witnessed a realistic trial demonstration of the procedures to be followed on election day. The process functioned very smoothly. Electoral officials and poll-watchers of the political parties will open the Juntas (voting sites) at 6 a.m. on February 25 to prepare for the day. They will receive sealed envelopes containing the ballots, and other voting supplies including three ballot boxes-for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, the National Assembly, and the Municipalities. The Juntas will open for voting at 7 a.m., with a limit of 300 voters per facility. Registration cards will be checked against computerized lists; a number selected by the junta and electoral officials on the day of the election will be stamped on each colored ballot. After voting, each individual will put their thumb in a jar of indelible ink to prevent voting a second time. A test was made to see how rapidly people could vote, and there is no question that 300 people will be able to vote by the time polls close at 6 p.m. Anyone still in line at that time will vote.

The Supreme Electoral Council has authorized our delegation to observe the voting by going in and out of the Juntas during the voting and counting. The delegation also met with the Regional Electoral Council for the Managua region and was impressed at its high degree of organization. In general, the delegation concluded that an excellent technical preparation has been made.

The delegation also attended major political rallies of Presidential candidates Daniel Ortega in Rivas and Violeta de Chamorro in Jinotepe. Both rallies were well attended and peaceful. The police kept a prudent distance from the rally as mandated by the Supreme Electoral Council decree that was issued at the end of the delegation's visit in December.

As in previous visits, the delegation consulted fully with the observers of the O.A.S. and the U.N. Both were concerned about the intimidation issue and were investigating the complaints. They urged us to pursue this issue with the government, and we did. In addition, we discussed ways to coordinate our deployments on election day and in conducting the parallel vote tabulations. In our visits to the rallies, we also consulted with these two groups.

### ***Results of Discussions***

*Intimidation and Harassment.* All parties agreed that any intimidation of fiscales was a serious threat to the integrity of the election. Government officials pledged, through private instructions and public pronouncements, to convince their supporters that any intimidation was damaging to their cause. President Ortega informed President Carter that he had just made a similar commitment to Cardinal Obando to take steps to end intimidation.

*Use of Government Facilities.* The FSLN had been using government vehicles and posters had been observed in government buildings. It was reported that the Sandinistas had not paid for the rent of the vehicles and that other political parties had not been permitted to use them.

The electoral laws permit leasing of government vehicles for campaign use. The SEC and FSLN officials will work to assure a complete accounting for the payment for this service, and other political parties will be reminded of this opportunity. The UNO campaign manager said that they did not wish to rent the vehicles at this time, but preferred to use those owned by private companies. The SEC and FSLN will make another effort, similar to the fairly effective one made before Christmas, to remove all campaign literature from government buildings.

*Access to Media.* Although the political agreement of last August had been honored concerning access to electronic media and additional time had since been allocated, the time and optimum hours for campaign advertisements were still not adequate. Both the OAS and the UN reported that because of the control of the most powerful radio and television stations by the government, an imbalance in the coverage of the campaigns was clearly evident.

We encouraged the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) and FSLN leaders to provide additional time on television time to the opposition parties and that their campaign advertisements might be shown during available prime time between 7:00 and 9:30 p.m. The SEC agreed and promised to take such steps.

*Verifying Registration*

SEC delivered the computer lists beginning on December 16 and continuing through mid-January. Since the last lists were delivered later than the previously-

would have to examine the contract in more detail later. The Ministry of External Cooperation then approved the transfer of funds to IPCE.

*U.S. Government Observers.* The U.S. Government had not been able to get approval for an adequate delegation to observe the election. The Nicaraguan government indicated that it considered such a delegation partial to the opposition, and that it had already invited an unprecedented number of international observers in their country, including our delegation and those of the UN and OAS. At the request of Senator Danforth and former President Carter, however, the Nicaraguan government leaders approved the addition of up to eight additional members of the U.S. Congress to our observer team. They will be given the same free access in performing their duties under the auspices of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government as has been granted to other international observers.

### **III. Conclusions**

After the delegation's visit in September, the Miskito Indian leaders were welcomed back into the country and seem to be fully involved in the political process. After our visit in December, new instructions were promulgated to end campaign violence, and everyone agreed there have been no incidents of violence or threats at any political rallies since then.

During this visit, the delegation was impressed by the determination of all the political parties to participate in the elections, but all were concerned about the problem of intimidation and harassment. The delegation made clear that it was in the interests of both the Sandinistas and the opposition that all designated opposition poll-watchers perform their duties on the day of the election. If this does not occur, this would call into question the integrity of the election. The government understands this point, and expressed interest in taking steps to ensure that it will not happen. Due to the active pre-election work and the plans for the election and the vote tabulation by our organization, the U.N., and the O.A.S., we believe that if there is fraud in the election, we will be able to detect it. In all, the election process is moving forward satisfactorily. Given the experiences in the past electoral process, it is fair to expect that new problems will emerge. But if the initiatives approved by the Nicaraguan government during this last visit are fully implemented in good faith, then we hope that any new issues will be similarly resolved. Therefore, we conclude that the opportunity for the Nicaraguan people to vote for their next government on February 25 looks good.

### **CONCLUDING STATEMENTS AND PRESS CONFERENCE**

**Managua, Nicaragua  
Sunday, January 28, 1990**

*Hon. Jimmy Carter:* "... Yesterday we witnessed a mock election, and it was conducted very well. The technical characteristics of the election are excellent. We also have made arrangements between my group and the UN and the OAS to monitor very carefully and adequately the conduct of the elections, and on the night of the 25th of February, the counting and tabulation of votes.

"As in the past, we have listened very carefully to reports of complaints and problems as they relate to the elections. One report that has been very disturbing to us has been of intimidation against supporters, candidates, and fiscales [poll-



watchers] of opposition parties. We have brought these matters to the attention of the leaders of the government and leaders of the FSLN. President Ortega informed me that he discussed this with Cardinal Obando y Bravo and that he and all the members of the government and the FSLN campaign were determined to eliminate any possible future intimidation, and that they would do this, and I quote President Ortega, 'with the firmest private instructions and also public declarations that it is crucial that all the fiscales that have been recruited and designated would be on their jobs on election day and night to assure the integrity of the elections.'

"Another complaint made to us was the use by the FSLN of government facilities including government vehicles and the use of government buildings to promote the candidacy of FSLN candidates for President and for other offices. It is legal for any party to rent and pay for the use of government vehicles. We have made this plain in discussions with all the parties and the Sandinistas, and the Supreme Electoral Council will certify that the FSLN is paying the full price for the use of government vehicles. We also raised the question of posters and other promotional materials in government buildings. The Supreme Electoral Council and the Sandinista leaders have agreed to make an effort to remove all of these improper uses of government buildings. Both the Supreme Electoral Council and the Sandinista leaders have agreed to permit more advertising and use of the electronic media especially during the hours of 7 - 9:30 p.m.

"All these agreements are very encouraging. The international observers will be monitoring very carefully to be sure that these agreements are carried out. This morning I discussed with President Ortega and Vice-President Ramirez the problem of delayed transfer of election funds from the U.S. Congress to the UNO campaign and also to IPCE [Institute for Election Promotion and Training], and I think we have successfully resolved that problem. We met with Government officials including those from the Central Bank, and this afternoon we met with representatives of IPCE and the Supreme Electoral Council. There has been an agreement signed and I'll read it. It is very brief:

"It is agreed that the Institute for Electoral Promotion and Training (IPCE) will work in harmony with the Supreme Electoral Council [SEC] to assure that activities and financial expenditures of IPCE will be compatible with Nicaraguan laws and electoral regulations as interpreted by the SEC. The SEC will assure compliance with this agreement."

"The agreement is signed by IPCE, SEC and me. With this, the bank and the Ministers and the President agreed that they would take immediate action without further delay to release all these funds. The final point that I would like to make is that there has been a problem with gaining the approval of the Nicaraguan government for a delegation of Congress members from the United States to observe the elections. At the suggestion of Senator Jack Danforth, we now reached an agreement that a total of not more than twelve members of the U.S.

Congress would join this delegation and would participate without restraint during the elections."

*Alfonso López Michelsen, former President of Colombia:*

efforts of thousands of observers in the world community and individuals like President Carter, my conclusion is that the prospects for the election being a fair one are good.

immediately  
plans

Minister George Price of Belize, former Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo, U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd, former governor of Nevada Michael O'Callaghan, and Ambassador Ambler Moss. Dr. Jennie Lincoln, Associate Director of the Carter Center Latin American program and Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Director of the Managua Office, accompanied the delegation.

## **II. Activities**

The delegation met with leaders and campaign officials of the major parties, government officials, the OAS and UN observer missions, the Supreme Electoral Council, the Regional Electoral Council of Managua and private sector leaders. The delegation witnessed a demonstration of the voting process, and part of the group witnessed the release of the prisoners and former National Guard members on Friday. (See attached itinerary)

*Registration list verification.* UNO representatives explained that the verification of registration lists had been slowed due to the delay of funding through IPCE for this activity, the lack of alphabetical order of the lists, and computer inadequacies. Nevertheless, thus far no major problems have been detected with the lists, and UNO expects to have checked a sample of 10% of the names before the elections.

*Fiscales.* The delegation expressed in all of the meetings its view that the presence of fiscales (poll-watchers) on election day will be very important to ensure the integrity of the process. During the delegation's visit the SEC decided to extend again the deadline for naming of fiscales, with lists now due on February 16. The FSLN campaign manager reported that the party had named 100 percent of its fiscales. UNO representatives reported that they expected to name a complete roster of fiscales, but that they feared some may be subject to intimidation. The delegation expressed its views to both parties and government officials that while parties have the responsibility to secure their own pollwatchers to monitor the process, these pollwatchers should be free to perform their duties without fear of intimidation.

The delegation received reports of intimidation and harassment of party activists

forces since the new president would have the right to change the chief of staff immediately.

## **ITINERARY**

### ***February 8, 1990***

Meeting with UNO presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro and advisors Antonio Lacayo, Alfredo César, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro

### ***February 9, 1990***

Meeting with UNO campaign officials: Edgar Quintana, Electoral Control, Hernaldo Zuñiga, Legal Representative, Guillermo Potoy, IPCE, Constantino Céspedes, Verification, and others

Attend release of prisoners, Tipitapa Prison

Meeting with UPANIC board of directors (private agri. producers)

Meeting with Jaime Wheelock, Ministry of Agrarian Reform

Visit and lunch at Chiltepe model dairy farm with Jaime Wheelock

Meeting with Supreme Electoral Council

Meeting with ONUVEN observer mission

Meeting with René Vivas, Vice Minister of Interior

Meeting with Bayardo Arce, FSLN campaign manager

Meeting with Costa Rican Ambassador Farid Ayala and U.S. Chargé, Jack Leonard

### ***February 10, 1990***

Team I: Visit to Puerto Cabezas

Team I: Meetings with FSLN and Yatama leaders and Regional Electoral

Team I: Council, Region VII

Team II: Attend UNO rally in Boaco and lunch with local UNO leaders

Team II: Attend UNO rally in Masaya and FSLN rally in Granada

### ***February 11, 1990***

Meeting with Regional Electoral Council, Managua, Region III

Attend vote demonstration

Meeting with OAS observer mission

Press conference

## **Appendix 19: Supreme Electoral Council Announcement of Election Results**

February 19, 1990

### **EXCERPTS FROM THE SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF ELECTION RESULTS**

The Supreme Electoral Council of the Republic of Nicaragua in accordance with





Briefings at Olof Palme Conference Center -UNO's Assessment of the Electoral Process, Violeta Barrios Chamorro and Antonio Lacayo

Briefings at Olof Palme Conference Center -FSLN's Assessment of the Electoral Process, Vice-President Sergio Ramirez and Bayardo Arce

Briefings at Olof Palme Conference Center -Observer Assessments of Electoral Process, Iqbal Riza, Chief of ONUVEN (UN Observers), Mario Gonzalez, Coordinator of OAS Mission

Reception with Other Observer Missions

***Saturday, February 24***

Meeting of Jimmy Carter, Elliot Richardson, Iqbal Riza, Joao Baena Soares, Mario Gonzalez, Robert Pastor

Press Conference with OAS, UN, and Council

Delegation Members depart for the regional observation assignments

Delegation Members depart for the regional observation assignments -meeting with regional election officials, local candidates and other observers

***Managua Delegation Visits***

come to support the people of this courageous country who want to vote and

During the last six months, we have seen Nicaraguans of all political persuasions come forward to offer their message to the people, and this political process has been gratifying. Today, we will complete our preparations to observe the election, and tomorrow morning, former President Carter, Governor Dan Evans, and I will discuss the electoral campaign with OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares and Elliot Richardson, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. Then, we will offer our evaluation of the process. Sunday will be the day for Nicaraguans. We hope and expect them to vote in large numbers with confidence that their decision will be observed and respected.

**Appendix 22: Joint Statement of the Council, the OAS, and the UN**

Council Representative:

Dr. Beatrice Rangel, (Venezuela)  
Rep. William Richardson (D-NM)  
Rep. Elton Gallegley (R-Cal)

Staff Coordinators:

Mr. Daniel Romero  
Mr. Barry Sklar

## **II. LEON/CHINANDEGA**

Council Member:

Hon. Raúl Alfonsín  
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn)  
Rep. Douglas Bereuter (R-Neb)  
Mrs. Elizabeth Frawley-Bagley

Staff Coordinators:

Mr. José Sandoval  
Mr. Raúl Alconada  
Mr. Robert Dockery

## **III. MANAGUA** - three teams

Council Chairman:

Hon. Jimmy Carter

Council Vice Chairman:

Prime Minister George Price  
Mrs. Rosalynn Carter  
Hon. Daniel Evans, Co-Leader of the U.S. Group  
Dr. Robert Pastor  
Father Fernando Guardia  
Mr. Genaro Arriagada

Staff Coordinators:

Dr. Robert Pastor  
Dr. Jennifer McCoy  
Mr. Santiago Canton  
Mr. Eric Bord

## **IV. GRANADA**

Council Member:

Hon. Rafael Caldera  
Senator Claiborne Pell, (D-RI)  
Rep. David Bonior (D-Mich)  
Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg  
Mrs. Harriet Babbitt

Staff Coordinators:

Dr. Jennie Lincoln  
Mr. Luís Miguel Gonzalez  
Mr. Geryld B. Christianson

## **V. CHONTALES/JUIGALPA**

**2 person team also visited IX RIO SAN JUAN - SAN CARLOS\***

Council Member:

Hon. Rodrigo Carazo  
Senator John Danforth (R-MO)  
Rep. Olympia Snowe (R-ME)  
Hon. Ambler Moss\*

Staff Coordinators:

Ms. Nina Serafino  
Mr. John Chambers\*

**VI. MATAGALPA**

Council Member:

Hon. Rodrigo Oduber  
Senator Larry Pressler (R-RD)  
Hon. Bruce Babbitt  
Hon. John Whitehead

Staff Coordinator:

Dr. Richard Millett

**VII. NORTH ATLANTIC (PUERTO CABEZAS)**

Hon. Donal (Mike) O'Callaghan  
Rep. Ben Jones (D-Ga)

Staff Coordinator:

Ms. Janet Shenk

**VIII. SOUTH ATLANTIC (BLUEFIELDS)**

Council Representative:

Hon. O.D. Ramtallie (Jamaica)  
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont)  
Mr. Leopold Berlinger (Haiti)

Staff Coordinators:

Ms. Janice O'Connell  
Mr. James Gallagher

**JRV EVALUATION FORM**

Observer Delegation  
Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government

Instructions: Please complete this form for each of the stations you visit. If you are unable to complete this form, please provide a written explanation of the reasons for this. The form is to be submitted to the coordinator of the participating JRV on the day of the election.

Time JRV Opened: \_\_\_\_\_ Region: \_\_\_\_\_ City: \_\_\_\_\_ JRV# \_\_\_\_\_  
Time of Visit: \_\_\_\_\_ Number of Registrants: \_\_\_\_\_

Number Waiting in Line to Vote: \_\_\_\_\_ Number That Have Already Voted (approx.): \_\_\_\_\_

2. Presence of Fiscals

The following fiscals were present: (circle) \_\_\_\_\_ a) \_\_\_\_\_

ESLN \_\_\_\_\_ LINO \_\_\_\_\_ OTHERS (specify) \_\_\_\_\_


3. Presence of Electoral Police

Electoral police INSIDE the JRV? YES/NO Armed? YES/NO Were elected? YES/NO  
Electoral police OUTSIDE the JRV? YES/NO Armed? YES/NO Were elected? YES/NO

4. Did you observe any irregularities concerning the following? If YES, specify.

- \_\_\_\_\_ Election materials missing (registration lists, ballots, ballot boxes, indelible ink, number stamp/serial number)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Discrepancies with secretary of JRV
- \_\_\_\_\_ Absence of JRV officials other than scrutineers
- \_\_\_\_\_ Other irregular activities (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

PARTICULARLY AT THE CLOSING:





The Sandinista National Liberation Front headed the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. It lived the bitter moments of the fall of the dictator Somoza, the moments of pain when we lost a brother in combat, and we Sandinista militants learned to forge ourselves in the difficult moments facing adversity. With the Nicaraguan people we conquered the rights to freedom, independence, democracy and peace on July 19, 1979.

### **Years of Suffering**

During those 10 hard and difficult years, cruel for the Nicaraguan people, the Sandinista Front with its revolutionary Government knew how to stay in the forefront of the defense of the interests of the people, in the forefront of the homeland, the national dignity, sovereignty, at the forefront of the struggle for Nicaraguan self-determination and of that struggle for peace.

Just as we succeeded in overthrowing Somozacism, we also defeated the counterrevolution, and also brought to trial before the world those who provided that policy of death against the Nicaraguan people, and in an act of historical transcendence for the people of the world, the World Court condemned the United States of America for its criminal acts against the people of Nicaragua and called on the United States of America to cease those acts and called on the United States of America to give indemnity to the Nicaraguan people....

We went to these elections of the 25th of February 1990 with the conviction that in this battle in the electoral field must be decided once and for all an end to the war, a little peace, stability and tranquillity for the Nicaraguan people.

That is the Sandinista Front, which with more political and historical force with the patriotic and flourishing Nicaraguan people has in these elections faced U.S. policy, the contras, the economic embargo, the economic erosion provoked by the war, with confidence in the people certain that the end of this electoral process would give all Nicaraguans that peace and that stability which we so need to reconstruct this country, to lift up the economy, to free well-being in the official areas, and aspire to a minimum of political stability....

### **World Is Watching**

Never in the history of any independent country have elections been carried out that have been so well observed as that have these here in Nicaragua, with observers from the United Nations, the O.A.S., the Carter Center, observers from Europe, Latin America and other parts of the world.

Hundreds of journalists also covered and observed this electoral process, proving that the political will of the revolutionary Sandinistas have never been fixated on power; that we were born poor and we are satisfied to die poor because we carried out our efforts in these elections to emphasize this project which has become a challenge to the intelligence, the imagination, the creativity, of the people in the permanent struggle for their liberation, their independence their self-determination and for economic and social justice....

### **Respecting Mandate**

I wish to express in my name, in that of my family, of my companion of my brothers in the National Directorate of the Sandinista Front, of my brother militant of the F.S.L.N., in the name of the heroic self-sacrificing, courageous, conscientious people who have participated in this electoral process and have



given their support to the F.S.L.N., I wish to say to all Nicaraguans and to all the peoples of the world that the President of Nicaragua and the Government of Nicaragua are going to respect and obey the popular mandate coming out of the vote in these elections.

In consider that in this historic moment, the principal contributions of the Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries, are making to the Nicaraguan people is that of guaranteeing a clean, pure electoral process, that it may heat up our consciences even more, that it may shine with the sun of this dawn, the 26th of February, in this 1990, that it may shine towards the consolidation of democracy, the consolidation of a mixed economy, toward the consolidation of a free, independent and democratic Nicaragua in peace without intervention by any foreign power where all of us Nicaraguans may be capable of demonstrating to the world that we can change these dreams, these hopes, into reality....

Thank you, Nicaraguan brothers. Thank you, brother militants of the F.S.L.N., thank you brother combatants of the Popular Sandinista Army and of the Ministry of the Interior who with your blood fertilized this labor defending the right of Nicaraguans to exercise their right to vote thanks to the blood of our heroes and martyrs, thanks to the pain full of hope of the mothers of Nicaragua thanks to every Nicaraguan brother.

I urge you today more than ever so that we may act firmly with the security that the steps we have taken are the correct steps, that we have been consistent with the proposals we have made, that if after all we have pledged so much sacrifice, so much effort during these years, that once again we Sandinistas will be victorious, once more we Sandinistas will be conquerors because we have changed our words into deeds in spite of all of the campaigns raised against this electoral process, in spite of all of the distrust that was intended to be generated around this electoral process in spite of the systematic actions of the counterrevolutionaries assassinating people during the electoral campaign....

We feel proud to be contributing to Nicaragua, to be contributing to the peoples of Central America, Latin America and the Caribbean, to the peoples on the road to development, to be contributing in this unjust world divided between the strong and the weak, to be contributing a little bit of dignity, a little bit of democracy, a little bit of social justice from this small territory in Central America which saw the birth of men who made Nicaragua shine in the world as did Darío and Sandino.

Thank you, Nicaraguan; brothers, and go forward, go forward with our struggle and our battle cry which is the cry of Sandino - "Free fatherland or death."

### **Text of Victory Speech by the Nicaraguan Opposition Leader**

Special to The New York Times

*MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Feb. 26 - Following is a transcript of a victory speech this morning by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the Nicaraguan opposition leader, as recorded and translated by The New York Times:*

Nicaraguans, Nicaraguans: after having heard about the first electoral results, I would like to tell you that I am certain that this constituency's tendency in favor of UNO is irreversible and will be getting broader as we keep learning the results from the rest of the country; that this margin in favor of UNO is identical for the three electoral ballots; that as long as the counting of the Supreme Electoral

Council goes on, I ask my Nicaraguan people to be calm and abstain from displaying any signs of victory

I want to congratulate all Nicaraguans because today it is everyone's triumph.

We have shown the world an example of civic duty, demonstrating that we Nicaraguans want to live in democracy, want to live in peace and, above all, that we want to live in liberty.

We have obtained the first democratic election in the history of this country. I

confess that I feel very emotional at such an important moment for Nicaragua.

Now I will honor my commitment to achieve national reconciliation because this is the only way we will be able to have peace and economic well-being.

This is the first election in our history won by the opposition, and, God willing, a change of Government will come about peacefully.

This is an election that will never have exiles or political prisoners or confiscations. Here, we have neither victors nor vanquished. I ratified today my commitment to comply faithfully to the plan of government of the National Opposition Union, which is a program for national salvation.

From the day I agreed to be UNO's candidate, I knew that the Nicaraguan people, given a fair election as we have had today, would vote to establish a democratic republic like the one dreamt of by my husband Pedro Joaquín.

I want to say to you that today we must all congratulate each other with a fraternal embrace because Nicaragua will again be a republic.

### **Bush's Remarks on Nicaragua**

*WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 (AP) - Following is a transcript of President Bush's remarks today on the election in Nicaragua, as recorded by The Associated Press. The President spoke at a meeting of the National Governors' Association.*

Any friend of democracy can take heart in the fact that Violeta Chamorro won the election. And the election process, by all accounts free and fair, is a credit to the people of Nicaragua, who chose to determine their nation's future, nation's future at the ballot box. And that is a victory for democracy.

Yesterday's election moves us one step closer to the day when every nation in this hemisphere is a democracy, and I'll soon send messages - I think they may have already gone out to - to Mrs. Chamorro, congratulating her on her victory; to President Ortega, congratulating him on the conduct of the election and on his pledge to stand by its results; to President Carter and his counterpart on that one, Dan Evans; to Mr. Soares of the O.A.S.; to Pérez de Cuéllar and Elliot Richardson of the United Nations for their leading roles in observing the elections.

In the next few days, I'll be speaking with Central and South American leaders.

This morning I talked to President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela about appropriate trade and economic measures that we can take to support the new Government of Nicaragua.

We hope now for a peaceful transition, for the institutionalization of the democratic process in Nicaragua, and there is space in a democratic Nicaragua for all political points of view.

Given a clear mandate for peace and democracy, there is no reason at all for further military activity from any quarter, and we hope the ceasefire will be re-established without delay and respected by all sides.

"There is no reason at all for further military activity from any quarter," said President Bush, who called Nicaragua's election a "mandate for peace." For years the people of Nicaragua have suffered, and today the people of Nicaragua have spoken. And now is the time for Nicaragua to move forward to freedom.

## **Appendix 25: List of Members of the Legislative Assembly**

### **NICARAGUA - Elected Officials 1990**

President of the Republic: Violeta Barrios de Chamorro

Vice-President of the Republic: Virgilio Godoy Reyes

Representatives of the National Assembly  
by Region and Party Alliance



## **Appendix 26: Transcript of Remarks by Jimmy Carter and Department of State**

### **DEPARTURE REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE JIMMY CARTER DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON, D.C. FEBRUARY 28, 1990**

*QUESTION:* Any problems with the Sandinistas giving up military power and the Contras relinquishing their arms as well?

*MR. CARTER:* No, I've had long meeting with the Sandinista leaders, including Humberto Ortega, the President's brother and the Minister of Defense, and also the leaders representing UNO and the transition. They're working harmoniously. The concerns of the Sandinistas are both understood and approved by the UNO leaders.

The key unresolved factor is what's going to happen to the Contras. I don't think that there is going to be a guarantee of an orderly transition as long as the Contras are a military force threatening the country. But Dona Violeta Chamorro and Daniel Ortega have both made identical statements now, calling for the Contras to demobilize immediately in accordance with the agreements reached by the Central American Presidents and for funding of the Contras to be used for repatriation and resettlement.

At the same time, it's very important to honor the concerns of the Contras. They have to be sure that when they go back to Nicaragua, they will be protected. So I don't see a problem at all; there's no incompatibility between them now.

*QUESTION:* How is it going to work itself out? The Contras, won't lay down their arms until they see the transfer of power and the Sandinistas say they won't transfer power unless the Contras lay down their arms?

*MR. CARTER:* The Sandinistas haven't said anything like that. I've known every single statement exactly word-for-word that the Sandinista leaders have said since the election and they haven't said anything like that. They realize that by April 25 there will still be a number of Contras-nobody knows how many-who will not have laid down their arms. The point is, will the UNO leaders and the Sandinistas work in harmony to make sure that the Contras will come back to Nicaragua-those who want to come back-in a peaceful way, without their arms-when they come back into the country? And will the United States cooperate with this, in accordance with the agreements the Central American governments have worked out? I can understand that the Contras are concerned. They need to be sure that when they do come back to Nicaragua, they'll be treated fairly and that their safety will be preserved. That's being worked out now in a very harmonious way.

*QUESTION:* You said one of the elements is whether the United States will support that type of arrangement. Now that you've spoken to the Secretary, what is your impression? Does the U.S. share your formula for a peaceful transition?

*MR. CARTER:* Well, the Secretary of State can speak for himself, but after going over the transcript of his testimony yesterday to the Congress, I think I could answer your question in the affirmative. Their basic commitment at the State

Department, as expressed by the Secretary to the Congress, is compatible with what I've just described-which is an identical approach between Violeta Chamorro on the one hand and Daniel Ortega on the other concerning the Contras. And everybody must realize the Contras have legitimate concerns which must be met.

*QUESTION:* Mr. Carter, did you bring any message to the Secretary from Nicaragua?

*MR. CARTER:* I brought a report to the Secretary from Nicaragua. I've been down there a lot of days, I've met with all the people. I know what's going on as well as anybody could from the outside, and I gave the Secretary of State a report on what my impressions were.

*QUESTION:* Have you received assurances from Humberto Ortega that the government control of the army will be transferred to the UNO government?

*MR. CARTER:* Yes, there's no equivocation about that anyway, including statements by Humberto privately and by Daniel Ortega publicly. They acknowledge the results of the election. They honor the fact that Violeta Chamorro is the President-elect and they will recognize her not only as President, but as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces. And along with that is her right to choose her own ministers, including the minister of defense and of the interior.

*QUESTION:* So the Ortegas do not tie that issue of turning over control of the Nicaraguan Army to Chamorro-they don't tie that issue at all to the Contra issue, or do they?

*MR. CARTER:* They tie it to the Contra issue, but not to the fact that the Contras have to demobilize. It's just a matter of them working out harmoniously the procedure by which the Contras will come back to the country. I think that's very important, because if you have an army on the edge and in your country that still threatens military action, that's obviously a very destabilizing factor. But I don't think there's any disharmony between the Sandinistas and UNO about how this should be handled. My assessment is, based on his testimony, that the Secretary of State agrees with this.

U.S. Department of State  
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman  
March 2, 1990

### **STATEMENT BY MARGARET TUTWILER/SPOKESWOMAN**

Now that a good election has been completed and a clear decision made by the citizens of Nicaragua, it is time to reconcile differences and to avoid any further conflicts or military threats. The re-imposition of a cease fire is a significant step in this healing process.

*The United States Government is also convinced that immediate steps should be taken to encourage demobilization and repatriation of the Resistance Forces.*

This is compatible with the bi-partisan accord reached between the President and the Congress early last year. Full assurances must be given to the Nicaraguan Resistance about their safety, proper economic security, and re-incorporation without discrimination into the Nicaraguan society. It is important that their legitimate needs be met, and that a mechanism be established to verify that they are, as required by both the Esquipulas and Tela Accords.

It is equally important that the full and unequivocal transfer of civil and military power go forward peacefully and in an orderly manner to Mrs. Chamorro's new government and that her campaign platform be respected.

As Secretary Baker said to the Senate Budget Committee Wednesday: "As a

PROCEDURAL PROTOCOL FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE EXECUTIVE  
POWER OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA:

- I. General Considerations
  1. It is the consensus of the two teams that the results of the clean and honest general elections held on February 25, 1990, must serve to strengthen the democratic process in Nicaragua and to achieve a just and lasting peace which will protect all Nicaraguans without political distinction.
  2. That, therefore, a solid base must be established for the reconciliation, internal harmony and stability of the Nation in all their aspects, in order to generate confidence and security for all Nicaraguans.
  3. That unified action to consolidate lasting peace and stability is also a necessary, indispensable condition for the economic reconstruction of the country.
  4. All undertakings must be based on national recognition of popular achievements and transformations to date and on full legal respect for the Constitution of Nicaragua and the Laws of the Republic.
- II. Stipulations for the Transfer
  1. Implementation of the Toncontin Agreement signed on March 23, 1990, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, for the demobilization of the Resistance forces before April 25, 1990, which constitutes an essential element for creating the climate of peace, stability and tranquility necessary for the transfer of government.
  2. The Defense and Public Order forces of the Nation will be subordinated to the civilian power of the President of the Republic in accordance with the Constitution and the Laws of the Republic.



Government must be strengthened within the proper application of the Constitution of the Laws.

4. There is agreement on the need to provide peace of mind and legal security to those Nicaraguan families who have received the benefit of urban or rural property through State assignment before February 25, 1990, reconciling this with legitimate legal property rights of other Nicaraguans, all procedures to be conducted within the framework of the Law. Adequate forms of compensation will be established for those who have suffered any damage.
5. The orderly transfer of the Executive Power must take place within a framework of mutual security and trust wherein any act of vindictiveness, reprisal or revenge will not have a place, and in a climate of respect for people's physical and moral integrity. In this respect, both transition teams support the initiatives of the public authorities to create a climate of National Reconciliation and Amnesty in benefit of the Nicaraguan family, and express the need to assure that arms and combat equipment are only in the hands of the armed institutions of the Republic.

It is also understood that existing associations and labor and community organizations in the country will enjoy the guarantees established by the Constitution and the Law.

Similarly, monuments dedicated to Heroes and Martyrs who fell in the struggle against Somociso and in defense of the Homeland will be respected.

6. The guarantee of job stability for government officeholders -- based on efficiency, administrative honesty and years of service -- is also supported by both transition teams.
7. Both teams agree they should join forces to obtain international resources during the transition stage in order to promote stability and economic growth.

The basis for the transference of power enumerated above constitute, in general, the outgrowth of coinciding opinions expressed by the heads of both teams at a February 27, 1990, meeting held in the presence of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Mr. Joao Baena Soares, Mr. Elliot Richardson as personal representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and Former President Jimmy Carter of the United States.

### **Appendix 28: Letters from Jimmy Carter to Violeta Chamorro and Daniel Ortega**

Today you fulfill a dream that all Nicaraguans have shared since your country's independence. The dream is of peaceful change - that the Presidency of Nicaragua would be transferred in a peaceful ceremony in which the loser was an incumbent and the winner offered reconciliation to him and to all Nicaraguans.

I am very proud of how Daniel Ortega and you have managed this very difficult transition, and I want you to know that my friendship for you and for all the people of Nicaragua is very dear to me. I regret that I can not be with you for the ceremony, but you know that I am there in spirit, and I would return in a moment if Nicaragua's democracy were in jeopardy, and you thought my presence would help.

The transition toward a consolidated democracy will take, time, patience, and mutual respect. You have a special understanding of the need to heal the divisions in your nation, and that will guide you in the days ahead. If I can help in anyway, please do not hesitate to call on me.

You justly enjoy the support of your nation and the entire democratic world. Congratulations to you and to your country for a wonderful victory. May democracy in Nicaragua flourish, and may your Administration succeed in bringing prosperity, justice, and happiness to your people.

Sincerely,

President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro

President of Nicaragua

Managua, Nicaragua

April 25, 1990

To the Honorable Daniel Ortega

This is a very important day for you and Nicaragua. Today, for the first time in your nation's history, an incumbent President will peacefully hand the Presidential sash to the leader of the opposition. You deserve the democratic world's congratulations for the way you have handled this difficult task, and I personally wanted to write to you to say how proud I am of your statesmanship.

I regret that I could not be there for the ceremony, but you know that my best wishes are with you and your country. Your role is in many ways a more difficult one now than when you were President. To help build democracy, President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro will need your help and your patience. I know that pressures from within your party will sometimes encourage you to be partisan and to make more difficult her job, but I hope that you will resist those pressures and continually offer your hand to help her build the democratic, just, and prosperous nation for which you have already worked so hard.

I also want to congratulate you for joining a select club, which I also joined against my preference. Today, you become a former President. It is an honorable group.

One of the most rewarding experiences for me in the last eight months was to become your friend. Now that you have more time, I hope you will remain good friends and come visit me in Atlanta. I would like to take you to a baseball game.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Daniel Ortega Saavedra

Former President of Nicaragua

Managua, Nicaragua

## **Appendix 29: Excerpts from Inaugural Address of Violeta Chamorro**

### **EXCERPTS FROM THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT DONA VIOLETA BARRIOS DE CHAMORRO**

APRIL 25, 1990

Today marks the dawn of the Nicaraguan Republic that was born from the people's vote ... not from shouts and bullets... For 100 years we have wished for this democratic republic where we could all be free and equal before the law... Some died for this dream. Others endured prison and exile for it. My husband, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, gave his life for this Republic.

This is the blue and white Nicaragua, without tyrants and without ideologies that destroyed its realities ... This is the blessed Nicaragua that instead of burying children in fratricidal wars will bury arms forever so the voice of cannons will never roar again.

There is no sovereignty without freedom ... However, freedom also means respect ...for the rights of others, for the law, for the property of others, for other people's feelings and opinions...





*Report of the Latin American Studies Association Commission to Observe the 1990 Elections*, March 15, 1990

Organization of American States, four pre-election reports and one election report

Puebla Institute, *Nicaraguan Election Report* March 20, 1990

The Ad Hoc Coalition of United States Sister Cities for Election Observation in Nicaragua,

"Carter Coaxing Nicaragua on Free Elections" *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, September 17, 1989

"Indians Cheer Carter Message in Nicaragua" by Deborah Scroggins, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, September 19, 1989

"Carter Asserts the Sandinistas Try to Smear the Opposition" *The New York Times*, November 15, 1989

"Nicaragua's Elections Back on Track, Carter Reports after Fact-finding Trip" by Elizabeth Kurylo, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, December 20, 1989

"Carter Lauds Managua on Procedures for Election" by Mark Uhlig, *The New York Times*, January 30, 1990

"Monitors Flood Nicaragua to Ensure Fair Vote" by Elizabeth Kurylo, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, February 24, 1990

"Carter Sympathizes with Ortega, Recalling his Own 1980 Loss" by Elizabeth Kurylo, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, February 27, 1990

"Carter Played Pivotal Role in Hours After Polls Closed" by Lee Hockstader, *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1990

"Chamorro Elected" by Mark Uhlig, *The New York Times*, February 27, 1990

"Sandinista Leaders, Facing Defeat, Didn't Argue, Carter Says" by Mark Uhlig, *The New York Times*, February 28, 1990

"Stunned Sandinistas Seek to Define Their New Role" by Larry Rohter, *The New York Times*, March 1, 1990

"Bush Seeks Soviet Help in Nicaragua Transition" by Robert Pear, *The New York Times*, March 1, 1990

August 9, 1989

## **Carter, at Sandinista's Urging, Will Monitor Nicaragua Vote**

Special to The New York Times

ATLANTA, Aug. 8 - Former President Jimmy Carter agreed today to lead an international delegation to monitor elections next February in Nicaragua.

Mr. Carter, who was a leader of a group monitoring Panama's elections in May, confirmed by letter today that he would accept a series of invitations sent by the Nicaraguan Government and opposition leaders to monitor the campaign and the election itself.

In a letter sent Thursday to Mr. Carter and made public here today, President Daniel Ortega Saavedra said: "We encourage you to come to Nicaragua as many times as you can during the electoral process, to observe all aspects of the process, and to meet with the members of the Supreme Electoral Council, the political parties and the Government. You will have unrestricted access to all aspects of the process."

In this letter today responding to Mr. Ortega's invitation, Mr. Carter promised he would "work to insure that the results of a free and fair election in Nicaragua will be respected in the United States and the rest of the world regardless of who wins or loses."

### **Other Letters Made Public**

Also made public today were the texts of letters sent to Mr. Carter by the president of Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council, Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren,

and by an official of the National Opposition Union, Gustavo Tablada Zelaya. The union will field candidates opposed to Mr. Ortega and the Sandinistas.

Mr. Carter and former President Gerald R. Ford served as observers of elections in Panama last May under the auspices of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, a group of 15 current and former presidents and prime ministers of countries in the Western Hemisphere.

The same group, which was formed after a meeting two years ago at the Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, will act as the sponsoring organization for the observer team in Nicaragua.

In addition to Mr. Carter and Mr. Ford, the council includes President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela, Prime Minister Michael N. Manley of Jamaica and Prime Minister Lloyd Erskine Sandiford of Barbados.

Mr. Carter said in his letter that "a senior international delegation" of about 20 people will be assembled to monitor the elections. Members of the delegation will



## **Against the Odds**

Opposition leaders did not immediately comment on reports that the Bush Administration planned to openly use the National Endowment for Democracy, which is federally financed, to send \$3 million to Mrs. Chamorro. In the past, the opposition leaders have been split on whether such aid would be worth the criticism it would draw from the Sandinistas, who have asserted that opposition politicians were puppets of Washington.

Roger Guevara Mena, a prominent Nicaraguan opposition figure, said he believed that the opposition ticket faced formidable obstacles, but that it could win at the polls.

"If we stay united, and if we are able to capitalize on the discontent that is out there, we can win," he said. "What happens if we do win, whether the Sandinistas would actually surrender power, is another question. But we can't worry about that now."

Another opposition figure, Luis Humberto Zuzmán, who is running for re-election to the National Assembly, said he also believes that the opposition has a real chance to win the presidency. But he predicted that whoever wins, the next government will be a coalition.

"The country can no longer survive with all political power concentrated in one party," Mr. Guzmán said in a telephone interview. "Apparently even the Sandinistas now accept this. Once the election is over, what will probably emerge is a government of national unity."

For years, Sandinista leaders have vowed never to surrender political power. President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, who is expected to be a candidate for re-election, has pledged to permit a free election in February. What the Sandinistas will do if they lose, however, is still highly uncertain.

## **Under Foreign Scrutiny**

The campaign and voting are to be monitored by an unusually large number of foreigners, *including former President Jimmy Carter*. Former Attorney General Eliot L. Richardson has been named to head the United Nations observer mission.

Nicaragua's last presidential election was marred by bitter debate over restrictions imposed by the Sandinistas. The principal opposition candidate, Arturo Cruz, refused to register his candidacy to protest the restrictions.

"If I had to bet on the outcome of this coming election, I would say that some kind of coalition government will be the final result," Mr. Cruz said in a telephone interview this week. "The Sandinistas are totally repulsed by the idea of giving up power. If they lose control over the national budget, they lose the ability to punish and reward, and if they lose that, they risk becoming a miniparty within four or five years."

"What I see in the future is some kind of understanding between the Sandinistas and the opposition. The country is in a disastrous state, and it needs a government that represents all social and political groups."

## **Rifts Within the Opposition**

by the selection of Liberal leader Virgilio Godoy Reyes as her running mate, and were threatening to sit out the campaign. But at a meeting Thursday, all factions of the United Nicaraguan Opposition signed a document pledging full support for the ticket.

The nomination of Mr. Godoy over the more militantly anti-Sandinista businessman Enrique Bolaños Geyer marked a sharp loss in political influence for the Superior Council of Private Enterprise, which Mr. Bolaños headed for much of the 1980's. Mr. Godoy presented himself as more ideologically progressive than Mr. Bolaños, and his presence on the ticket suggests an openness to future talks.

Mr. Godoy served as Minister of Labor in the Sandinista Government from 1979 to 1984, before breaking with the regime.

"Godoy knows the Sandinistas from inside," Mr. Guevara said. "He is one of the few politicians in Nicaragua who has the qualities of a statesman. If there is any kind of negotiation after the election, he would be an ideal negotiator."





"If any money goes to the political parties, it goes in equal amounts to the Supreme Electoral Council," he said. "This is clearly understood by me, by the leaders of Nicaragua, by the opposition party, and by the electoral council." Mr. Carter added that he has asked the Sandinistas "to correct the impression" that young men are still being conscripted into the army, one of the opposition's main concerns.

He said government officials have told him they will stop expropriating private land, another opposition complaint.

### **Carter Asserts the Sandinistas Try to Smear the Opposition**

Special to The New York Times

ATLANTA, Nov. 14 - Former President Jimmy Carter said today that the Sandinista Government was trying to smear opposition candidates in February's elections by tying the leading opposition coalition to military violence by contra forces still fighting in Nicaragua.

Mr. Carter made his remarks at a daylong seminar on the Nicaraguan elections at his Presidential center. He is to lead an official team to monitor the Feb. 25 elections, a role he performed at elections May 7 in Panama - elections Mr. Carter denounced as fraudulent.

Earlier today, a new, independent poll of Nicaraguan voters was made public showing a virtual dead heat between President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and the candidate of the National Opposition Union, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

Mr. Carter said he had complained privately to Sandinista representatives about a news article and an editorial today in the official Sandinista newspaper, Barricada, which attacked Alfredo César, member of the National Opposition campaign committee.

"I've been quite concerned that Barricada, the official newspaper of the Sandinista Government, has apparently published a totally fraudulent letter ostensibly written by Alfredo César," Mr. Carter said.

"He informed the news media, including Barricada, that this was a false document. They have persisted in trying to besmirch his own character and tie U.N.O. in with the contra military activity in a completely illegitimate fashion.

"We discussed this in a private session this morning. And I think the appropriate corrective action to be taken by both President Ortega, who has great influence over the editor of Barricada, and the newspaper itself, is to acknowledge the falsity of this report."

The feature of today's forum at the Carter Center of Emory University was a debate between opposition representatives, including Mr. César, and Alejandro Bendaña, secretary general of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry.

Mr. Bendaña said the Sandinista Government was seeking an unequivocal condemnation by opposition leaders of military violence by the contras.

"I did not hear Mr. César explicitly condemn the murders of innocent victims by the contras that have been documented in the press," Mr. Bendaña said. "I did not hear him call, nor have we had anybody call, for the explicit demobilization of the contras. If we are talking about post-electoral society these are factors that are going to be taken into account because the wounds are deep and it is civilians that are getting killed."

But Mr. César said the opposition had no ties to the contras and should not be forced to apologize for contra military actions. "What is wrong is to try to put U.N.O. into a trap. If U.N.O. were to say openly or clearly as the Government wants, that we condemn the contras, then what will happen is U.N.O. will become evidently responsible for whatever happens later on.

"I condemn and U.N.O. has officially condemned every military action, attack, assassination, kidnapping, bomb, mines that take lives of Nicaraguans away, that happen on Nicaraguan territory, without naming that we condemn one specific party or not. Wherever they come from, we condemn them all, all of them."

Mr. César and Moisés Hassan, presidential candidate of the Movement for Revolutionary Unity, said that the new poll results indicated that whoever wins



Mr. Carter said poll watchers from opposition parties complained of harassment by the military and state security forces. But he said Sandinista leaders agreed to investigate and halt any intimidation by their supporters.

And he said the Government agreed to provide international observers on election night with two extra copies of the results from each voting place, signed by all poll watchers present.

Officials from the United Nations and the Organization of American States, he said, will use the tallies to conduct independent counts for all votes cast in the election. The sheets will serve as a permanent, verifiable record of the poll watchers responsible for protecting the opposition interests at each polling place, he said.

"It is crucial that all the fiscales that have been recruited and designated beyond their jobs on election night to insure the integrity of the elections," Mr. Carter said, using the Spanish term for a poll watcher.

The former President said his group also investigated growing complaints by opposition members that Government leaders were blocking funds approved by Congress for the coalition.

#### **Issue of U.S. Aid**

Of the \$9 million that was approved, opposition officials said, \$3.3 million was due to have reached their coalition and a related foundation, the Institute for Electoral Promotion and Training, which was set up to train (o)-1(r)6.4(m)-4.8(er)6.n(ill serv)11.zon officials accepted a special agreement, hand-written and witnessed by Mr.





MANAGUA, Nicaragua - Former President Jimmy Carter said Monday that he reached back to the memory of his painful 1980 re-election defeat to help Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega cope with his loss to Violeta Chamorro. "I told him that I understood how he felt perhaps better than anyone else at the table because I had been through a re-election attempt and had been defeated. It was very painful for me," Mr. Carter said. "But I wanted him to realize that despite his feelings at that moment, he had also gained a victory. "He had taken the initiative to offer his people complete freedom to achieve democracy through expressing their own will," and the exercise was "successful, even though I knew that the results to him were a surprise."

Mr. Ortega appeared emotionally crushed during a private meeting at his campaign headquarters with Mr. Carter and the heads of the United Nations and Organization of American States observer teams, Carter aide Robert Pastor said. Dr. Pastor said it became clear that Mr. Ortega was losing about 9:30 p.m. Sunday when "quick count" polls conducted by U.N. observers showed Mrs. Chamorro with 56 percent of the vote and Mr. Ortega with 40 percent. Knowing that Mr. Ortega was receiving a count that confirmed the U.N. numbers, the Carter team worked feverishly to arrange a meeting. If Mr. Ortega was considering stealing the election, as former Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega did last May, he would do it at that point, Dr. Pastor said.

Mr. Carter said he "described the generosity that has been shown by President

Union not be allowed to release preliminary results early on, that the opposition not gloat over their apparent victory.

Carter's next stop was Chamoro's house, where one source said the mood was festive before he arrived. But Carter's arrival brought a somber air to the house at

The vote lays the groundwork for the first democratic transfer of power that this country has known, a turnover that parallels to some degree the changes in Eastern Europe, where Communism has little by little given way to democratic change.

**Lead of 14 Percentage Points**

Mrs. Chamorro, 60 years old, is the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the newspaper publisher whose assassination touched off the rebellion that led to the Sandinista takeover. She ran as the candidate of the 14-party National Opposition Union, a coalition of leftists, rightists and other Nicaraguan parties.

suggested that the election of Mrs. Chamorro would make Nicaragua "ungovernable."

There was no immediate word on how such a policy might be received by the estimated 10,000 remaining members of the contra army. Nor was there respect for the election results. But Mr. Borge did not have a clear sense of how contra fighters expected total amnesty would be received by or integrated into former Sandinista military units.

But both issues promised to add to the burdens of the diverse and frequently divided opposition leadership, which has never shown the success at internal politics that it showed in Sunday's balloting.

### **Results Were Delayed**

Although election results had been promised to reporters and international observers beginning just two hours after the 6 P.M. close of voting, initial returns were abruptly discontinued at mid-evening Sunday, and official radio stations stopped broadcasting news reports, playing only a continuous stream of music. Questioned by reporters, election officials attributed the problem to slow receipt of information from outlying districts and inexperienced computer technicians at the large convention center, where hundreds of special phone and telex lines had been installed to process the election results.

Several diplomats suggested that the counting had been stopped to permit international officials time to persuade Mr. Ortega and other Sandinista leaders to accept the vote. But that version of events was denied by Mr. Carter, who said the public announcement was held up by a previous agreement among the political parties not to release premature or incomplete results.

At the barn-like Managua restaurant that has served as an opposition meeting place during the campaign, hundreds of cheering, dancing, crying opposition supporters arrived to celebrate Mrs. Chamorro's victory, yelling loud chants and signaling "No. 1" with their fingers. The coalition's acronym, UNO, means "one" in Spanish.

Across town at a large fairground that had been reserved for a Sandinista victory celebration, crowds began appearing before the scheduled start of the midnight rally. In place were giant sound systems, spotlights and the other equipment that has become a standard feature of mass Sandinista rallies.

### **Silence and Ashen Faces**

But as the news of Mr. Ortega's defeat filtered through the crowd, preparations for dancing and drinking gave way to silence and ashen faces. Gradually, confused Sandinista supporters drifted toward the sleek new Sandinista campaign headquarters a few hundred yards away, looking for some indication of how to react to what was clearly an unimaginable, perhaps unimaginable turn of events.

At one point, as the solemn, shifting crowd gathered, Mr. Ortega's wife, Rosario Murillo, came out to lead the group in traditional songs of the Sandinista guerrilla movement.

In the working class neighborhood of Batahola North, 25-year-old Lorena Sánchez Barrios sat with her child and wept openly as she listened to Mr. Ortega's speech accepting the voting results.

"I can't believe it," Mrs. Sánchez said, expressing an emotion shared by the supporters of the Sandinistas and the opposition alike. "I just can't believe it."

## **Sandinista Leaders, Facing Defeat, Didn't Argue, Carter Says** **By MARK A. UHLIG**

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Feb. 27 - When Sandinista leaders discovered on Sunday evening that they were losing their country's first free and broadly contested national elections, they made no attempt to keep power or dispute the results, former President Jimmy Carter said today.

Mr. Carter, who is leading a group of observers that monitored the fairness of Sunday's balloting, said he and the leaders of two large teams of international observers met with President Daniel Ortega Saavedra at about 11:30 on election night. He said they found no need to convince Mr. Ortega or other Sandinista leaders of the need to step down.

"There was never any question about whether they would accept the results of the election," Mr. Carter said, speaking with reporters at the hotel where his group set up its observation center.

The former President said the meeting, which took place before significant voting results were announced to the public, was arranged at the request of Mr. Ortega. Mr. Carter said the Sandinista leader appeared to be speaking with the full authority of the nine-member Sandinista National Directorate, of which he is a part.

### **Consensus Among Leaders**

"He took the initiative, and I am sure he had thorough discussions with the other comandantes," Mr. Carter said "He was speaking as a leader representing a consensus."

Mr. Carter, who is at the center of one of the largest vote-monitoring networks assembled to insure the integrity of a democratic election, said preliminary "quick counts" of statistically selected voting stations made it clear to Sandinista leaders



Since election night, most of the 2,000 foreign observers and invited guests who arrived here to monitor the election process have prepared to leave the country. Mr. Carter himself said that he will leave Wednesday morning, with the idea of returning on short notice if problems occur.

But Mr. Carter and officials of the United Nations and O.A.S. teams said that, in the wake of the opposition's victory, all three groups will leave behind skeleton staffs of observers to monitor the transition process.

The most important element still to be resolved, Mr. Carter said, is the demobilization of the Nicaraguan rebel troops still inside the country and its Honduran base camps. No agreement has been reached, either with the opposition or with the who are known as contras, on how such a demobilization should take place, and Mr. Carter said that Sandinista leaders expressed particular concern that safeguards be provided to prevent violence or revenge by armed contras after the Sandinista Government leaves office.

Other central issues, he said will be the peaceful transfer of control over the 65,000-man Sandinista People's army to opposition leaders. And he said delicate negotiations would be required about the new government's policies toward the poor farmers and other Nicaraguans who have received land that was confiscated from members of the Government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, which the Sandinistas overthrew.

But Mr. Carter expressed confidence in the commitment of Sandinista leaders to fulfill their commitment to a peaceful transition, and praised Mr. Ortega and other Sandinista officials for what he said was a demonstrated commitment to a democratic process that he said they could someday look to for a future chance to govern.

"The Sandinistas are still young," he said. "It's not the end of the world for them."

### ***Stunned Sandinistas Seek To Define Their New Role***

**By LARRY ROHTER**

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Feb. 28 - Still in shock from their defeat in Sunday's election, leaders and loyalists of the Sandinista National Liberation Front are struggling to redefine their revolutionary movement as a more conventional political party.

The Sandinistas Front forged its identity in combat and solidified it during a decade of revolutionary power. Forced unexpectedly into opposition, the Sandinistas grudgingly admit they must rebuild their organization as a democratic party committed to competition, with all the risks and uncertainties that this entails.

"The struggle continues, but in a different field, the political field," a 30-year-old telephone company worker named Alvaro said today, reflecting the new line put forth by President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and his allies in the Sandinista leadership.

Since Sunday's crushing electoral defeat at the hands of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and her 14-party opposition coalition, Sandinista loyalists have spent much of their time in what Mr. Ortega described on Tuesday as "plenary meetings to discuss and analyze the results of the election." Members of the

party, the army, the bureaucracy and Sandinista unions have attended such sessions, hastily called to maintain party unity and morale.

### **'Our Attitude Is Belligerent'**

"Of course we feel we have suffered a blow, but among members of the front, our attitude is belligerent," Antonia Tiffer, a Sandinista lieutenant, said today. "There has been some orientation to encourage those who are feeling discouraged." Such meetings are also necessary because some Sandinista supporters, including many in the party-controlled military and police, are reluctant to accept Mrs. Chamorro's victory. Truck-loads of uniformed Sandinista supporters have appeared in the streets chanting "Daniel! Daniel!" and pro-Sandinista newspapers and radio stations are filled with demands that the front surrender "authority, but not power" to the victorious National Opposition Union, or U.N.O. But some of the party meetings have turned into freewheeling exercises in self-criticism in which neither Mr. Ortega nor other leaders of the front are spared. Among themselves, some Sandinistas are even franker in acknowledging the need to reform the front and rid it of the complacency and arrogance that has accumulated since the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle and his family dictatorship on July 19, 1979.

### **Privileges for the Elite**

"All the top people got themselves a house, a car, shopping privileges in the dollar store, and free electricity and water," a Sandinista army officer said. "The people knew that, and they resented it because they were suffering and have nothing."

During the presidential campaign, he continued, the Sandinista leadership "tried to do in four months what it failed to do during 10 years, namely, to expand the base of support beyond the 400,000 of us who are already members of the front." But through years of polarization and neglect, "the front manufactured its own opposition, which now must be won over again," he said.

Sandinista loyalists said such sentiments were expressed at a meeting attended by Mr. Ortega and other senior members of the front's leadership. Some people present at the meeting said Mr. Ortega came down to embrace the critic but also told him that he too must do his part to help reform the party.

In a speech on Tuesday, Mr. Ortega sought to console his followers by reminding them that the front remains "the biggest, most solid and most organized party in the country." But some loyalists worry about the party's ability to hold its own in the new, more competitive political environment.

"The Americans are going to be sending Doña Violeta lots and lots of aid," a Sandinista official said, referring to the President-elect. "Where is our money going to be coming from? Perhaps the only way we will be able to return to power is through another revolution."

Still, not even the most fervent opponents of Sandinista rule say the Sandinistas will disintegrate in the way Communist parties in Hungary and East Germany have. Acknowledging that their movement adopted Marxist-Leninist principles, Sandinista members say nevertheless that theirs is an indigenous political force, not one imposed by a foreign power.

During its decade in power, the front benefited from its control of many news organizations and from a blurring of the distinction between state and party funds and materials. Once out of government, it is likely to lose many of those privileges, which have helped assure the loyalty of party members.

"The Sandinistas are going to shrink, because that's what happens to parties out of power," said Robert Pastor, an adviser on Latin American affairs under President Carter and the chief of Mr. Carter's team of observers here. "But they are a party built on an ideal, with a dedicated and talented leadership."

It is not clear which set of leaders will emerge strongest from the internal restructuring under way. Mr. Ortega and his brother Humberto, the country's Defense Minister, staked their personal prestige and reputation on winning the vote, and they will have to bear the responsibility, diplomats here said, for the front's poor showing.

### **Control of Security Forces**

In addition, Humberto Ortega and Tomás Borge, who as Minister of the Interior commands the state security apparatus and a private army of more than 10,000, are virtually certain to be stripped of their posts in a Chamorro Government. Mr. Borge, the sole surviving founding member of the Sandinista front, and others who belong to the front's ruling nine-member directorate like Luis Carrión, are believed to have questioned the wisdom of staking everything on electoral politics.

Mr. Borge has not spoken in public since the balloting, though he did appear at Mr. Ortega's side on Tuesday at the party rally.

Sandinista loyalists who have heard Mr. Borge speak at closed party meetings say he remains strongly opposed to the idea of surrendering control of the military, the police and the security apparatus to the opposition, which has longstanding ties to the contras and is much resented by Sandinistas for the ruin of eight years of civil war.

As the losing presidential candidate, Mr. Ortega will be entitled to a seat in the 91-member National Assembly, where he could test his political skills as leader of the 39-seat Sandinista minority delegation. Under Nicaraguan electoral law, Mr. Ortega is entitled to a seat in the assembly as the leader of the losing party. According to preliminary results, the Sandinistas won 37 or 38 seats in the election itself, and UNO either 51 or 52. Another seat could go to a member of the Social Christian Party from a remote area near Honduras.

Certain that victory would be theirs, all but one of the other members of the Sandinista directorate declined to run for an Assembly seat.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 - President Bush appealed today to the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, to help insure an orderly transfer of power in Nicaragua, Administration officials said today.

Mr. Bush made the appeal in a telephone call this morning before he set out on a cross-country trip that included stops in New York and San Francisco. The President described the talks as "very constructive."

The Administration also stepped up efforts to get the 10,000 contras encamped in Honduras to lay down their arms and go back to Nicaragua, a condition that both sides in Managua have called vital to an orderly transfer of power.

"The war is over in Nicaragua," said Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, testifying today before the Senate Budget Committee.

Mr. Baker's comment was perhaps the clearest sign to date that the United States effort to arm and support the contras was ending. Since 1981, the United States has provided more than \$321 million in direct aid to the contras, including at least \$142 million for weapons and military equipment. Congress last cut off military aid in February 1988.

### **Moscow Reaction Pleases U.S.**

Bush Administration officials said they were delighted that Moscow had moved quickly to accept the results of the elections on Sunday in which the Nicaraguan opposition candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, defeated President Daniel Ortega Saavedra by nearly 15 percentage points.

"I was very pleased with the Soviet statements about recognizing the winners of the election," Mr. Bush said. He reported that the telephone conversation lasted 40 minutes and also touched on the question of German reunification and plans for a summit meeting of the two leaders in Washington in June.

Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary, said on Tuesday that the United States would upgrade relations with Nicaragua and send an ambassador to Managua. Harry W. Shlaudeman, a former United States Ambassador to Venezuela, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, was mentioned today as the leading candidate.

Mr. Shlaudeman conducted the last serious talks between Washington and the Sandinistas, which were terminated by the Reagan Administration in early 1985.

Mr. Shlaudeman, 63 years old, retired in June after a 35-year career in the Foreign Service, but he continues to serve as a consultant to the State Department on Nicaragua.

The last United States Ambassador to Nicaragua, Richard H. Melton, was expelled in July 1988 amid accusations that the United States Embassy was abetting opposition violence in Nicaragua. The United States responded by expelling Carlos Tunnerman, the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States.

### **Carter Meets With Baker**

Former President Jimmy Carter, who led a delegation of election observers in Nicaragua, met with Mr. Baker at the State Department for 45 minutes today. Mr. Carter said the contras should lay down their arms and return to civilian life in Nicaragua. He said the future of the contras was "the key unresolved factor" in Nicaragua now that Mrs. Chamorro has defeated Mr. Ortega.

"If you have an army on the edge of your country or in your country that still threatens military action, that's obviously a very destabilizing factor," Mr. Carter said. "I don't think there is going to be a guarantee of an orderly transition as long as the contras are a military force threatening the country."

Mr. Baker voiced confidence today that the contras would be able to return safely to Nicaragua. The administration has asked the United States Ambassador to Honduras, Cresencio S. Arcos Jr., to work with the contras and persuade them to go home as soon as possible.

As a State Department official, Mr. Arcos worked closely with the contras last year. He occasionally expressed impatience with their political directors on the ground that they were "engaged in internecine political warfare, squabbling over sinecures" in Miami.

The United States has substantial leverage over the contras, having armed, trained, supplied, fed and clothed them for years. But Administration officials said they could not force the contras to return to Nicaragua if the rebels feared reprisals by Sandinista supporters, who will probably remain a strong political force in Nicaragua.

Bush Administration officials say their emphasis on bipartisanship home and regional diplomacy abroad has proved much more effective than the President Reagan's attempts to overthrow the Sandinistas with a guerrilla army. Aides to Mr. Baker said they hoped to curtail aid for the contras without seeming to abandon the rebels.

Mr. Baker's testimony came as the Sandinista Government decreed an immediate cease-fire in its war with the contras. President Bush called Monday for just such a step, saying he hoped that a cease-fire would be re-established because "there is no reason at all for further military activity from any quarter."

State Department officials noted today that even conservatives like Representative Mickey Edwards, Republican of Oklahoma, were now saying the contras no longer had a mission.


"The purpose of the contras was to bring democracy to Central America, particularly Nicaragua," Mr. Edwards said on Monday. "When Mrs. Chamorro is sworn into office, there will be no reason for the contras to continue to exist."

Robert A. Pastor, an aide to Mr. Carter, said today that he and the former President felt sure that the Sandinistas would hand over power to Mrs.

Chamorro's team, despite statements by Mr. Ortega about the need for the contras to disband immediately.

"What Ortega means is that there must be a recognition of and respect for the integrity of the armed forces as an institution," Mr. Pastor said. "The Sandinistas have legitimate concerns about the nature of the transition, including the possible abuse or persecution of Sandinista leaders. Members of the opposition alliance understand that they must be sensitive to such concerns to achieve a smooth transition and to govern effectively."

**BOLETA ELECTORAL PARA PRESIDENTE Y VICEPRESIDENTE  
CONSEJO SUPREMO ELECTORAL  
REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA**



**Note 1:** As a result of this agreement, the new President will hold office for seven years-the 10 months remaining in the current term and the subsequent 6 year term. [Back](#).