


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
DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY FOR CONFLICT  
PREVENTION: THE CASE OF ESTONIA

BY JOYCE NEU AND VAMIK VOLKAN

THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROGRAM AND THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MIND AND HUMAN INTERACTION ARE GRATEFUL TO THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, THE CHARLES STEWART MOTT FOUNDATION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND EXCHANGES BOARD FOR FUNDING THIS PROJECT.



DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION: THE CASE







## PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union in 1991 essentially was peaceful, the volatile emotional undercurrents unleashed after decades of Soviet rule permeated even seemingly simple issues. The continued presence of Russian troops three years after independence and a large Russian ethnic minority compounded the many problems of Estonia's newly won sovereignty and its economic and political transformation.

Because Estonians and Russian speakers<sup>1</sup> had no means of informal, unofficial dialogue, virtually no communication took place between these groups.

From 1994-96, The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program (CRP), in partnership with the University of Virginia's Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI), led an interdisciplinary International Negotiation Network (INN) project in Estonia to "vaccinate" the country's major ethnic groups. The initiative sought to prevent tensions from developing into dangerous domestic and/or international conflict.

A CRP/CSMHI team conducted six high-level, unofficial (Track Two), psychopolitical dialogues between influential Estonians, Russians, and Russian speakers in Estonia. These workshops, "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Political Change," brought together parliamentarians, government officials, scholars, professionals, and students to discuss Estonia's future. The CRP/CSMHI team facilitated the meetings to head off potential miscommunication, rigidification of policies, tendency toward revenge and retribution, and any threat of hypernationalism at the decision-making level.

The workshops created an extensive network among people who previously had little to no contact. Through the psychopolitical dialogue process, participants gradually altered their previous conceptions of "us" and "them."<sup>2</sup> Also, several personal

relationships developed that had a positive impact on Russian-Estonian relations. Indeed, rigid, emotion-filled positions on all sides have loosened. Some Estonians now are working, albeit slowly and cautiously, toward institutionalizing new, adaptive strategies for a more tolerant, multiethnic Estonia. The dialogue series set the stage for the development of models of interethnic collaboration and coexistence in Estonia.





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(Titles accurate at the time of the workshop series)

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
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
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## 1) SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

Estonia's primary concern after 1991 was removing former Soviet troops from its territory.<sup>4</sup> At the time of the CRP/CSMHI's first workshop, approxi-





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Estonian authorities made available alien passports to all noncitizens so they could leave the country without requesting permission. As of Feb. 3, 1997, nearly 133,000 people had applied for the passports; about 33,000 had already received them (see Appendices C and D).

Noncitizens are subject to several restrictions due to their legal status, which affects their economic and political rights. Citizenship is necessary to sit on some companies' boards. Noncitizens cannot belong to a political party or vote in general

ESTONIAN POPULATION CHANGE

Percentage of Estonians and non-Estonians in Estonia 1934-195 and predictions for 2000. (Table adapted from E. ... Human Development Report, 1995, United Nations Development Programme, p. 30.)

	Population	Non-citizens	Non-citizens	Percentage	Percentage
		Estonians	Non-Estonians	Estonians	Non-Estonians
				Percentage	Percentage
Population II					
Population:					
1934*	1,126,413	992,520	133,899	88.1%	11.9%
Population:					
Population:					





bers represent mainly Russian speakers who are citizens of Estonia. Estonian President Lennart Meri initiated a Round Table on Minorities in 1993, which brought together representatives of all minority groups to consider matters affecting them.<sup>11</sup>

## 5) CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION

International organizations, including the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, have identified several shortcomings in Estonia's citizenship and naturalization policies.<sup>12</sup> Under a 1995 law, applicants must pass an exam testing their proficiency in the Estonian language and their knowledge of the country's history and institutions. New procedures, introduced by law in April 1995, did not increase the number of naturalizations, and the number of candidates remained relatively low. The small number of applications has been explained by applicants' fear of the exam's difficulty and by the relatively high cost of registering for it. Another negative factor is that applicants must wait one full year to take the exam after submitting their applications.

The law soon after was improved by eliminating the written and oral tests for elderly people. The 1995 law, however, put the existing citizenship exam on hold until a new one could be developed. A new exam, completed at the beginning of 1996, appeared to be more difficult but was standardized throughout the country. This enabled better documentation of results and greater transparency in the process.

A set of Jan. 1, 1997, rules introduced more improvements, making the exam easier to pass. The success rate for this new test was estimated at 80-90 percent. According to Estonian authorities' forecasts, about 7,000 people were naturalized during 1997. At that rate, however, it would take 47 years to naturalize all 335,000 noncitizens, assuming no new immigrants entered the country. ■



## METHODOLOGY

The CRP/CSMHI team began workshops in Estonia in April 1994 as part of a Baltics project that



Joyce NRU

The CRP/CSMHI team began workshops in Estonia in April 1994 as part of a Baltics project that



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group attempts to preserve its own identity and retreats from closeness (Volkan, 1998b, 348).

Another phenomenon derived from the same need to maintain distinction from the enemy is the exaggeration of minor differences. Seemingly small issues take on major importance as groups strive to shore up their identities as different from the “other.”

Psychoanalysts on the team brought to participants’ attention their hidden (unconscious) shared visions and perceptions. For example, Estonians feared that their survival as a people was in jeopardy and that it depended on their statehood and on not being diluted by the Russians among them or invaded by Russia. Once articulated during the dialogues, this fear became less of an obstacle to realistic discussion.

As the series progressed, participants relaxed and expressed negative emotions without anxiety, instead of channeling them into resistances. They developed symbols to use in discussion that let them play out anticipated dangers and design action plans to improve the situation. Estonian and Russian participants compared tiny independent Estonia to a rabbit and gigantic neighboring Russia to an elephant. Then they playfully imagined the ramifications of a relationship between these two animals. Even if friends, the rabbit could not help fearing that the elephant

would step on him. In fact, if the rabbit trusted too much, he could become careless and not realize the elephant was about to inadvertently crush him. When participants played with anxiety-producing relationships, they better appreciated each other and modified perceptions of the other. With the elephant-rabbit metaphor, some Russians came to see Estonians not just as ungrateful for the Soviet Union’s past help but also as understandably cautious (Volkan, 1998b, 353).

The small group dialogues also served to separate emotions pertaining to past conflicts from discussions of present problems. As noted above, participants from opposing camps primarily spoke from their group identity rather than as individuals. A group’s identity often is marked by a “chosen trauma,” that is, the image of a past event during which a large group suffered loss or experienced helplessness and humiliation in a conflict with a neighboring group. When perceptions and emotions relating to this trauma condense with a current conflict, a “time collapse” occurs, making resolution nearly impossible. CRP/CSMHI facilitators encouraged a time expansion to separate past from present, enabling more productive negotiation.



Joyce Niu



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Thus, little by little, the poison of interethnic tension lessened.<sup>17</sup> Efforts were made to spread any insights or new attitudes gained from the dialogues to local and national governmental groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A few practical projects were created to help build institutions that would be left behind when the project concluded. This approach, nicknamed the “Tree Model” (Volkan, 1998b), involved a methodology that planted roots for constructive, open discussion, fed those roots, and facilitated growth of healthy, new branches, such as concrete model programs promoting peaceful coexistence.

Before and during the dialogues, the facilitators took several information gathering trips in Estonia. The American team visited many towns and villages to gain a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, meeting with local officials and businesspeople. Firsthand data collected by the CRP/CSMHI team in so-called “hot spots” proved crucial to diagnosing the mental representations of recent and more distant events. These hot spots included national cemeteries, memorials, museums, or monuments that had become invested with strong emotions due to political, military, or cultural events. Visiting these places with the workshop participants, observing their behavior, and listening to their remarks allowed the facilitation team to better comprehend what the sites represented and the psychological impediments that likely would emerge in

group interaction. The visits also revealed what otherwise might have remained unexpressed in group dialogue and provided both facilitators and participants with important information.

One Estonian “hot spot” was the former Soviet nuclear submarine base at Paldiski on the Gulf of





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Photo by Joyce Niou (left) and  
A. H. (right) in  
September 1995.

JOYCE NIOU

Instead, they were a series of gatherings using an open-ended process. Intensive, facilitated, small group dialogues addressed group and national identity. Themes included objective review of historical grievances and elaboration of and deliberation on specific problems facing each group.

This process helped participants learn both sides' concerns, as many misunderstandings existed due to lack of information and contact. An open discussion approach made participants "hear" multiple meanings attached to what was being said and allowed them to modify their views. Facilitators could absorb emotions that surfaced when members of opposing groups traded historical grievances.

The workshops' continuity proved very important. The meetings took place about twice a year for three years, involving both veterans of the process and some new members. The team retained the same core members in an effort to transform participants' thinking about each other and eventually change relationships. Through such attitudinal transformation, positive actions could take place. This was particularly significant for participants


who played an important role in shaping a more tolerant, democratic Estonia. The CRP/CSMHI's work to grasp the underlying causes of participants' rigid or extreme positions facilitated their loosening. This in turn potentially contributed to the ability of Estonian and Russian leaders to resist immoderate policies even when there was evidence of support for such policies among constituents.

Throughout the three-year process, the facilitation team consulted with representatives of Estonian and Russian NGOs; the Estonian Foreign Ministry; the OSCE mission in Estonia; the U.S., Swedish, and Norwegian embassies; the European Union; and the U.S. State Department to share information and obtain different perspectives. From the beginning, the team had contact with a representative of the Estonian President's Roundtable and with members of the Estonian diplomatic corps.

### THE WORKSHOP SERIES

The first CRP/CSMHI workshop was held in Tallinn on April 4-7, 1994, modeled after two previous workshops in Kaunas, Lithuania, and Riga, Latvia. Some of the Lithuanian and Latvian partici-

D





Russian, and interpreters were available at all times. Of the facilitators, only one spoke Russian, and none spoke Estonian. Of the participants, only a few of the Russian speakers and Russians spoke English and even fewer knew Estonian. Most of the Estonians were proficient in both Russian and English.

## PARTICIPANTS

Each workshop consisted of 40 people: a core group of people who were present at each session, members added during the process, and facilitators. The CRP/CSMHI team comprised nine-10 people; 25-30 people represented the three parties. The workshops brought together participants interested in entering into dialogue with groups that represented different sectors of society and who were influential decision-makers in their respective communities.


During the fourth workshop, facilitators and core participants, ages 35-60, decided that to help transform relationships between groups, the next meeting would be intergenerational as well as interethnic. They believed the younger generation of Russian speakers and Estonians might have fewer prejudices and more permeable attitudes. Thus, the fifth workshop brought in eight university students—four Estonians and four Russian speakers. They were included to develop cohesion among the students across ethnic lines as a model for a future Estonian society. Facilitators hoped the students would think in terms of the whole country rather than focus on ethnic components.

Combining generations and ethnic groups proved to be productive. In February 1996, to cement the students' developing bonds, the facilitation team brought them to the United States for leadership development at The Carter Center in Atlanta, Ga., and the CSMHI in Charlottesville, Va. The experience collectively exposed them to influences that would help them understand how societies can integrate minorities, methods of doing so, and consequences of not integrating minority groups.

Their change in attitude was dramatically demonstrated in Atlanta on the morning of their departure for Estonia. Two of the Russian-speaking students announced their decisions to remain in the United States, where each knew someone with whom they thought they could stay. Both wanted to learn English (neither had more than rudimentary knowledge of it) and get jobs.

Although each had reached the decision separately and had informed Neu the previous evening, the announcement to the group was devastating. Instead of attending a planned farewell brunch, the students went to The Carter Center to have a discussion with Neu (in the room) and Volkan (by phone). Several students shed tears at their friends' "defection" and as a result they thought they had bonds, the fu5

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JOYCE NEU

On the left, from top to bottom, are: (left to right) M. S. V. H. M. H. P. V. N. I. V. F.

U.S.S.R. did not issue passports to everyone and that freedom of movement was severely restricted.

The student participants thought Estonians overdramatized the country's history. To the older Estonians' surprise and disappointment, the younger generation had little sense of the history from an Estonian perspective, as they had been educated using Soviet textbooks. The young Russian Estonians expressed sadness and anger at being the victims of Estonian resentment. They did not understand the humiliation Estonians experienced under Soviet rule. However, to many Estonians, they had become representatives of the old Soviet system and thus targets for revenge.

### STATEHOOD


Estonia's struggle for independence seemed to be not only political but also existential. Open to their larger neighbor's geopolitical ambitions, Estonians regarded statehood as their only guarantee of survival as a people. Over the centuries, the Estonian population has been reduced, deported, assimilated, or killed, and a fear of shrinking or disappearing was still evident during the workshops. One Estonian noted that several thousand Estonians are "lost" every year due to suicide, crime, alcoholism, and a declining birth rate.

The second workshop occurred just weeks after the ferry "Estonia" sank, killing 852 passengers, most of whom were Estonian. Thus, that meeting began with somber reflection on the loss of the many lives and brought to the fore Estonians' fear of disappearing as a people.

In its 5,000-year history, Estonia first gained independence on Feb. 24, 1918. It was cut short only 22 years later on June 17, 1940, when Soviet troops occupied Estonia. More than 50 years later, Estonia regained independence on Aug. 20, 1991 (Fjuk and

The Estonian people have a long history of struggle for independence. In 1918, they gained independence, but in 1940, they were occupied by the Soviet Union. In 1991, they regained independence.

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


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Arnold Rüütel promoted the idea of giving World Bank loans to Russians who lived and worked in Estonia. Thus, they could return to Russia if they wanted, and discussion on this issue could end for good.

By the time Russian troops had withdrawn from the territory of Estonia, the idea of giving World Bank loans to Russians who lived and worked in Estonia had been discussed. Thus, they could return to Russia if they wanted, and discussion on this issue could end for good.







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## WORKSHOP OUTCOMES

The “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Political Change” workshop series yielded several tangible results. It facilitated professional and private networking among people who previously had little to no interaction with each other. A major benefit cited by a Russian participant from the State Duma was the chance to meet informally and unofficially with Estonian parliamentarians.

Professional contacts among decision-makers strengthened outside the dialogues. The Riigikogu invited Vladimir Homyakov, former deputy of the Narva City Council and representative of the Russian-speaking population, to address the parliament so Estonian deputies might better understand Russian concerns. Yuri Voyevoda, then vice chair of the Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent State Affairs and Relations with Compatriots in the State Duma, asked that Estonian and Russian parliamentarians meet regularly.

During the fifth workshop, three State Duma representatives were invited to the

Riigikogu, where they met with their counterparts. They discussed the then-upcoming Russian parliamentary elections and Russia’s reaction to Estonia’s desire to join NATO. Both Estonian and Russian members of parliaments (MPs) at the workshop reported that the talks were productive.

Facilitators watched as personal contacts between CRP/CSMHI participants also grew. During the last workshop, Russian policy consultant

Andrei Zakharov, who had never met an Estonian before the project, invited Sergei Ivanov, leader of the Russian-Estonian faction in the Riigikogu, to participate in a conference on security issues in Pskov, a Russian town near Estonia’s border.

Workshop discussions helped participants reflect on the role of the Russian parliament in





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director of the Narva-based Institute for Social and Economic Analysis in Estonia, said he would never have understood the Estonian viewpoint if he had not taken part in the project. Arno Aadamsoo, an Estonian psychiatrist, said the workshops allowed him to learn how others feel about Russian-Estonian relations. Aivars Lezdinysh, a Russian MP from Kamchatka, remarked during the fifth workshop that now he could see the “wrong” aspects of Russian behavior in Estonia. He credited the project with changing his way of thinking and broadening his comprehension of the issues.

Arnold Rüütel, former Estonian president and deputy speaker of the Riigikogu<sup>21</sup> attended portions of four of the workshops. Although his views remained highly nationalistic, his continued interest in the process was welcomed as was the participation of a representative from the Estonian Foreign Ministry. In some cases, participants translated their changed attitudes into action. For example, Homyakov softened his initial resistance to Estonian demands and began taking Estonian language classes. During the

last workshop, he declared with pride that his daughter had passed the language exam for Estonian citizenship.

Some State Duma members told facilitators that their participation in the workshops caused them to review Russian policies toward Estonia. They were now better informed about Baltic affairs and shared what they had learned with peers in the Russian







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administered. She unofficially shared these observations with the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities and with Estonians involved in the exam process. Thus, the reports may have contributed to changes in the exam in 1996.

Other projects proposed by participants included an Estonian-Russian project to reforest an area in Estonia destroyed by Russian tanks. This initiative was seen as a way to build confidence between the two groups. One participant suggested a review of the history of the Soviet era in Estonia so more accurate textbooks for schools could be generated to give children a clearer picture of what occurred during Soviet occupation. Several participants saw use in creating courses or units of area studies at Russian and Estonian universities. For example, departments of Finno-Ugric languages and Baltic studies in Russia could help so students and faculty would engage in teaching and research about the other and enhance their appreciation for each other's history, language, and culture.

Although the project's eight university students did not join the process until November 1995 and thus only participated in two workshops, they saw themselves six months later as a unified group of future leaders of Estonia—whether in politics, education, or business. The group's cohesiveness across ethnic lines grew significantly during their training trip to the United States. By 1998, two students had started their own businesses. Another works for

a political party, two are law students, and one has returned to the United States to learn English. Several of the students united for an environmental endeavor, and others planned to work on parts of CSMHI's Pew project. Two students applied for internships at The Carter Center. This young group may serve as a model for older citizens on how to break the generational transmission of stereotype and prejudice.


The CRP/CSMHI's unofficial diplomacy led to increased trust in and acceptance of the neutral but active position of the facilitating group among Estonians, Russians, and international officials. The project received increasing attention and credibility in Estonia, where media interviewed several participants during the fifth workshop. Media in Russia also covered the project. Numerous international officials expressed support for the work, saying it was important that different ethnic groups had a way to unofficially meet to dispel some of the tensions that existed between Estonia and Russia and between Estonians and Russian speakers in Estonia.

In many ways, the CRP/CSMHI project typified a successful INN project, where third-party expertise and an interdisciplinary team achieved optimal results. The workshops represented the only regular, unofficial dialogue process in Estonia that directly addressed the problems between the ethnic groups and brought people together face-to-face to resolve their differences. ■




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After it gained independence in 1991, Estonia faced potential conflict on three levels. First, tension between the Russian and Estonian governments brewed on border issues, the history, and the rights of the Russian minority in Estonia. Second, on the national level, problems arose from Estonia's fairly restrictive citizenship



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<sup>1</sup> A large majority of ethnic Russians in Estonia are either Russian citizens or without any nationality. We use the term “Russian speakers” to refer to Russians in Estonia regardless of legal status and the term “Russian Estonian” to distinguish those of Russian ethnicity who are Estonian citizens. For attitudes of Russian speakers and Russian Estonians, see Appendix D.

<sup>2</sup> For discussion on the role of mediation in changing images of the “other,” see Ayres, 1997, 431-47, and Committee of International Relations, 1987.

<sup>3</sup> Established in Helsinki in 1975, the CSCE was institutionalized at the 1994 Budapest Summit, and its name was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The post of high commissioner on national minorities was created in 1992 following the U.S.S.R.’s dissolution. The high commissioner’s function is to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability, or friendly relations between OSCE participating states.

<sup>4</sup> This section on major issues reflects the perceptions and discussions of workshop participants, not the authors’ beliefs.

<sup>5</sup> In October 1997, Russia proposed a regional security



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<sup>11</sup> For more information on the Round Table on Minorities, see *Forced Migration Projects*, 1996; *American Refugee*, 1997, 14-15. See also Lund, 1996, for discussion on how conflicts may be prevented through moderate leadership, such as that demonstrated by President Lennart Meri.

<sup>12</sup> For more on Estonian and Latvian citizenship, see de Jong, 1995; *Forced Migrations Projects*, 1997; Kamenska, 1995; and Shorr, 1994. See also the *U.N. Development Programme, Population, Refugees, and Migration, Nationality, Ethnicity, and Migration*, 1992. Estonia's citizenship legislation is based on *ius sanguinis* (law of the blood, i.e. one or both parents must be citizens of the country) and naturalization. However, most of the international community's concerns have focused more on the laws' implementation and application than on the legislation itself. For citizenship studies, see *Forced Migration Projects*, 1997; Harlig, 1997; Neu, 1994-96; and Young, 1995.


<sup>13</sup> The Estonia project began after the CSMHI had already gained considerable insight into the Baltic republics through two meetings (one in Kaunas, Lithuania, and one in Riga, Latvia), prior to the first workshop in Estonia. Influential representatives from all three Baltic countries as well as Russia attended. See Volkan, 1992, and Volkan and Harris, 1993. The CRP/CSMHI team included psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, psychologists, former diplomats, political scientists, one historian, one linguist, and one psychiatric nurse. See "List of Key Participants" on pages 6-9.

<sup>14</sup> The meetings were so titled because they were designed to be participatory discussions rather than mediation sessions. In a country such as Estonia, where there has been no armed conflict, using the term "conflict prevention" is controversial because it evokes images of imminent destruction and violence.

<sup>15</sup> The INN has undertaken heads-of-state level mediation missions in Bosnia, Ethiopia, the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, Korea, Liberia, and Sudan. Prior to this, projects typically were short-term and led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The Estonia project represented the first long-term, sustained interconflict mediation mission. See *Forced Migration Projects*, 1997, 14-15.



D





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
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## APPENDIX A

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Estonia is the northernmost of the three Baltic states, sharing its eastern border with Russia and its southern one with Latvia.<sup>1</sup> It covers 45,215 square kilometers, approximately the size of Denmark or the U.S. states of New Hampshire and Vermont combined. Of its roughly 1.5 million population, 65 percent are ethnic Estonians, 29 percent are Russian, and 6 percent have Ukrainian, Belarussian, Scandinavian, or other roots. Historically, Estonia has maintained close links to Finland, with its language from the same Finno-Ugric family. Also, the country is connected to both Finland and Sweden by the Lutheran religion.

Since the early Middle Ages, Estonia has been part of numerous foreign empires and spheres of influence. Vikings overran the territory in the ninth century. The German Teutonic Knights invaded in the 12th century to Christianize the region, and their descendants retained power as feudal barons for centuries. Later, the Danes exerted control over parts of Estonia, as did the Hanseatic League. Rule passed to Sweden in 1561 and to Russia in 1710.

The 19th century brought an era of national awakening. Despite attempts at revolution in 1905, Estonians remained under Russian rule when World War I began in 1914. Initially, Estonia stayed on the periphery of the war, but eventually, the Russian military mobilized a force of some 100,000 Estonians. Twelve-thousand Estonians died in the war.

When the Germans captured Riga in neighboring Latvia in 1917, Estonians feared an invasion. That autumn, Germany took Estonian islands west of the mainland and advanced on Estonia's capital, Tallinn. The Estonian Salvation Committee of the underground assembly announced the Republic of

Estonia on Feb. 24, 1918. Merely 24 hours before, German troops invaded. After Germany's capitulation to the Entente Powers in November, fighting erupted between the Bolshevik Red Army and Estonian forces.

A peace treaty was signed Feb. 2, 1920, in Tartu, Estonia, in which Soviet Russia recognized Estonia's independence unconditionally and for all time. The Republic of Estonia thus became part of the international community, joining the League of Nations in 1921. The Estonian Constitution established it as a democratic parliamentary republic, where the state assembly—the Riigikogu—exercised supreme legislative power. With independence, Estonian society and culture developed rapidly. The growing economy became reoriented toward the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Nordic countries.

In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that decreed the partition of Poland in exchange for Soviet control of the Baltic states. The U.S.S.R. occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, annexing them in June 1940. Between the summers of 1940-41, the Soviets murdered or exiled thousands of Estonian intellectuals, farmers, military personnel, religious leaders, and others.

In 1941, the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, thereby breaking the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Estonia again became a battleground. That year, Soviet and Estonian Communist authorities deported approximately 30,000 people, mostly former Estonian elite and peasantry, to Siberia or elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. Families were divided along battle lines. The Soviets re-established control in 1944, causing mass deportation of Estonians and settling of Russians in



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Estonia. Soviet rule of the Baltic states, though not recognized by most Western states, remained intact until 1991, when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regained independence.

The more than 50 years of Soviet reign destroyed Estonia's economic and political integrity. With incorporation into the U.S.S.R., the small state became communist. As in other Soviet republics, state ownership dominated, and private entrepreneurship was practically nonexistent. The economy was based on labor inflow, mainly from Russia, and on strong trade and production links with the U.S.S.R. Estonia's economic base shifted from agriculture to heavy industry. A relatively well-developed infrastructure, combined with a skilled labor force, led to the establishment of fairly sophisticated industries, making Estonia one of the U.S.S.R.'s most advanced republics.

Soviet communism, particularly dominant until 1953, severely restricted basic rights and freedoms and suppressed political opponents. From 1953-78, local

officials gained some control inside Estonia, where democratic traditions of popular culture and everyday life continued. Estonians condemned abuses of power and offered support to victims.

Pressure for economic and political independence existed in Soviet Estonia, gaining impetus in the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika created an atmosphere for free expression. A law on economic autonomy, approved by the U.S.S.R.'s Supreme Soviet in 1989, paved the way for various reforms.

Unlike Romania's rebellion against a dreaded and powerful leader, Estonia directed its revolution against an occupying "nation," the Soviet Union. Because its leadership was not oppressive and was in tune with people's desire for independence, Estonia did not face a deadly political struggle in breaking away from the



A March 1991 referendum gave clear support for restoring Estonia as an independent republic. Thus, on Aug. 20, Estonia decided to re-establish independence on the basis of historical continuity of statehood. On Sept. 6, the Soviet Union recognized Estonia's independence as well as that of Latvia and Lithuania. Later that month, these three former League of Nations states became members of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

Compared to other post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, Estonia had to not only reform but also recreate its economic, political, and legal structures. A June 1992 referendum supported a new constitution that defined Estonia as a parliamentary democracy. The constitution provided for a 101-member unicameral legislature—the Riigikogu—with a prime minister as head of government, and a president as head of state. The first parliamentary and presidential elections in September 1992 were deemed free and fair. The 1995 elections—marked by the establishment of a genuine multiparty system—resulted in a change of government and peaceful transfer of power.

Despite frequent shifts in the government coalition, there was consensus on developing a liberal market economy. Because huge financial difficulties followed the first years of independence, few believed Estonia would become a viable economy, let alone one of the fastest and most successful reformers among the post-communist states.

After regaining independence, Estonians faced practical and psychological hardships related to their status as former Soviet citizens. Most problematic was the continued presence of thousands of Soviet troops. Other disputes concerned demarcating and administering a new border with Russia, transferring property and infrastructure previously under communist control, and deciding who could become a citizen. Estonians feared that Russians living in Estonia could become a “fifth column” preparing for eventual return



APPENDIX B



APPENDIX C


THE CITIZENSHIP ACT OF ESTONIAN REIDEN  
(BEGINNING OF 1997)

Total Population as of Jan. 1, 1997	1,462,130
Estonian Citizen Passports Issued as of Jan. 1, 1997	956,876
Naturalized Citizens from May 1992 to Dec. 31, 1996	88,534
Residence Permits Issued to Stateless Persons as of Jan. 1, 1997	335,368
Applicants for Alien's Passport as of Feb. 3, 1997	133,646
Alien's Passports Printed or Issued as of Feb. 3, 1997	101,819
Citizens of Other States	Over 16.3( Ov8nreO388nreO388)



APPENDIX D







## ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER

The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering by advancing peace and health worldwide. With a fundamental commitment to human rights, the Center is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center works to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health. The Center collaborates with other organizations, public or private, in carrying out its mission. In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in more than 65 countries.

Charitable contributions from individuals, foundations, corporations, and other donors support the Center's activities. Programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom

downtown Atlanta. Four circular pavilions house offices for the former president and first lady and most of the Center's program staff. The complex includes the Ivan Allen III Pavilion and the nondenominational Cecil B. Day Chapel, other conference facilities, and administrative offices. Adjoining the Center is The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, a repository for the records of the Carter administration, operated by the National Archives and Records Administration of the federal government and open to the public. The



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The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre park two miles east of downtown Atlanta.

teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, and partners in the United States and abroad.

The Center is located in a 35-acre park two miles east of

Center and the Library and Museum are known collectively as The Carter Presidential Center.

More information about The Carter Center is available on the World Wide Web at: [www.cartercenter.org](http://www.cartercenter.org). ■

