

*The Journey to Democracy: 1986-1996*

When I established The Carter Center, I was equally committed to the region. The Carter Center and Emory University recruited Robert Pastor to be director of our Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP). He served as my national security advisor for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs when I was president and has been the principal advisor on the region to Rosalynn and me ever since. An Emory professor and author of 10 books and hundreds of articles on U.S. foreign policy and Latin America, he and his staff have applied considerable energy and creativity to build a program that has had a profound effect on both Latin America and U.S.-Latin American relations.

International Republic Institute, the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations.

As I look back on the last 10 years, I am gratified by what we have accomplished by working together. For example, it was no accident that Nicaragua, Haiti, Guyana, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay all held their first free and fair elections in many years and, in some cases, ever. It took a lot of hard work by the people in each country, and we were pleased to be able to support them. I also am proud of the work The Carter Center did to further democracy in the hemisphere through our work on the debt crisis and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Because of these and other efforts, the hemisphere is a more democratic and just place.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this report to the memory of Daniel Oduber, a great president of Costa Rica and a member of the first Executive Committee of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government. He was a dear friend and an inspiration to all of us.

*Jimmy Carter*

## **INTRODUCTION**

In my travels throughout Latin America, I have always found the region's leaders eager to converse with American statesmen, but with few exceptions, they mostly had to content themselves with speaking to specialists like me. The kind of transnational dialogue that would permit hemispheric relations to rise to a higher level just did not exist. When President Carter asked if I would direct a new program at The Carter Center, my thoughts turned to the question of whether I could help form a group of senior statesmen from throughout the hemisphere, who not only could consult with each other, but also work together to advance the ideals of human rights, democracy, social justice, and equitable development that lie at the core of the inter-American promise.

The United States and Latin America share a hemisphere, but they have often approached problems as if they inhabit two different worlds. The challenge of studying or solving problems in inter-American relations is to find a common

Nicaragua, when he persuaded the Haitian military to step down and permit President Aristide's return. development that lie at the core of the inter- Each of these events, however, was the result of patient and usually confidential consultations and work that began years before. This report aims to place our work in a broader context-to understand what we have tried to do to reinforce democracy, how we have tried to advance inter-American interests and values, as well as what we have done in specific projects, like Nicaragua, Haiti, or Cuba. Of course, nothing that The Carter Center accomplished could have been possible without the leadership and perseverance of President Carter. When fixed on a goal-whether it was democracy in Nicaragua or the restoration of constitutional government in Haiti-no mediator could be as skilled as he, and no one, as Sen. Nunn pointed out, could be as dogged or determined.

From the beginning of the program, I have been fortunate to have a talented, dedicated staff. Some, like Jennifer McCoy, David Carroll, Harriette Martin, and Becky Castle, continue to work with the program; others, like Eric Bord, have joined us on special assignments when we have needed them. Many students and faculty from Emory University also have contributed to different projects over the years.

threshold of the 21st century, the Americas can realize the promise of consolidated democracies tied together into the world's most effective free trade area. We want to contribute to that vision.

Robert A. Pastor  
September 1, 1996

## **TIMELINE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN PROGRAM**

1984

### **October**

Trip to Consult with Leaders in Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Panama (President and Mrs. Carter and Robert Pastor)

1986

### **February**

Trip to Prepare for Conferences on Debt and on Democracy to Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mexico (President and Mrs. Carter and Robert Pastor)

### **April 7-8**

"The Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past or Planning for the Future?"  
Conference Co-Chaired by President Carter and Sen. Howard Baker

### **April 9**

Symposium for Businesses: "U.S. Interests and Opportunities in Mexico"  
Conference Co-Chaired by President Carter, Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, and Mexican Finance Minister Jesus Silva-Herzog

### **Nov. 16-18**

"Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas"  
Conference Co-Chaired by Former Presidents Carter and Gerald Ford



**May 7**

Monitor Elections in Panama (Pre-election visits in March and April) with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and  
1990

**Feb. 25**

Monitor Nicaraguan Elections (five pre-election missions begin July 1989).  
Delegation Led by Hon. Bruce Babbitt Attends Inauguration on April 25, 1990.

**May 16**

Monitoring Elections in the Dominican Republic with the NDI

**Dec. 16**

Monitor Elections in Haiti (five pre-election missions begin in July 1990) with NDI  
1991

**Feb. 7**

Attend President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Inauguration in Haiti

**February-March**

Two Trips to Nicaragua to Assist All Parties to Agree to an Anti-Inflation  
Economic Policy

**May**

Two Visits to Observe Electoral Process in Suriname



**July 12**

Monitor Elections in Chihuahua and Michoacan, Mexico (Electoral monitoring begins in 1986 and continues, involving high-level discussions with Mexican leaders, through August 1994)

**Oct. 5**

Monitor Elections in Guyana (Five pre-election missions begin in October 1990)

**Nov. 4**

Mexican Leaders and Council Members Monitor U.S. Presidential Elections in Georgia  
1993

**August-November**

Co-Sponsor Bipartisan Presidential Commission on NAFTA with Center for Strategic and International Studies (includes conferences in Atlanta and Washington)

**May 9**

Monitor Elections in Paraguay with NDI

**Sept. 22-23**

President Aristide of Haiti Attends Carter Center Conference Co-Sponsored with Academy of Arts & Sciences on "Collective Responses to Regional Problems" (to discuss strategy for restoring constitutional government in Haiti)  
1994

**March-April**

Three-Week Lecture Series Begins with First Woodruff Visting Fellow and Carter Center Visiting Statesman Michael Manley, former Prime Minister of Jamaica

May 8

### **July 4-5**

"Nicaraguan Property Disputes" Conference, Montelimar, Nicaragua, Co-Sponsored with United Nations Development Program  
1996

### **January**

Monitor Palestinian Elections with NDI (Pre-election visits in December 1995)

### **April-July**

Monitor Electoral Process in Dominican Republic with NDI

### **March-October**

Monitor Electoral Process in Nicaragua

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **ONE JOURNEY TO DEMOCRACY**

For as long as he could remember, the man had lived and labored near the Guyana coast, growing rice and sugar cane and raising his family. But for his entire adult life, he had been denied a political voice in his native land. Although the right to elect one's leaders is recognized as an inalienable, universal right by the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization of the American States (OAS), the farmer had never had the opportunity to cast a ballot that he believed would count. He had never voted for the future of his country without fear or intimidation.

Then, on Oct. 5, 1992, the surge of democratization that had swept over Latin America and the Caribbean since 1978 finally arrived in Guyana. Proudly, the man joined thousands of his countrymen in participating in Guyana's first election in nearly 30 years that all parties accepted as free and fair.

This was no overnight political miracle, nor was it the result of a violent revolution. Instead, it was the culmination of efforts by Guyanese and of a two-year effort led by the Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) of The Carter Center. The LACP staffs the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, a group of 27 presidents and prime ministers from throughout the hemisphere, led by Jimmy Carter. Among the Council's representatives who participated either directly or through delegates in monitoring the Guyanese elections were George Price, then prime minister of Belize, former Costa Rican Presidents Oscar Arias and Rodrigo Carazo, former Jamaican Prime Ministers Michael Manley and Edward Seaga, Venezuelan Presidents Rafael Caldera and Carlos Andres Perez, and former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.

For two years and through five high-level missions, the Council mediated electoral reforms among the major Guyanese political parties that permitted all sides to begin to trust the electoral process. The goal was not to force democracy on Guyana but instead to remove perceived and actual barriers to free elections and to reinforce democratic tendencies. As a result of the Council's efforts, the government and the Elections Commission accepted major electoral reforms, which set the stage for a genuinely competitive election.

When the day for voting arrived, most people came to vote peacefully. But by late afternoon, ethnic tensions suddenly broke through the surface and erupted in violence. Bullets sprayed the Elections Commission headquarters; looting broke out in the capital of Georgetown.

Despite the danger, the 65 members of The Carter Center/Council delegation continued to visit polling sites in every region in the country. President Carter went directly to the Elections Commission, which was under assault, to offer his solidarity to Commission Chairman Rudolph Collins and to insist that the police protect the site.

Their confidence in the election process bolstered by the commitment of international observers, Guyanese voters refused to allow the election to be aborted.

In the end, democracy prevailed. Election

All of the democratic leaders remembered President Carter's human rights policy with genuine appreciation. The English-language *Buenos Aires Herald* published an editorial titled: "Thank you, Jimmy," which read: "It was Jimmy Carter's government that did more than any other group of people anywhere for the cause of human rights in Argentina." Lionel Brizola, a presidential candidate and then governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, declared before a large audience: "Millions of Brazilians are delighted that Jimmy Carter should come here so that they can publicly express their immense gratitude for everything he did." At every stop, President Carter heard a similar message, and all encouraged him to re-engage and forge new paths through the current problems in inter-American relations.

At the conclusion of their journeys, Dr. Pastor, who was then teaching international relations as a Fulbright professor at El Colegio de Mexico in Mexico City, accepted a joint appointment as professor of political science at Emory University and director of a new Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) at The Carter Center.

The program began with two major conferences aimed to seek solutions to the debt crisis and generate new ideas to preclude chronic political instability. In both areas, the LACP enlisted the finest scholars in the field and asked them to translate their theories into practical recommendations for policy.

*"In the long run, our national interest, the interests of the inter-American community, and the stability of the international finance system all depend on making the debt burden bearable."*

Sen. Bill Bradley in his proposal for managing debt in the  
hemisphere

The conferences were deliberately bipartisan and policy-oriented. Howard Baker, White House chief of staff under President Reagan and former Senate majority leader, co-chaired the first symposium with President Carter on "The Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past or Planning for the Future?," held April 7-8, 1986.

Supported by the Institute of the Americas and the Rockefeller Foundation, the symposium attracted leading policy-makers, bankers, and economists including Jesus Silva-Herzog, Mexican finance minister; Eduardo Wiesner, Western Hemisphere director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, co-chairman of First Boston International; and David Mulford, U.S. assistant secretary of the treasury.

By the mid-1980s, Latin American debt exceeded \$400 billion, with nations spending an increasing share of their export earnings on debt service. Latin American governments were compelled to impose harsh austerity measures to balance their budgets. The United States also was affected as Latin America had to generate savings by reducing its imports. At the conference, some argued that the debt was manageable and the crisis had passed, but others, notably President Carter, Sen. Baker, and Sen. Bill Bradley, argued that additional steps to reduce and restructure the region's debt were essential to permit the Latin American economies to recover. These issues would be taken up again in three years at the "Hemispheric Agenda" conference, which helped put flesh on the Bush administration's new proposal for relief, the "Brady Plan."

The day after the symposium, President and Mrs. Carter hosted an informal dinner and private briefing on U.S.-Mexican relations for 52 business and foundation executives. The keynote address was delivered by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, who negotiated the Panama Canal Treaties, and whose report on U.S.-Latin American relations in 1976 had a decisive influence on the Carter

U.S.-Mexican relations was led by Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics; Victor Urquidi, former president of El Colegio de Mexico; and Sidney Weintraub, professor





At another point, Sen. Richard Lugar, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House Majority Leader Jim Wright discussed the prospects of a bipartisan approach to Central America. Their hope for such an approach would have to await the arrival of the Bush administration before it would be accepted.

might make a vital contribution," t

length with Gen. Namphy, the interim president, who informed me that he would welcome such an initiative ... to assist that country in its declared intention to return to democracy." That letter was the beginning of a long journey by Haiti and the Council that would begin with a free election in December 1990 and culminate with a 30-hour negotiation in September 1994 by President Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn, Gen. Colin Powell, and Dr. Pastor to restore constitutional government.

While the Council has worked on debt, trade, and other economic issues, its most important contribution has been to reinforce democracy. It has done so primarily by monitoring and mediating elections. Since its creation, the Council has sent representatives to 14 elections throughout the hemisphere. Observers have denounced elections that were fraudulent and celebrated those that were free.

## **REINFORCING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS PARTICIPANTS NOVEMBER 1986**

### *Original Members of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government*

**Raúl Alfonsín**, Argentine President

**Nicolas Ardito Barletta**, former Panamanian President

**Fernando Belaunde Terry**, former Peruvian President

**Errol Barrow**, Prime Minister of Barbados

**Rafael Caldera**, former President of Venezuela

**Jimmy Carter**, 39th President of the United States

**Vinicio Cerezo**, Guatemalan President

**Gerald Ford**, 38th President of the United States

**Oswaldo Hurtado**, former President of Ecuador

**Daniel Oduber**, former President of Costa Rica

**George Price**, former Prime Minister of Belize

**Pierre Trudeau**, former Prime Minister of Canada

*OAS and Latin American Government Officials*

**Luiz Bresser Pereira**, former Finance Minister, Brazil

**Teodoro Petkoff**, Member of the Chamber of Deputies of Venezuela

**Sergio Ramirez Mercado**, Vice President of Nicaragua

**Joao Baena Soares**, Secretary-General, Organization of American States

**Gabriel Valdes**, former Undersecretary General of the United Nations, 1971-81

*U.S. Government Officials*

**Raymond Burghardt**, Director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, National Security Council

**Richard Lugar**, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

**William D. Rogers**, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1974-76

**James Wright**, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives

*Scholars*

**Karl W. Deutsch**, Carter Center Fellow, Emory University

**Tom J. Farer**, Professor of Law, American University

**Joseph Grunwald**, President, Institute of the Americas

**Samuel P. Huntington**, Director, Center for International Affairs at Harvard University

**Juan Linz**, Yale University

**Lorenzo Meyer**, Professor, Center for International Studies of El Colegio de Mexico

**Guillermo O'Donnell**, Academic Director, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame

**Robert Pastor**, Carter Center Fellow and Consultation Director, Emory University

**Thomas E. Skidmore**, Director, Program on Iberian American Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison

**Alfred Stepan**, Dean, School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University

**Laurence Whitehead**, Official Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford University

## CHAPTER THREE

### ELECTION MONITORING AND MEDIATING

In the consultation on "Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas," participants first tried to reach some consensus on a definition of democracy. Some defined it as a worthy end: social justice of self-determination. There are two problems with a goal-oriented definition. First, for democracy to be sustained, a certain distance is needed between the system and its managers. When an administration fails to achieve social justice, the people should hold the incumbent, not democracy, accountable. Second, and more pertinent, a goal-based definition begs the central question of government: *Who decides* the goals, the priorities, and the programs?

That is why the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights refer to "representative democracy" and "periodic and genuine elections." Their definition of democracy is based on processes rather than goals; it can be summarized as a system of government in which *the people choose* their leaders in a free environment, and those leaders exercise authority within the law. Samuel Huntington, a well-known scholar on democracy and Harvard professor, described this definition as "modest"; it is not as captivating or energizing as a utopian definition, but is more likely to guarantee human rights. This civil-society definition encourages a focus on elections and political environments that permit people to make a free choice. Council members discussed the issue and concluded that *democracy should be more than a free election, but it can't be less.*

The moment in which a people freely elect their leaders is a delicate one, and "transitional governments" that have had little or no experience with such elections often find the transition hazardous and difficult. Why? Political parties and leaders are usually suspicious of one another. Opposition skepticism about

the integrity of the electoral process is based on fear that the incumbent could manipulate election officials. The Council came to realize that the greatest contribution they could make in reinforcing democracy was to reduce suspicion and elevate confidence in the electoral process.

Election-monitoring was hardly a new phenomenon. The OAS had sent observers to 19 elections in 15 countries from 1962 to 1982, and the U.S. government had sent observers to numerous elections in Vietnam and El Salvador. But the principal purpose of these missions was to legitimize an election, not to monitor or assess its fairness. Governments generally have broader issues at stake in critical elections than the purity of the process, and so the behavior during these missions is not surprising. With regard to the OAS and the United Nations, however, the essence of their problem was that both sat at the intersection of a contradiction: They defended the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of its members, yet they were committed to universal rights that were often violated by the same members. Faced with this dilemma, the easy path was to be quiet.

But the Council was determined to try a different path. Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuelan president and active Council member, complained that too often, the nonintervention principle allowed "the protection of dictatorships... Nonintervention became a passive intervention against democracy."

As a result of the initiative on Haiti pursued by a founding Council member, Prime Minister Errol Barrow of Barbados, the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council invited Jimmy Carter and Council representatives to visit their country before elections scheduled for November 1987. When two Haitian presidential candidates were assassinated in October of that year, President Carter asked George Price and Robert Pastor to join him there. They met with Gens. Namphy

and Regala of the interim government, members of the Provisional Electoral Council, church and business leaders, and 16 presidential candidates. In their report, the Council team concluded: "Everyone committed to free elections in Haiti expressed gratitude for our visit and said that they believed that continued international attention to the electoral process in Haiti is of the greatest importance... Haitians requested sustained interest and moral and political support from the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government and from the entire international democratic community."

The invitation to observe the election and the clear message that the Council received represented an important change in the definition of sovereignty. In the past, most governments would have rejected international election observers as violators of a sovereign principle; after 1987, one government after another accepted a broader understanding of the role of the international community in sensitive domestic matters such as elections.

In November 1987, George Price led a delegation to Haiti cosponsored by the Council and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), but the military stopped the election after a group of paramilitary thugs, associated with the Armed Forces, massacred 34 voters. Rather than the conclusion of the Council's work in Haiti, its involvement in the fall of 1987 proved to be the beginning of an effort that would culminate in an unprecedented collective endeavor to construct and defend democracy in that country.

### **Preparing for Panama**

One of the toughest political issues that Jimmy Carter tackled as president was the Panama Canal Treaty. Most Americans agreed with Ronald Reagan, who repeatedly said: "We bought the Canal. We paid for it. It's ours, and we should keep it." Sen. S.I. Hayakawa from California put it a little differently: "We stole it, fair and square." Americans were proud of the Canal, but Panamanians resented



the fact that the United States operated a strip of land 10 miles wide down the middle of their country. After 60 years of pleading to no effect for a more equitable relationship, Panamanian nationalism passed the boiling point in January 1964. Riots led to the death of 24 Panamanians and the condemnation of the United States by the OAS.

For the next 13 years, four U.S. presidents negotiated new Canal Treaties. Jimmy Carter completed and signed two treaties in September 1977. The first ended the Canal Zone and promised to gradually cede operational authority of the Canal to Panama until the year 2000, when Panama would gain full control. A second treaty on the Neutrality of the Canal permitted the United States to defend the Canal permanently. Latin American presidents led by Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela and Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica and Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley supported the negotiations and helped both governments to reach an agreement.

As a result of the Treaties, Panamanians had deep respect and affection for President Carter. In the 1980s, when Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega took control of the country and began to impose martial law, many Panamanians turned to Council members Carter, Perez, Oduber, Manley, and others to gain their moral and political support for restoring democracy.

In early February 1989, President Carter met with President Perez, newly inaugurated for a second term, and Panamanian opposition leaders to discuss what the Council could do. They decided to send a pre-election mission to Panama in mid-March to prepare and present a report to the Council at a meeting on March 30, which was co-chaired by former Presidents Carter and Ford. The mission noted serious problems including censorship and intimidation and harassment of political parties, but it also reported that it had received assurances from the government and the military that international observers



ordered the delegation out of the country, after which President Bush invited President Carter and the delegation to the White House for a debriefing. The Council had hoped the election would be fair and accepted by Gen. Noriega.

When he tried to rig the results, the Council's denunciation denied Gen. Noriega's candidacy any legitimacy. Much was learned from the experience, especially that the Council should become involved in the electoral process early, at least six months before the election. Second, it needed to work with all parties to ensure that they would accept the results. The Council soon had an opportunity to apply these lessons.

### **The Road to Democracy in Nicaragua**

President Carter was invited to the 10th anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution, and he asked Dr. Pastor to attend on his behalf and meet with government and opposition leaders to explore whether they might be interested in the Council observing the elections scheduled for Feb. 25, 1990. Dr. Pastor found that he was pushing on an open door. The government respected President Carter and many Council members as impartial observers who would not interfere in an illegitimate way in Nicaragua's internal affairs, and the opposition was very anxious to have the Council observe.

*"Today you fulfill a dream that all Nicaraguans have shared since your country's independence. The dream is of peaceful change-that the presidency of Nicaragua would be transferred in a peaceful ceremony in which the loser was an incumbent and the winner offered reconciliation to him and to all Nicaraguans."*

President Carter in an April 25, 1990, letter to newly elected President Violeta de Chamorro regarding the transfer of power in  
Nicaragua

As president, Jimmy Carter had met with Sandinista leaders, and although the discussions then were frank and difficult, the Sandinistas appreciated his willingness to sit down across a table to negotiate in contrast to the Reagan administration's covert war against them. In February 1986, President Carter spent several days in talks with President Ortega and with other government and opposition leaders in an unsuccessful attempt to jump-start the peace process.

Three years later, Presidents Carter and Carlos Andres Perez had long discussions with Presidents Ortega and Arias about the peace plan. President Ortega pledged to move up the date of his country's election to occur within one year.

The newly elected Bush administration also decided to stop confronting the U.S. Congress on the Nicaraguan issue, to support the Arias Plan, and to press for free elections. In March 1989, Presidents Carter and Perez met with Secretary of State James Baker in Atlanta, and Secretary Baker reaffirmed his administration's commitment to winding down the contra war and allowing some political space for a free election.

The invitations from the Nicaraguan Election Council, the president, and the leaders of the opposition all arrived in mid-August 1989 and, as requested, the Council was granted complete and open access to every stage of the electoral process. In no other case did the Council work so hard as it did in mediating the 1990 electoral process in Nicaragua.

The strategy for relating to Nicaragua's complicated political landscape was based on an extensive analysis developed in the book *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*, written by Dr. Pastor, and published in 1987. The conclusion summarized Nicaragua's historical dilemma and identified an exit:



A delegation 34 members, representing nine Council members from 10 countries and 11 U.S. senators and congressmen from both parties arrived several days before the election on Feb. 25, 1990. In Spanish, President Carter told Nicaraguans to "vote and be confident that your vote will be secret and will count. We are here to make sure of that... We will monitor every step of the process and do parallel vote counts to guarantee that the final results reflect the will of the people."

The delegation divided into 14 teams to visit all nine regions, filling out survey forms that permitted them to assess whether there were any national patterns to electoral irregularities. Eighty-six percent of Nicaraguans who had registered-1.5 million people-voted in a remarkably peaceful demonstration of civic responsibility.

By 10 p.m., the quick count demonstrated that Violeta de Chamorro, the presidential candidate for the opposition coalition UNO, would defeat President Daniel Ortega by a substantial margin. President Carter, the OAS Secretary-General, and Elliott Richardson, head of the U.N. mission, met with President Ortega, whose polls had led him to believe that he would win.

President Carter consoled him by recalling his own loss ("it wasn't the end of the world") and by helping him understand that President Ortega "had also gained a victory. He had taken the initiative to offer his people complete freedom to

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country's history. The inauguration of Violeta de Chamorro as president on April 25, 1990, was a historic event for the people of Nicaragua and a rewarding experience for the Council, which had devoted more time and effort to that election than any other.

### **Haiti, 1990-95**

Other than Nicaragua, the country to which the Council dedicated the most time was Haiti. From the aborted election in 1987 until the summer of 1990, the Haitian military tried to avoid free elections, but the people of the country and the international community did not relent. Finally, in July 1990, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, the provisional president, invited President Carter and the Council to observe the elections scheduled for Dec. 15, 1990. The Council decided to collaborate with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which had been working there for several years.

*intimidation, without violence, and that clearly reflects the will of the people of this country."*

Former Speaker of the House

Jim Wright

Dec. 16, 1990



constitutional government in Haiti, but neither was willing to threaten the kind of force that would compel the Haitian military to take the negotiations seriously.



and Mrs. Carter and Dr. Pastor visited Guyana on Oct. 12-13 and mediated two crucial electoral reforms to permit counting at each voting site and to update registration lists. Over the next two years, subsequent delegations assisted all parties in restructuring the Elections Commission so it could be led by people who were acceptable to all parties.

*"As practically everybody is saying, [free and fair elections in Guyana] would not have happened without the international observer teams, which watched both the preparation and the conduct of the election, and without Mr. Carter's personal involvement. Not only the tTsonset ofo/5t rhoc. Orctically everybody is sayinglly eve 0.gcen0.*



Given Mexico's historical sensitivities and the government's reluctance to invite international observers, the Council approached Mexico's elections indirectly and with some delicacy. It began by inviting human rights activists, like Sergio Aguayo and Miguel Basa\$ez, to participate in its election missions in Haiti and Guyana. These individuals subsequently organized Mexican groups to monitor their elections much as the Council was doing. In the spring of 1992, eight Mexican election-observer groups invited the Council to witness and advise them in their observation of two state elections in Chihuahua and Michoacan. Dr. Pastor consulted with the highest levels of the Mexican government and was told: "We neither approve nor object to the Council sending a mission."

*"The Council of Freely Heads of Government provided an apt summary: 'While positive, the electoral reforms taken as a group fell short of establishing a foundation that would give all parties and all people of Mexico confidence that a genuinely free and fair election would occur in August of 1994.' Founded and led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the Council has acui red great credibility throughout the Americas for its impartiality in election-monitoring. Its judgment on these partial reforms proved all too accurate."*

Jorge Dominguez and James McCann,

*Democratizing Mexico: Pu0 1lectio450.0029 Tw proved all e of 19MC/E0.0001 Tc J-*

Excerpt from the *International Observation of the U.S. Elections*  
report, November 1992

The Council delegation offered advice to the in accordance with a prior agreement, did not comment on the elections per se. The Council then invited a high-level delegation from Mexico to observe the U.S. presidential election in November 1992. When Jimmy Carter cast his vote for the U.S. president in Plains, Ga., Mexican election monitors watched. The group then presented its findings at a panel chaired by President Carter and former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on Nov. 4. While they admired the confidence that Americans had in the electoral system, they offered some specific proposals for improving it. They thought more people would vote if election day was a holiday, and people on the West Coast would be more likely to vote if they did not hear national projections of the outcome based on earlier East Coast results. They also were surprised to find such a decentralized election process where multiple registration lists county-by-county might not prevent a person from registering or voting twice and where the media, not a national authority, announced the results.

Council members continued to offer recommendations privately to Mexican leaders on new electoral reforms through meetings and reports prepared by Council staff and representatives. Two pre-election trips to Mexico in September 1993 and June 1994 analyzed the reform negotiations and preparations for the election. For example, their report in September 1993 concluded that Mexico had not yet chosen between two fundamental paths of political reform: "One leads to a new formula for dividing power between the political parties. This is the traditional road in Mexico. Another road leads toward full respect for the secret vote and acceptance of the uncertain outcome that is a part of the democratic process."

Continued consultations finally led the Mexican government to make substantial reforms and to invite international observers for the first time to the Aug. 21,

1994, presidential elections. But the invi

reluctant to give up power since 1966, when he won the presidential election after a U.S. invasion.

Former President Juan Bosch, leader of an opposition party, phoned President Carter in late April 1990 to ask if he would observe the elections slated for May 16, 1990. President Carter had impressed Dr. Bosch when the Carter administration issued a strong protest over the suspension of the vote count in the 1978 Dominican presidential election.

President Carter said he would not monitor the Dominican elections if he were not invited by the government or the elections board. Just eight days before the election, the Central Election Board (JCE) formally invited President Carter, and he decided to go with a small team, including Council Vice Chairman George Price, and NDI representatives.

After President Carter arrived, Dr. Bosch told him he expected problems, but "because you [Carter] are here, there will be no fraud. Your presence will prevent that." The delegation did not have time to review the voter registration list, but the group asked leaders of the four major political parties about possible irregularities and none presented documented evidence of fraud. In fact, all candidates indicated that they would accept the results of a fair election. The election was very close, and Dr. Bosch accused President Balaguer of fraud. The Carter delegation monitored the computer center and found a number of serious errors but no evidence of a bias in them. On May 24, President Balaguer was officially declared the winner by 1.2 percent. President Carter asked the opposition parties to produce evidence of fraud that would have altered the outcome but never received any.

For the 1994 election, NDI sent a delegation led by former Congressman Stephen Solarz. This time, the opposition parties were better organized to detect



the fraud, and they did. Rep. Solarz denounced the election, and the parties negotiated a constitutional change that permitted President Balaguer to remain in office for two instead of four years and made him ineligible to run in 1996.

"There is no doubt that aspects of the May 16 elections were flawed. All parties, as well as the JCE, acknowledged irregularities in the process. At the same time, despite the close outcome, the delegation was not presented with evidence that indicated sufficient irregularities in the balloting and counting process to invalidate President Balaguer's victory."

Excerpt from the *NDI/Carter Center 1990 Dominican Republic Report*

For the May 16, 1996, election, the Council and NDI teamed up again for a pre-election visit and first and second round election observation delegations. The first election went smoothly, but none of the three principal presidential candidates won a majority. As mandated by the constitutional changes instituted after the 1994 elections, a second round was held on June 30. In the weeks before the second round, the polls showed a statistical dead heat between Leonel Fernández of the PLD and José Francisco Peña Gómez of the PRD. Council and NDI representatives met with both candidates on the night of the elections as the quick count revealed a close race, but one that Dr. Fernández was likely to win. Dr. Peña Gómez pledged that he would accept the results, and Dr. Fernández promised magnanimity. Both made good on their promises the next day when the Election Board announced Dr. Fernández's victory by a vote of 51.25 percent to 48.75 percent. The statesmanlike concession by Dr. Peña Gómez and the words of conciliation by President-elect Fernández made the June 30 election historic for the Dominican Republic.

## **Paraguay, 1993**

Paraguay elected Gen. Andres Rodriguez in 1989 after a coup ousted Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, who had ruled the country since 1954. The question was whether the election scheduled for May 1993 would be fair or controlled by the Colorado Party, the party of Gens. Stroessner and Rodriguez. During the campaign, Commanding Gen. Lino Oviedo stated that the military would continue to be allied with the Colorado Party. In a country "just emerging tenuously from dictatorship, it [the statement] was truly intimidating and threatening," President Carter stated.

On April 27, President Carter, on behalf of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, received a letter from the three presidential candidates urging the Council to observe the upcoming election. "Because of your achievements as a champion of world democracy and a symbol of the defense of human rights," the letter read, "you will be the most significant witness of these elections and will strengthen the ties of friendship and common ideals between the people of Paraguay and the United States."

On May 4, President Carter, joined by former Costa Rica President Rodrigo Carazo, led a 31-member international team cosponsored by NDI. The free elections were threatened by sabotage and fraud. Telephone lines used by a local monitoring organization conducting a parallel vote count were cut temporarily, and a few volunteers trained to observe the vote counts and deliver the results were physically barred from some voting tables.

Despite the problems, the international delegation found that the electoral process was satisfactory at 92.5 percent of the sites surveyed and that the irregularities weren't significant enough to affect the election outcome. Indeed, the quick count confirmed the results.

Juan Carlos Wasmosy was elected president, and power was transferred peaceably to a civilian president for the first time in many decades. With this election, every country in South America had held free, competitive elections.

### **The Return to Panama, 1994**

Following the fraudulent election of 1989, which President Carter and the team of Council election monitors had denounced, the United States invaded Panama and arrested Manuel Noriega for illegal drug activity. Guillermo Endara, winner of the May 1989 election, was then sworn in as president.

Like Paraguayans, Panamanians were still fearful and uncertain whether the election scheduled for May 8, 1994, would be successful, so they invited the Council to observe. A pre-election mission in April found widespread support for the Electoral Tribunal but with some cacEMC/P h07 TMay 1989 election, was thend supegal dru0.0

*"All three of our groups (the OAS, CAPEL, The Carter Center) share the view that this election was one of the best organized and successful we have ever seen."*

Comments by Jimmy Carter speaking as a representative of the Council in a May 9, 1994, Panama departure statement

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE HEMISPHERIC AGENDA**

Although reinforcing democracy became the centerpiece of its work, the Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) pursued the entire hemispheric agenda from its inception. In the mid-1980s, the United States was preoccupied with Nicaragua and El Salvador, and Latin America was focused on its debt crisis. There was hardly any genuine communication, let alone cooperation, between the United States and its neighbors. The LACP chose debt as its first conference topic for two reasons: first, to show the region that some in the United States were ready to listen to their concerns and respond to their agenda; and second, to try to press governments toward tangible, comprehensive solutions such as debt relief combined with economic reforms and new funding.

The region was already in the midst of a very painful economic adjustment. A new generation of "technicos"-many with PhDs from top American universities-moved into key economic positions and altered development strategies from those that relied on an import-substitution model to those based on an open-economy, export-promotion model. The international community was slow to respond.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled in 1988 for the United States, Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, and Jamaica. Council members hoped that the election of a new set of leaders could put an end to the past eight years of confrontation. The LACP decided to prepare for the change by enlisting

candidates and their representatives in each of these countries to find new solutions to the outstanding issues of Central America, debt, and drug trafficking. The Executive Committee of the Council met in October 1988 with representatives of leading candidates from several countries, and the participants fleshed out an agenda with specific proposals. These were addressed at a conference on "The Hemispheric Agenda" on March 29-30, 1989. Former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford co-chaired the meeting. Secretary of State James Baker also participated, using the forum to give his first address on U.S. policy toward Latin America and become acquainted with two active Council members, Carlos Andres Perez and Michael Manley, who had just been re-elected president of Venezuela and prime minister of Jamaica.

*"I believe Latin America's democratic leaders are reaching out to the United States to offer a new partnership built on mutual respect and shared responsibility."*

Secretary of State James A. Baker III

March 1989

Secretary Baker's address showed that the prior consultations had helped the Bush administration to break with the confrontational approach of its predecessor. "We need each other now," Secretary Baker said. "Latin America's democratic leaders are reaching out to the United States to offer a new partnership... I am here on behalf of a new president with our answer: We are reaching back to you." He also spoke of the "democratic wave sweeping Latin America today," the movement toward freer markets and less state intervention in the economy, and the need for cooperation on drugs, debt, and Central America.

Participants in the consultation, which included all of the newly elected leaders or their representatives, forged a consensus on the need for an invigorated

approach to debt reduction so that Latin America could accelerate growth and economic reforms. This proposal became the heart of the Bush administration's "Brady Plan." Secretary Baker committed the Bush administration to supporting the Arias Plan for peace in Central America; the discussion focused on ways to ensure it would be implemented. Without a system of incentives for compliance and sanctions for noncompliance, it would be difficult to move the plan forward. In the end, the Arias Plan was implemented through the mediated electoral process in Nicaragua and U.N.-sponsored negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Although the Mexican foreign minister insisted that democracy should not be exported, the rest of the participants agreed that collective action in defense of democracy was essential and unilateral action undesirable. Some discussed a renewed version of the "Betancourt Doctrine" by which the democratic governments would increase pressure on dictators to change. The OAS approved part of this proposal in June 1991 and another part in December 1992. Everyone agreed that the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government should play an active role in monitoring elections. It would prove to play a far larger role in Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Guyana than anyone had anticipated at the time.

*"We used to say economic reform was just something the U.S. wanted. Now we see we need it for our own sake. People said drugs are a U.S. concern, not our worry. Now we see we need controls even more than you. We are more vulnerable to these vicious people and we need help. This is the greatest criminal conspiracy we've ever known. There has to be an international response. It affects individuals, society, and above all democracy."*

Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley, 1989

The Council encouraged strengthening of the inter-American system by inviting Canada, Belize, and Guyana to join. All did so in the next three years. Discussion of how to reintegrate Cuba in the inter-American system was split. Latin America wanted to pursue this initiative; the United States believed that more pressure on Cuba was needed. Finally, the group discussed new modes of cooperation and coordination, particularly in the OAS, to stop drug trafficking, and OAS cooperation on drug trafficking did improve.

*"The most valuable asset of the '80s is democracy. But that asset, which is so dear to our people, is running serious risk as a result of the economic crisis, aggravated by the catastrophic impact of the external debt."*

Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Pezer, March 1989

### **Economic Approaches to Consolidate Democracy**

In early election-monitoring missions, the Council realized that its effectiveness required involvement in the country long before the election. In large part because of its experience in Haiti, the Council decided to work with newly elected governments to ensure that the fruits of new elections would not fall prematurely. The LACP developed projects to sustain young democracies, beginning in countries where it had previously worked. In Nicaragua, the newly elected government faced a crisis of hyper-inflation and requested the help of the Council. In March 1991, President Carter traveled to Managua and helped forge a consensus that brought inflation down from five figures to single digits.

Three years later, at the invitation of President Violeta de Chamorro, The Carter Center sent several expert delegations to Nicaragua to help all sides resolve their differences on the property issue that had inhibited foreign and domestic investment. Teams visited the country in June, August, and November 1994, offering ideas on how to organize the courts to better deal with property issues

and to construct mediation alternatives. Then, on July 4-5, 1995, a historic meeting was held. Co-sponsored with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), led by President Carter and Belize Prime Minister George Price, and supported by LACP staff Jennifer McCoy and Robert Pastor, the conference forged a broad consensus on the following principles:

small beneficiaries of urban and agrarian reforms should be protected;  
former owners should be compensated with improved bonds;  
recipients of larger properties should either pay for the properties or return them;  
those who abused property laws during the last months of the Ortega government should be prosecuted.

After the Guyana elections in October 1992, The Carter Center devised a new approach to coordinating development efforts called the "Global Development Initiative." The government of Guyana chose to become the pilot project for designing a detailed strategy for developing all the productive and social sectors in the economy. International donors welcomed increased coordination. Guyana worked with them and Carter Center representatives on a plan presented by President Cheddi Jagan and discussed by opposition leader and former President Desmond Hoyte and international donors at a major conference at The Carter Center on June 6, 1996.

### **North America and Freer Trade**

Throughout its existence, the Latin American and Caribbean Program has conducted research and policy analysis on regional trading systems and on collective responses to regional problems. The proposal for a free-trade area between the United States and Mexico was not a new idea; it had been broached at different times by U.S. officials for nearly 100 years. Dr. Pastor raised it again in August 1978 in conversations with Carlos Salinas, then a middle-level official in Mexico's budget ministry. Mr. Salinas rejected the idea then and still was not interested in 1988 when he took office as president.



In the spring of 1990, however, President Salinas changed his mind and proposed a free-trade agreement with the United States. He said he did so for three reasons. First, Europe and Japan did not want to provide sufficient investment to stimulate Mexico's economy. Second, Mexico had lowered its tariffs to fight inflation. Third, he feared that the United States was becoming protectionist. President Salinas wanted to make sure the U.S. market would remain open to Mexican goods.

Canada had concluded a free-trade agreement with the United States two years before and decided to make the negotiations trilateral. The goal of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was to reduce and eventually eliminate all trade and most investment barriers between the United States, Mexico, and Canada by the year 2005.

The Carter Center began several research projects on the subject. One study conducted with faculty and students from the Emory University's Goizueta Business School analyzed the implications of NAFTA for Georgia and the southeastern United States. A second, more extensive study written by Dr. Pastor for the Twentieth Century Fund analyzed the Bush-Salinas agreement and proposed some modifications on labor and environmental issues that newly elected president Bill Clinton could consider. The Clinton administration negotiated many of the proposals as side agreements. Dr. Pastor's study also analyzed the longer-term implications of integrating such different economies as Mexico and the United States. He proposed a North American Development Bank (which was approved by the U.S. Congress) and new modes of coordination among the three countries to prevent anticipated financial or social problems.

At the inaugural conference on NAFTA in 1992, participants discussed the prospect of extending NAFTA to the rest of the hemisphere and whether it would

be a roadblock or a building block to the approval of a stronger world trade system. LACP research argued for extending NAFTA to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was more likely to be completed if NAFTA was approved than if it failed. (GATT was completed soon after NAFTA passed, and the Summit of the Americas in December 1994 decided to extend NAFTA to the entire hemisphere.)

In October 1993, The Carter Center announced it would co-sponsor "The NAFTA and Beyond Commission: Implications for the American Economy" with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chaired by former U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, George Bush, and Ronald Reagan, the commission addressed the implications of NAFTA for the American economy and its relations with Mexico and Latin America. Dr. Pastor served as senior advisor to the group. The presidents pledged to lead a group of academic, civic, political, and business leaders to help Americans understand that NAFTA represented a significant and positive step forward for the United States and hemispheric relations. The Commission was invited to discuss its findings with President Clinton at the White House.



November 16, 1993

five years; the five of us often had occasion to differ with each other. On the issue of the North American Free Trade Agreement, however, we are united in our belief that its approval is crucial for our nation.

Like you, we have all experienced the loneliness of making difficult decisions that were unpopular. We know that a vocal minority have been effective in making known their opposition to NAFTA. We ask you not to confuse their noise with public opinion and not to confuse the insecurity of the moment with the long-term interests of our country.

We acknowledge that there can be honest differences of opinion about the short-range impact on specific industries. However, there is no doubt that from a long-term perspective, NAFTA will

NAFTA represents a turning point for America. If you vote against it, the role of the United States in the world economy will be severely damaged and the prosperity of our United States will be

We all went into public life to do the right thing. The right thing for America is to approve NAFTA. If you are a member of Congress, you are in a position to make a difference. If you are a citizen, you are in a position to make a difference. If you are a member of Congress, you are in a position to make a difference. If you are a citizen, you are in a position to make a difference. If you are a member of Congress, you are in a position to make a difference. If you are a citizen, you are in a position to make a difference.

unite to be in the Congress at this moment. Your decision will be historic, and if you approve the agreement, you will be proud of that decision. Like our courageous forefathers who signed our nation's declaration of independence, you have the opportunity to sign the right side of America's history.

Sincerely,

*Richard Nixon*  
*Gerald R. Ford*  
*Jimmy Carter*

*Ronald Reagan*

*George H.W. Bush*

In November 1993, shortly before the U.S. House of Representatives approved NAFTA, the LACP held a conference that examined the pros and cons of NAFTA. President Carter joined with former Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush in signing a letter to all members of Congress, urging them to approve NAFTA. Never before in American history had five former presidents sent a letter to Congress. The letter acknowledged that the five ex-presidents had their

differences, but "on the issue of the North American Free Trade Agreement, however, we are united in our belief that its approval is crucial for our nation." In 1996, the LACP began two research projects related to Mexico and North America. Working with the Instituto

**"Is NAFTA a Watershed?" Feb. 18, 1992**

**Moderator**

**Robert A. Pastor**, Director and Fellow, Latin American and Caribbean Program,  
The Carter Center

**Panel Participants**

Peru insisted that the 1,000-mile border between the two countries was established by the 1942 Protocol of Rio treaty. Ecuador contended that the -95 0 Td4 Td5(Rio agr

at the inauguration of Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez in February 1989.

The climate was not propitious to advance the agenda then, but in early 1995, The Carter Center tried a second time. Led by President Carter, the LACP began a confidential and intense set of consultations with U.S. senators and congressmen, senior officials from the executive branch, and members of the full political spectrum of the Cuban-American community. None of the groups discouraged The Carter Center, and most of them encouraged it to pursue a dialogue with Cuba to try to narrow differences between the two countries and increase the prospects for democratization on the island.

Following an initial round of talks, Dr. Pastor traveled in May 1995 to Cuba for meetings with President Fidel Castro, Vice President Carlos Lage, and other Cuban officials as well as Cuban dissidents, religious leaders, and members of the human rights community. Follow-up meetings, however, were aborted after the Cuban Air Force shot down two American civilian planes in February 1996. This tragedy led to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, which froze the dysfunctional relationship between the United States and Cuba and made any future discussion very difficult.

The LACP also has used dialogue to try to gain the release of political prisoners. On a wide range of human rights cases throughout the hemisphere, the LACP worked closely with The Carter Center's Human Rights Program. It also has advised The Carter-Menil Human Rights Foundation, proposing a number of candidates for the Carter-Menil Prize. Several from Latin America won, including the Vicaria de Solidaridad of Chile; Amilcar Mendez and the Consejo de Comunidades Etnicas Ranujel Juran (CERJ), an Indian organization in Guatemala; the six Jesuit priests who were assassinated in El Salvador; and the Grupo de Apoyo, a mutual support group of human rights organizations in

Guatemala, who united to help relatives of people who had been kidnapped or had disappeared.

### **Collaborative Research Projects**

In many of its projects, the LACP has collaborated with a host of research and policy institutions, governments, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. One particularly fruitful collaboration was with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), based in Cambridge, Mass.

Carl Kaysen, a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and deputy national security advisor to President Kennedy, invited Dr. Pastor to join an AAAS project to examine the shifting boundaries between national sovereignty and international obligations in the post-Cold War era. How far should the United Nations go if Iraq fails to fulfill its international obligation to dismantle all weapons of mass destruction? What should the OAS do in the event of a military coup against a constitutional government that had pledged to defend its neighbors' democracies? These questions were examined in conferences and books on *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention* and on *Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean*. The latter conference was held at The Carter Center in September 1993. Participants included President Carter, exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark, and senior representatives of the U.S., Venezuelan, and Costa Rican governments. Participants discussed the need for collective intervention to restore democracy to Haiti. The proposed strategy was implemented one year later.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **THE FUTURE**

Latin America has undergone profound changes in the last decade—from a region trying to escape debts, civil wars, and military dictatorships to one led by



democratically elected leaders, working on similar social and economic issues, and committed to forging a hemispheric-wide free-trade area. The United States has changed as well. With the end of the Cold War and the rise in the salience of economic, social, and trade issues, the United States has been compelled to look at its relations in a different light. This presents to all those who care about the future of hemispheric relations new opportunities and grounds for hope.

A decade ago, military dictators ran Panama, Chile, Paraguay, Suriname, and Haiti, and elections in Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Mexico were viewed widely as rigged. The Carter Center has played a significant role in each of these countries, and the results have been breathtaking. The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government helped secure the first free elections in Guyana in nearly three decades, mediated the first free election and peaceful transition of power in Nicaragua, robbed the Noriega regime of legitimacy, and helped secure democratic gains in Panama.

The military has returned to the barracks in all of these countries, and today, democrats govern in Panama, Nicaragua, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, and the Dominican Republic. In Haiti, human rights are far more respected now than at any time in its history, and electoral reforms have brought Mexico to the threshold of free elections that could be acceptable to all the major parties. Cuba showed the beginning of a political opening, but that was closed in February 1996, hopefully temporarily. The success and international respect of the LACP/Council's work in promoting democratization through election monitoring has been recognized and institutionalized over the past 10 years-especially in "first elections" and in countries torn by longstanding political enmity or civil violence.

The techniques that the Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) has developed in the hemisphere have increasingly been used in other regions. In

December 1995 and January 1996, LACP staff played an active role in the organization of election monitoring in the West Bank and Gaza. Algerian leaders have consulted with the program on the same subject, and the program has offered advice on elections in Africa and Asia, and will continue to do so.

The hemisphere's agenda has changed, even on democratization. There are fewer "transitional countries" in the hemisphere that have had little or no experience in free elections. The political issues relate more to governability than to the transfer of power. The economic agenda has shifted from debt to trade; the security issues from civil war to arms control; the social agenda has risen in importance.

### **The Americas in the 21st Century-The New Agenda**

In light of the dramatic changes in the hemisphere, the LACP/Council believes it is critically important to chart a new c

energize the Summit of the Americas process by proposing concrete policy recommendations and other actions for governments as well as the Council and other NGOs. The agenda set out at the December 1994 Summit of the Americas is the natural point of departure.

Based on its previous work and study, the LACP/Council believes that its 1997 Hemispheric Agenda Conference should focus on the following five sets of issues: (1) trade and other economic matters, which were the centerpiece of the 1994 Americas Summit; (2) security and arms control; (3) democracy and human rights; (4) the social agenda; and (5) the old agenda, notably Cuba, revolutionaries in Colombia, and bases in Panama.

In addition to addressing the key hemispheric issues above, the Hemispheric Agenda Conference will provide an opportunity for the LACP/Council and staff to discuss possible steps that the Council could take to further institutionalize its work and to expand its influence in the region. Over the last 10 years, the Council has provided an effective means for former and current presidents and prime ministers of the Americas to help advance universal values such as democracy and human rights and to help solve conflicts. In the coming years, the LACP hopes to expand and intensify the work of the Council and to ensure that its work reflects a genuinely hemispheric approach. Some of the possible steps that might be considered are to establish regional offices in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America and to seek collaborative relationships with organizations in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada. Although the LACP has had a clear strategy and agenda, much of its most exciting and innovative work has come from requests and unanticipated opportunities from leaders in the region. Mindful of that fact, the LACP will remain open to new ideas and directions where it can make a difference.

Ten years from now, the hemisphere will hopefully be more united, modern,

relations from the University of South Carolina. He holds a B.S. in finance from Northern Illinois University.

**Jennifer McCoy** is the LACP's senior research associate and an associate professor of political science at Georgia State University. She was director of The Carter Center's Managua office during the 1990 Nicaraguan elections and associate director of the LACP from 1987-88. She is the author of articles on election monitoring and the Latin American democratization process. Dr. McCoy received her Ph.D. in political science from the University of Minnesota and her B.A. in political science and Spanish from Oklahoma State University in 1978.

**Becky Castle** joined the LACP as program coordinator in February 1996. Prior to joining The Carter Center, she worked in international marketing. In 1993, as a Rotary Ambassadorial Fellow, she lived and studied in Costa Rica and worked for Fundaci#n Mujer, an NGO that gives training and loans to small businesses. Ms. Castle received her B.A. in political science from Middlebury College.

**Harriette Martin** has been the LACP's administrative assistant since 1993. She has been involved in organizing election monitoring activities and conferences on NAFTA. Ms. Martin attended Brenau College and Catholic University in Quito, Ecuador.

#### **Latin American and Caribbean Program Staff Since 1986**

**Eric Bord**

### **Administrative Assistants**

**Diane Diaz-1986-88**

**Sandy Reiss-1988-90**

**Giselle Apostle-1990-91**

**Felicia Agudelo-1991-93**

### **ITOCHE Corporation Representatives**

**Ted Iino**, Executive Advisor to The Carter Center (1989-July 1992)

**Yukio Sekiguchi**, Executive Advisor to The Carter Center (July 1992-July 1994)

**Yasuo Yoshioka**, Executive Advisor to The Carter Center (September 1994-Present)

## **APPENDIX II**

### **The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government**

The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government is a group of 27 current and former heads of government from throughout the Americas. The Council was

first such elections in 28 years. Since the elections, the Council has worked to help consolidate democracy in Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti. In addition to reinforcing democracy, the Council has supported efforts to resolve the debt crisis of the 1980s, and to promote freer trade in the 1990s. Members have worked to resolve property disputes in Nicaragua and the Ecuador-Peru territorial dispute, among other issues.

### **The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government**

**Jimmy Carter**, Chairman of the Council, former U.S. President (1977-81)

**George Price**, Vice-Chairman, former Prime Minister of Belize (1981-84, 1989-93; Premier, 1965-81)

**Ernesto Pérez Balladares**, President of Panama (1994-present)

**Rafael Caldera**, President of Venezuela (1969-1974, 1994-present)

**Carlos Saúl Menem**, President of Argentina (1989-present)

**P.J. Patterson**, Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-present)

**Julio María Sanguinetti**

**Luis Alberto Lacalle**, former President of Uruguay (1989-95)

**Alfonso López Michelsen**, former Colombian President (1974-78)

**Michael Manley**, former Jamaican Prime Minister (1972-80, 1988-92)

**Carlos Andrés Pérez**, former Venezuelan President (1974-79, 1989-93)

**Erskine Sandiford**, former Prime Minister of Barbados (1987-94)

**Edward Seaga**, former Jamaican Prime Minister (1980-88)

**Pierre Trudeau**, former Canadian Prime Minister (1968-79, 1980-84)

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **LACP, The Carter Center, and Emory University**

From its inception, the Latin American and Caribbean Program (LACP) has sought to involve graduate and undergraduate students and faculty. Dr. Pastor served as director of the Latin American and Caribbean Studies (LACS) program on the Emory University campus from 1987-91. Drs. Pastor, McCoy, and Carroll remain active on the LACS Committee and lecture in LACS courses. The LACP has encouraged faculty participation in its activities. Several faculty have played important roles, especially Juan del Aguila of the political science department, Jeffrey Rosensweig of the Goizueta Business School, and Susan Socolow of the history department.

In coordination with the LACP, the Goizueta Business School has developed a unique program for selected graduate students to develop a special capacity for Latin American studies. The following students have participated in the program and have conducted their research at The Carter Center: Kathryn Kemp, Michael Discenza, Tamara Markowitz, and Brooke Lindsey.

Emory University and the LACP also created a Distinguished Visiting Statesman Program. Michael Manley, former Jamaican prime minister and Council member, was the first statesman to visit Emory and The Carter Center under this program from March 14-April 1, 1994. During his visit, Prime Minister Manley delivered



three public lectures and conducted a seminar class with Emory students. He also participated in a series of meetings with President Carter, LACP/Council staff, and other Carter Center program staff to offer advice on possible LACP/Council initiatives in the region.

The Carter Center also offers Graduate Research Assistantships to outstanding graduate students. Originally, these assistantships were created to strengthen the bond between The Carter Center and Emory University. Consistent with the initial purpose, most of the LACP's graduate assistants have been doctoral students in political science at Emory. Graduate assistants have participated in election monitoring projects, large research projects, and preparation for conferences. All were from Emory University and include:

**1996:** Marc Craighead, Ph.D. Student in Political Science

**1995:** Robin Gault, Ph.D. Student in Political Science

**1994:** Alma Idiart, Ph.D. Student in Sociology

**1993:** Svetlana Savranskaya, Ph.D. Student in Political Science

**1992:** Kjersten Walker, Ph.D. Student in Political Science

**1991:** Jennifer Cannady, Ph.D. Student in Political Science

**1990:** Frank Boyd, Ph.D. Student in Political Science

In spring 1996, Emory created a new course, "Public Policy and Nongovernmental Organizations," in an effort to study the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the post-Cold War world and their work in transforming ideas into public policy. In addition to lectures by the course professors, Dr. Pastor and Steve Hochman (President Carter's historian), specialists with experience in and knowledge of NGOs delivered lectures including former President Jimmy Carter and former Ambassador and Director General of the Foreign Service Harry Barnes. Emory students also can take advantage of lectures sponsored at The Carter Center, which in the past have

included distinguished speakers such as Oscar Arias, Gert Rosenthal, P.J. Patterson, and Nicolas Ardito-Barletta.

The principal way in which the LACP relates to Emory University, however, is through the internship program, which provides undergraduates an opportunity to work directly in the program while gaining credit for a class. Emory students predominate in the fall and spring semesters, but in the summer, the LACP accepts interms from universities thr

**1990:** Frank Boyd, Jose del Campo, Emile de Felice, Robert Frost, Ivonne Mena, Marcello Presser, Steve Rao, Elizabeth Scott, Gerald Wood

**1986-89:** Felicia Altman, Jose Amoros, Michael Beck, Joseph Bellon, Carolyn Bence, Kenneth Brandeis, Cindy Cuttler, Donna Demenus, Leticia Farias, Reid Flamer, Yvette Garcia, Amy Gittleman, Amy Gottsche, Joseph Huey, Bradley Katz, Deanna Kerrigan, Amy Lesnick, Anna-Lena Neld, Kimberly Olsen, Daniel Soles, Rook Soofian, Brigette Vincent

## **APPENDIX IV**

**Election Reports and Related Publications by the Latin American and Caribbean Program of The Carter Center and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government**

### **Election Reports**

#### **Haiti, 1987**

"Report on Visit to Haiti, Oct. 22-23, 1987." Atlanta, Ga.: The Council of Freely

### **Dominican Republic, 1990**

"1990 Elections in the Dominican Republic: Report of an Observer Delegation." Washington, D.C.: The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, The Carter Center, 1990.

### **Nicaragua, 1989-90**

"Report on Pre-Election Trip to Nicaragua, Sept. 16-18, 1989." Atlanta, Ga.: The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, The Carter Center, 1989.

"Report on Pre-Election Trip to Nicaragua, Oct. 20-23, 1989." Atlanta, Ga.: The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, The Carter Center, 1989.

"Observing Nicaragua's Elections, 1989-1990." Atlanta, Ga.: The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, The Carter Center, 1990.

### **Haiti, 1990**

"The 1990 General Elections in Haiti." Washington, D.C.: The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, The Carter Center, 1991.

### **Guyana, 1990-92**

"Report on Pre-Election Trip to Guyana, Oct. 12-13, 1990." Atlanta, Ga.: The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, The Carter Center, 1990.

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## APPENDIX V

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## **APPENDIX VI**

### **Some Participants in Conferences and Election-Monitoring Missions**



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